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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C & A DEVELOPMENT CO., an
Arizona corporation and C & A
ENTERPRISES, an Arizona
partnership,
Appellants,

NO.

20676

vs.
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership,
GARY WORTHINGTON and EDWIN N. KIMBALL,
general partners,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
and
OTTO BUEHNER & CO.,
Defendant and Appellee.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This is an action arising out of construction of a
manufacturing plant.

Plaintiffs seek confirmation of an arbitra-

tion award and enforcement of a mechanics lien.
Defendant, Otto Buehner & Company, seeks enforcement of its
mechanics lien and damages in contract against Plaintiffs.
Defendant, Joseph Smith Plumbing, seeks damages in contract
against Plaintiffs.

Defendants, C & A Enterprises and C & A

Development Co. seek vacation of the arbitration award and
Defendant, C & A Enterprises, seeks damages from Defendant, Otto
Buehner & Company, for its negligence.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The arbitration award was confirmed on Plaintiffs1
Motion.

The District Court held that the cross-claim of C & A

Enterprises against Otto Buehner & Company was barred by collateral estoppel.

The mechanics lien of Otto Buehner & Company was

granted but the lien of Plaintiffs was denied.

Joseph Smith

Plumbing was awarded damages in contract against Plaintiffs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants herein seek reversal of the judgment and
remand to the District Court with instructions to vacate the
arbitration award and to permit Appellant, C & A Enterprises, to
pursue its cross-claim against Otto Buehner & Company.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 12, 1984, the District Court for Weber County
confirmed an arbitration award in favor of Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co.

Record at pp. 160-161.

Said Appellee

had moved to confirm the award (Record at 41-43) within the time
provided by statute.

The motion had been opposed by Appellants

who also moved the court to vacate the award.

Record at 69-70.

Trial was held with respect to additional claims of the parties
which were not concluded by confirmation of the arbitration award.
The trial resulted in the Corrected Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Record at 1116-1137) and a Corrected Order, Judgment
and Decree of Foreclosure (Record at 1108-1115) on April 18, 1985.
The arbitration award provided for "interest11 to
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. (referred to as

the contractor in the award) at fifteen percent (15%) from
December 1, 1982.

Record at 48-49, paragraph 7.

The District

Court refused to enforce the fifteen percent (15%) "interest"
award made by the arbitrators because it found that that portion
of the award, while denominated by the arbitrators as "interest",
was apparently intended as a penalty.
paragraph 33.

Record at 722 and 1130,

The District Court therefore granted Appellee,

Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., interest at the rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum on their Judgment against Appellants.
Record at 1109-1110, paragraph 1.
The arbitrators had specified in the award that the
fifteen percent (15%) "interest" was in part a measure of damages
to Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. for the unreasonable
withholding of the balance of the contract price.
4 8-49, paragraph 7.

Record at

The District Court's determination that the

"interest" was in fact a penalty was based on the language of the
award itself.

Record at 1227, lines 8-9.

By its terms, the arbitration award was not payable by
Appellants (referred to as the owner in the award) until Appellee,
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., filed with the American
Arbitration Association lien waivers from the contractor and all
its subcontractors.

Record at 49, paragraph 9.

The contract

between Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. and C & A
Development Co. ("Contract") specifies with respect to the date
payments are due thereunder:
11.7 No payment shall be made under Article 11
unless Contractor shall have attached to the

Application for Payment Lien Waivers, from Contractor and Sub-Contractors, as the Owner and Interim
Lender shall require.
Record at 60.

It further indicates with respect to the final

payment:
11.5 Before issuance of Final Payment, the Contractor shall submit satisfactory evidence that all
payrolls, materials bills and other indebtedness
connected with the Project have been paid or otherwise satisfied.
Record at 60.
Under the Contract, interest was payable on payments due
but unpaid "provided Contractor shall have timely furnished Owner
all documentation required for such payment."
graph 11.1.4.

Record at 60, para-

The arbitrators had indicated to the parties that

they believed that any award to Appellee, Worthington & Kimball
Construction Co., should be conditioned upon delivery of lien
waivers or release.

Record at 97, paragraph 8.

The District Court

did not find nor does the record reflect that lien waivers were ever
provided.

In a letter specifying issues the arbitrators wished the
parties to address in their post-hearing briefs, the arbitrators
indicated they were considering imposing a penalty.

Among the

questions they asked the parties to address were:
4.a. Did C & A withhold an unreasonable amount
on contractor's request for final payment?
b. If so, what penalty, if any, should be
assessed against C & A?
Record at 96.

With respect to arbitration, the Contract provides:
16.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in
questions arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof, except with respect to
the Architects/Engineers decision on matters relating
to an artistic effect, and except for claims which
have been waived by the making or acceptance of Final
Payment shall be decided by arbitration in accordance
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association then obtaining
unless the parties mutually agree otherwise. . . .
16.4 Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the Contractor shall carry on the Work and maintain the
Contract Time Schedule during any arbitration proceedings and the Owner shall continue to make payments in accordance with this Agreement
Record at 65-66.
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules referred to in
paragraph 16.1 of the Contract provide with respect to the scope of
an award made pursuant thereto:
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
which is just and equitable and within the terms of
the agreement of the parties. . . .
Record at 82, Rule 43.
The arbitrators stated in the award that the arbitration
was "to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the
performance and interruption of a contract . . . for the design and
construction of a factory building . . . . "

Record at 44.

The

arbitrators awarded Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction
Co., "the unpaid balance of the contract price as adjusted by change
orders . . . subject to such deductions therefrom as the arbitrators
find to be warranted under the terms of the contract and the evidence received with respect to the claims of the owner."

Record at

47, paragraph 4.

Among the reasons stated for denial of other

claims of the owner are:
a.

Not the responsibility of the contractor;

c. Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the
contract between the parties, including the plans and
specifications;

e. Not included within the scope of work to be
performed by the c o n t r a c t o r ; . . . .
Record at 48, paragraph 6.

Among the reasons given by the Arbitra-

tors for denial of other claims of the contractor are:
a.

Not the responsibility of the owner;

c. Not authorized by the contract or barred by the
terms of the contract, including the plans and
specifications;
d. Already covered in change orders executed by
owner and contractor; . . . .
Record at 49, paragraph 8.
With the exception of the reference to a penalty, all of
the issues which the arbitrators requested the parties to consider
in the post-hearing briefs dealt with claims grounded in the contract between the parties.

Record at 95-98.

Seventeen days of hearings were held in connection with
the arbitration.

Record at 44.

At the close of the hearings,

counsel for Appellants and counsel for the Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co., both indicated that they had no further
witnesses.

Record at 131, line 18 through 132, line 8.

The

arbitrators and the parties had previously agreed on dates for
submission of briefs and reply briefs, (Record at 130) and agreed
that the arbitrators would meet thereafter and declare the hearings
closed, (Record at 132, line 14-133, line 1 ) . The hearings were
closed by the arbitrators September 2, 1983 and an award was to be
made on or before October 2, 1983.

Record at 83-84.

On August 30, 1983, after the evidence taking portion of
the hearing had concluded and the time for filing briefs had passed,
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., moved to reopen
the hearing.

Record at 85-88.

Appellants had argued in their

arbitration reply brief that no claim had been established against
two of the respondents in the arbitration, C & A Enterprises and
C & A Companies, Inc.

Record at 85, 89-91.

In its motion to reopen the hearings, Appellee,
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., claimed assignment of the
Contract by C & A Development Co. to C & A Enterprises, but did not
cite testimony in the arbitration of any assignment or consent
thereto nor did it refer the arbitrators to an assignment of the
contract or a consent thereto which had been made an exhibit to the
arbitration.

Record at 85, numbered paragraph 1 and 2.

Appellee,

Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., by its motion, supplemented
its briefs by proposing theories upon which the joint and several
liability of all the arbitration respondents could be based.
at 85-88.

Record

With respect to presentation of evidence, the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules specified by the Contract provide in
part:
All
the
any
his

evidence shall be taken in the presence of all of
arbitrators and all of the parties, except where
of the parties is absent in default or has waived
or her right to be present.

Record at 81, Rule 31.
There is no evidence in the record of any default by Appellants or
either of them at the time the motion to reopen the hearings was
submitted nor of any waiver of the right to be present at such time.
The arbitration hearings were reopened (Record at 92) over
the objection of Appellants, (Record at 89-91).

An additional

hearing was noticed for the purpose of taking additional evidence
regarding the claims of Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction
Co., Record at 93.

Appellants objected to the hearing and to any

proceedings which permitted Appellee, Worthington & Kimball
Construction Co., to further support its claims without also permitting Appellants to present additional evidence in support of their
claims.

Record at 94.

When the hearing was held despite their

objection, Appellants stipulated that the Contract had been assigned
by Appellants, C & A Development Co., to Appellant, C & A
Enterprises.

Record at 45.

Appellee asserted in its motion to reopen the hearings
that reopening the hearings should not delay making the award.
Record at 88.

No award was made as of October 2, 1983, the date

thirty days from close of the hearings set for making the award.

Record at 8 3-8 4.

The award was not made until November 7, 19 83.

Record at 50.
The Contract does not fix a date by which any arbitration
award must be made thereunder.

Record at 51-66.

It does provide

that the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association apply unless the parties otherwise agree.
Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1.

The record does not reflect any

other agreement by the parties regarding the time for making an
arbitration award.
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules provide with
respect to time for making an award:
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator
and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or
specified by law, not later than thirty days from the
date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings
have been waved, from the date of transmitting the
final statements and proofs to the arbitrator.
Record at 82, Rule 41.
There is no evidence in the record of any agreement by the
parties for extension of the time for making the award.

The

Construction Industry Arbitration rules provide:
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at
will, or upon application of a party at any time
before the award is made. If the reopening of the
hearing would prevent the making of the award within
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the
contract out of which the controversy has arisen, the
matter may not be reopened unless the parties agree
upon the extension of such time limit. When no
specific date is fixed in the contract, the arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator shall
have thirty days from the closing of the reopened
hearing within which to make an award.

The District Court ruled that Appellant, C & A Enterprises
were barred by collateral estoppel from maintaining its cross-claim
(Record at 307-315) against Otto Buehner & Company for negligence.
Record at 44.

Otto Buehner & Company was not a party to the con-

tract or the arbitration.

Record at 711-713.

The contract pro-

vides :
4.3 No contractual relationship shall exist between
the Owner and any Subcontractor and the Contractor
shall be responsible for the management of the
Subcontractors in the performance of their Work.
Record at 55.
The confirmation of the arbitration award (Record at
160-161) and the Order and Judgment signed by the District Court in
connection therewith (Record at 166-167) did not adjudicate all the
claims, rights or liabilities of all the parties to the action.
Retrial Order, Record at 726 et seq.

The District Court did not

make a determination that there was no just reason for delay or
direct entry of judgment confirm in the award.

Record at 166-167.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The District Court found that a portion of the arbi-

tration award was a penalty and refused to enforce that portion of
the award.

The arbitration agreement between the parties did not

give the arbitrators the authority to award punitive damages.
Applicable law limits contractual damages to compensatory damages.
In exacting a penalty which was noncompensatory, the arbitrators

exceeded their power and the award should have been vacated rather
than confirmed in part.
II.

The award was not made within the time set by agree-

ment of the parties or by statute, whichever is applicable.

The

arbitrators1 reopening of the hearing which prevented making the
award in the required time was improper as the parties had not
agreed to extend the time limit.

The powers of the arbitrators to

make an award terminated when the time limit passed.

In making the

award after their powers terminated, the arbitrators exceeded their
powers and the award should have been vacated.

Appellants did not

waive their right to rely upon the time limit for making the award
but objected to reopening of the hearings and additional proceedings .
III.

The cross-claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises,

against Otto Buehner & Company were not barred by collateral estoppel.

There was no final judgment on the merits with respect to such

claims nor was there an actual determination of the issues.

The

only judgment was the "Order and Judgment11 confirming the arbitration award in this case.

The "Order and Judgment" was non-final as

it did not dispose of all the issues or parties in this case and the
District Court did not direct entry of the "Order and Judgment".
Confirmation of the arbitration award did not constitute a determination of the issues.

The arbitrators only determined contractual

issues between the parties to the contract.

They did not make any

determination regarding the common law issues which were the subject
of the cross-claim.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
The District Court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration award although it found that the award included an improper
penalty which the court would not enforce.
II.
The District Court erred in failing to vacate the arbitration award which was not made within the time required and with
respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the hearing.
III.
The District Court erred in ruling that the claims of
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner &
Company are barred by collateral estoppel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The District Court erred in refusing to vacate

the award although it found that the award included an improper
penalty which the court would not enforce.
This court has recognized the public policy in favor of
arbitration.

Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d

1070 (Utah 1981).

The Court has noted that arbitration is a practi-

cal and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court
congestion.
1983).

Robinson and Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah

However, the legislature has enacted statutes which govern

the arbitrability of claims, the procedure to be followed and the
court's powers and responsibilities with respect thereto.
Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1 through 78-31-22.

Utah Code

This court has

recognized that judicial authority with respect to arbitration is
limited by statute.
846.

Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, supra at p.

In fact, the court has stated that judicial review of arbitra-

tion awards "should be strictly limited to statutory grounds and
procedures for review." Id.

Clearly, the function of the court is

to consider the award and the arbitration in accordance with the
statutes.
When the District Court found that the arbitration award
included an improper penalty, it should have vacated the award
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16 rather than
confirming the award but refusing to grant a judgment which enforced
the offend i_ng provision.
The District Court found that the award on its face
included a penalty.

Record at 1227, lines 8-9.

The award which by

its terms was not yet payable included "interest" as a measure of
damages for unreasonable withholding of the balance of contract
price.

Punitive damages are not appropriate damages for contract

claims.

Highland Construction Company v. Union Pacific Railroad

Company, 683 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1984), Jorgensen v. John Clay and
Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983).
As indicated in the award, the arbitrators perceived their
responsibility was to resolve disputes arising out of the performance and interpretation of the contract.

Except for the "interest"

found by the District Court to be a penalty, the award clearly
evaluates the claims and defenses of the parties based upon the
Contract.

The amount of the award is the amount due under the

Contract as adjusted by change orders and reduced by the contractual
claims of Appellants.

Many of the other claims of Appellants and of

the Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., were disposed
of by the arbitrators by reference to the terms of the Contract
between them.

Clearly, the arbitrable claims were those sounding in

contract.
Even if the court looked beyond the four corners of the
arbitration award, it would have properly concluded that only
contractual damages were to be included in the award.

The rules

agreed upon by the contracting parties provided that the scope of
award was limited to remedies and relief "within the terms of the
agreement of the parties".

Record at 82, Rule 43.

There is no

provision in the Contract for assessment of any penalty from a
party.
There was sufficient evidence beyond the face of the award
to support the District Court's finding that the "interest" which
the arbitrators awarded was not intended to compensate the Contractor but was intended as a penalty.

No interest was payable by the

terms of the Contract until all documentation required for payment
was furnished to the Owner.

Among the documentation required was

lien waivers from the contractor and subcontractors. Payments were
not due until these documents had been provided.

The final payment

was not due until satisfactory evidence that all payrolls, material
bills and other indebtedness connected with the project had been
paid or otherwise satisfied.

The arbitrators recognized the con-

tractual requirement of supplying these documents prior to payment

and provided in the award that the award was not payable and would
not be until lien waivers were provided.

There is no evidence in

the record that the required lien waivers were ever obtained or
provided, nor that other evidence that payrolls, materials bills and
other indebtedness connected with the project had been paid or
satisfied was supplied.

The arbitrators had indicated to the

parties that they felt that any award to Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co. should be conditioned upon delivery of lien
waivers or release of liens.
Since lien waivers had not been provided, the final
payment was not due; no interest was accruing thereon under the
Contract.

Thus, the withholding of the final payment was not

wrongful or malicious and would not have supported a claim grounded
in tort for which punitive or exemplary damages could be av/arded had
the claim been brought in a judicial forum rather than in arbitration.

Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983).
Since the "interest" awarded was not intended as compensa-

tory damages but was a measure of damages for "unreasonable withholding" , it was punitive.

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc.,

675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983).

However, in a private proceeding

such as an arbitration, punitive damages do not serve societal
interests.

Arbitrators who are called upon to resolve contractual

disputes and make awards within the terms of the parties' agreement
derive their authority from the agreement and statute and, absent
agreement by the parties or statutory authority,
award punitive damages.

have no power to

One court has even held that an arbitration

award of punitive damages violates public policy and is improper
even if the parties provided in their arbitration agreement that
punitive damages may be awarded.

Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40

N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
Having determined that the "interest" was an improper
measure of damages and could not be enforced, the District Court
should have vacated the award.

The District Court had found that

the arbitrators had exceeded their authority.

Such a finding

requires that the award be vacated when a party to the arbitration
has properly so moved.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16.

The District Court could not modify the award pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17.

The District Court is

empowered to modify an award only upon application of a party.
such application had been made.

No

The statute does not grant the

District Court authority to modify the award on its own motion.
Without arrogating to itself powers which the legislature did not
grant, the District Court could not modify the award.
Even if a party had made application for modification or
the District Court had authority to modify the award on its own
motion, a modification excising the improper damages would not have
been appropriate.

The statute provides that "the order must modify

and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof."
Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17.

Utah

The District Court had

already determined that the intent of the arbitrators in awarding a
penalty was improper.

It could not make an order giving effect to

that intent.

The award could not be modified in accordance with the

statute which strictly limits the District Court's authority.
The District Court was required to either confirm or
vacate the award.

Because it found that the award included an

improper measure of damages which the court could not enforce, the
arbitration fell within the scope of Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Section 78-31-16.

The arbitrators had exceeded their authority.

The statute required the District Court to vacate the award.

Under

the statute, the Court had no authority to confirm the balance of
the award.
POINT II.

The District Court erred in failing to vacate

the arbitration award which was not made within the time required
and with respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the
hearing.
The award was made after the time set forth in the letter
of the American Arbitration Association for making the award had
lapsed.

There was no agreement of the parties to extend that time.

There was no waiver by Appellants of the requirement that an award
be made within the time specified.

The arbitrators derive their

authority from the parties 1 agreement and statute and have no power
to make an award after the time provided in the agreement or statute
for making the award has lapsed.

General Metals Corp. v. Precision

Lodge 1600, 183 Cal. App.2d 586, 6 Cal. Rtpr. 910 (1960).
Appellee argued below that the time was extended by
reopening of the hearings.

Appellee asserted that no specific date

for making the award was fixed in the Contract and consequently, the

third sentence of Rule 36 of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules (Record at 81) extends the time for making the award. The
language of the third sentence of Rule 36 indicates that it is not
intended to apply to agreements to arbitrate future disputes.

With

few exceptions, no specific date is set forth in any contract
relating to the submission to arbitration of potential future
disputes.

The parties to a contract have no way of knowing when a

dispute will arise, when arbitration would be demanded, or how long
a proceeding to resolve an unknown dispute could be expected to
take.

In the absence of such foreknowledge, attempting to fix a

specific date by which an award must be made is meaningless.
However, the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules are designed to
cover agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration as well
as agreements relating to future disputes.

The third sentence of

Rule 36 is designed to control with respect to agreements to submit
existing disputes to arbitration.

The parties can, if they choose,

agree on a specific date by which the award must be made with
respect to a known, existing dispute.
With respect to agreements to submit future disputes, the
second sentence of Rule 36 controls.

That sentence provides:

If the reopening of the hearing would prevent
the making of the award within the specific time
agreed upon by the parties in the contract out of
which the controversy has arisen, the matter may not
be reopened, unless the parties agree upon the
extension of such time limit.
It is clear that either a time for the award was agreed
upon by the parties in the contract or they failed to set a time.
It is also clear that, there was no agreement to extend the time.

If the parties did agree upon a time, that time was thirty days from
the close of the hearings as indicated by Rule 41 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules (Record at 82) which the parties
agreed would apply (Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1) and by the
letter of the American Arbitration Association which stated that an
ward would be due within thirty days of the close of the hearings
(Record at 83-84).
No award was made within that time as a result of the
reopening the hearing.
the parties.

No extension of the time was agreed upon by

Therefore, reopening the hearings was improper.

The

time for making an award having lapsed, the arbitrators had no
authority to make the award.

The District Court should have vacated

the award.
If the parties failed in their agreement to set a time
within which the award must be made, the Utah Statutes set a time
limit.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8 provides:
Award-Time for Making.- If the time within which the
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration
agreement, the award must be made within sixty (60)
days from the time of the appointment of the arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of sixty (60)
days shall have no legal effect, unless the parties
extend the time in which said award may be made,
which extension, or any ratification, shall be in
writing.
The date of appointment of the arbitrators does not appear

in the record but that appointment certainly occurred before the
first hearings were held on April 25, 1983, (Record at 4 4 ) , one
hundred ninety-six (196) days before the award was made. More than

sixty (60) days elapsed after the closing of the hearings on
September 2, 198 3 before the award was made.
If the parties did not set a time limit for making the
award, by statute the award, made more than sixty days from appointment of the arbitrators, has no legal effect.

It should have been

vacated by the District Court.
Whether (1)

the parties agreed upon a time for making the

award and the rule applied or (2)

the statute applied because they

had failed to so agree, no award was made within the time required.
No extension of time was agreed upon.

The arbitrators had no power

to make an award after the required time.
in making the award.

They exceeded their power

The award has no legal effect and pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16, it must be vacated.
The doctrine of waiver does not justify confirming an
untimely award.

There is no evidence in the record of any waiver by

Appellants of their rights.

They did not acquiesce to any proceed-

ings after the time set forth in the letter of the American
Arbitration Association for making the award.

They objected to

reopening the hearings, to submission of additional evidence and
argument of new theories for recovery by Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co., after the taking of evidence had concluded
and agreed upon briefs had been submitted, and objected to additional proceedings.
Both the statute regarding time for making the award and
the rule regarding reopening of the hearing require an affirmative
act by both parties to extend the time.

Refusal or failure by

Appellants to make such an affirmative act does not constitute a
waiver.

Nor does it evidence an intent to waive.

Rather, it

evidences the unwillingness of Appellants to agree to extend the
time.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, interpreting a statute
similar to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8, held that
because written agreement is required to extend the time for making
the award, waiver is precluded by the statute.

Marsala v. Valve

Corporation of America, 157 Conn. 362, 254 A.2d 469 (1969).

There

was in that case no waiver despite participation in and failure to
object to proceedings after the time fixed by the statute had
lapsed.
While public policy favors resolving disputes by arbitration, the arbitration must conform to the agreement of the parties.
Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co. 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981).
The Court cannot ignore the requirement of the statute or of the
rule which the parties agreed would control, one of which must
apply.

Nor should the Court construe the statute or rule to require

a party to take some action to avoid waiver of a time limit when
both the statute and rule specify that the time limit applies unless
there is an express agreement to the contrary.
The finding of a waiver would not do justice to the
parties.
the award.

Appellants were not responsible for the delay in making
They argued in their arbitration reply brief that

Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., had not established a claim against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A

Companies, Inc., another respondent in the arbitration.

It was not

Appellants burden at any time during the arbitration proceedings to
remind Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that it
would be necessary to establish a case against each arbitration
respondent which it desired to be bound by an award.

Appellants did

not raise a new issue by arguing the failure to establish a claim.
The issue existed from the moment Appellee, Worthington & Kimball
Construction Co., named those parties as respondents in the arbitration.

Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., in its

motion to reopen the hearings, argued new theories for recovery and
facts not then in evidence.

All this occurred after it had con-

cluded its case and stated it had no further witnesses and after the
time agreed upon by the parties and directed by the arbitrators for
all briefs to be filed had passed.

If there was any waiver,

Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., waived its right
to prove a case against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A
Companies, Inc. in the arbitration proceeding by waiting until the
hearings were to close to prove its claims against such parties.
No award was made within the time established by statute
or agreed upon rules, whichever applies.

There was no agreement to

extend the time for making the award as required under the statute
or rules.

Rather, Appellants objected to reopening of the hearings,

and to additional proceedings which were held.

There is no basis

for finding that Appellants waived their rights to insist upon an
award within the required time.

Instead, if there was a waiver, it

was Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that waived

its right to prove claims it omitted until after all evidence and
briefs had been submitted.

Any award made by the arbitrators was

made after the time for making the award had passed.

The arbitra-

tors had no power after the time had lapsed and thus exceeded their
powers.

The District Court should have vacated the award.
POINT III.

The District Court erred in ruling that the

claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto
Buehner & Company, are barred by collateral estoppel.
This Court has discussed the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah
1979).

In that case, the Court stated that in order for collateral

estoppel to apply, there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits
and (2) an actual determination of the issues.

Neither of the two

requirements is met in this case.
The only judgment which existed upon which collateral
estoppel could be based was the Order and Judgment which confirmed
the arbitration award.

However, that judgment issued in this same

case was not a final judgment.

Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, an order, however denominated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the issues or the rights and liabilities if fewer
than all the parties is not final unless the court makes a determination that there is no just reason for delay and directs entry of
judgment.
case.

More than one claim for relief had been presented in this

Multiple parties were involved.

The judgment confirming the

arbitration award did not adjudicate all the claims presented nor
did it adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

The claims remaining to be decided are described in the pretrial
order.
While it might have done so under Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court did not determine that
there was no just reason for delay or direct entry of judgment.

As

a result, the judgment was "subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties", Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
54(b).

The order was in fact modified by the District Court as it

refused to give effect in the Corrected Order, Judgment and Decree
of Foreclosure to the fifteen percent (15%) "interest" provided in
the arbitration award.
Since there was no final judgment, collateral estoppel
could not bar Appellants' claims against Appellee, Otto Buehner &
Co.
There was not an actual determination of the issues raised
by the cross-claim of C & A Enterprises.

The arbitration award is

binding only to persons who are parties to the arbitration and only
as to subject matter submitted to the arbitrators.

Patrick J.

Ruane, Inc. v. Parker, 185 Cal.App.2d 488, 8 Cal.Rptr. 379 (1960);
Geo. V. Nolte & Co. v. Pieler Construction Co., 337 P.2d 710 (Wash.
1959).

Hosek MFG-Overland Foundry Co. v. Teats, 110 P.2d 976 (Colo.

1941) .
Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, was not a party to the
arbitration.

It was not a party to the contract which was the

subject of the arbitration.

There was no agreement between

Appellant, C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Co. to
arbitrate claims existing between them.

While public policy favors

arbitration, the Court has recognized that a person cannot be
compelled to arbitrate claims which he has not agreed to arbitrate.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1;
Construction Co., supra.

Lindon City v. Engineers

Similarly, arbitrators cannot make binding

decisions regarding matters not submitted to them.

Even if the

award purported to resolve claims between Appellant,
C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, it would to
that extent be ineffective.
The claims of C & A Enterprises against Otto Buehner &
Company were claims based on negligence.

The arbitrators only

considered the contractual claims of the parties to the Contract.
They did not consider common law claims for negligence arising out
of the work performed by Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, or its
failure to exercise due care in connection therewith.
There was no final judgment which actually determined the
claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto
Buehner & Company.
apply.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not

The District Court erred in refusing to permit C & A

Enterprises to prove such claims.

CONCLUSION
The arbitration award should have been vacated.

The

arbitrators exceeded their powers by including in the award a
measure of damages which the District Court held to be improper and

which it refused to enforce.

That the "interest" was not compensa-

tory damages was evident from the face of the award and is supported
by evidence beyond the award itself which indicates that actual
interest was not payable under the contract and the arbitrators
intent was to impose a penalty which was not within the parties1
agreement and was not within the arbitrators1 authority.
The arbitrators further exceed their power by making an
award after the time for making an award had lapsed.

Whether the

time for making an award was set by agreement of the parties or by
statute, the award was not timely made.

Arbitrators only have power

to the extent authority is granted by an agreement of the parties or
by statute.

After the time for making the award had lapsed, the

arbitrators had no further power to make an award.
The District Court should have vacated the award.

This

court must reverse the judgment confirming the award and remand this
case to the District Court with instructions to vacate the arbitration award.

Collateral estoppel did not apply to the claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company.
There was no final judgment which determined the issues with respect
to such claims.

Appellant, C & A Enterprises, was improperly barred

from submitting evidence to prove such claims.

The decision of the

District Court that collateral estoppel applied must be reversed and
the case remanded to permit Appellant, C & A Enterprises, to pursue
its claims.
Respectfully submitted this ^9-bto day of August, 1985.

Robert F. Bentley
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[9] On appeal, GMAC asserts that
Draper Bank's appeal was in bad faith, and
asks for attorney's fees pursuant to
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-56 (Supp.1983).
That section allows a court to award attorney's fees to a "prevailing party" if an
action or defense to the action was "without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith." Although Draper Bank's
claims of error are without merit, it did not
appeal in bad faith. Cady v. Johnson,
Utah, 671 P.2d 149 (1983).
Affirmed.

Costs to GMAC.

HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Diana BEHRENS, individually and as
Guardian ad Litem of Nathan Alan
Behrens, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RALEIGH HILLS HOSPITAL, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 1809.3.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 22, 1983.
Plaintiff brought wrongful death action against hospital seeking compensatory
damages. After defendant's motion for
new trial was granted, plaintiff moved to
amend her complaint to include claim for
punitive damages. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J.,
denied motion to amend complaint, and
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs
amendment to include punitive damages
count was not barred by limitations; (2)
plaintiffs motion to amend complaint to
add punitive damages count did not refer to
new or different acts of misconduct bv

defendant hospital but, rather, relied upon
different legal characterization of the same
conduct, and thus, was not outside scope of
notice of intent to sue; and (3) wrongful
death statute permits recovery of punitive
damages in appropriate cases.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Pleading <3=>238< 2)
Trial court may deny motion to amend
for movant's failure to present written motion and proposed amended complaint.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 7(b)(1).
2. Death <s»55
Plaintiffs written motion to amend
complaint to add punitive damages count
filed prior to trial in wrongful death action,
which included specific language to be added to complaint, was improperly denied.
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7.
3. Pleading c=»250
Plaintiffs renewed motion to amend
complaint to add punitive damages count
filed after trial court granted defendant's
motion for new trial was improperly denied, where plaintiff had previously filed
written motion to add punitive damages
count before trial which included specific
language to be added, and where defendant
did not object to plamriffs failure to file a
proposed complaint and in fact, knew precisely what issues were. I' C.A.li)o3. 7811-7.
1. Pleadin* C-~ 127
If plaintiff in wrongful death action
were able to adduce necessary foundational
evidence at trial, she could claim punitive
damages without formal amendment to
pleadings. Rules Civ P r o c Rule 54(c)(1);
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7.
5. Limitation of Actions C=>127(18)
Amendment of claim to include damages does not import into case new and
different cause of action; thus, plaintiffs
motion to amend complaint to add punitive
damages count was not barred by statute
of limitations in wrongful death action.
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7.
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6. Limitation of Actions <3=>127(5)
Setting forth of an additional ground
of negligence as cause of same injury is not
new cause of action.
7. Physicians and Surgeons <§=> 18.20
Notice of intent to sue is not intended
to be equivalent of complaint and need not
contain every allegation and claim set forth
in complaint. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8.
8. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»18.20
Purpose of an intent to sue notice is to
give parties an opportunity to discuss, and
hopefully to resolve, potential claim before
they become locked into lawsuit. U.C.A.
1953, 78-14-8.
9. Physicians and Surgeons <©=>18.20
Although notice of intent to sue must
include specific allegations of misconduct
on part of prospective defendant, that requirement does not need to meet standards
required to state claim for relief in complaint; parties need to give only general
notice of intent to sue and of injuries then
known and not a statement of legal theories. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8.
10. Physicians and Surgeons C^IH^O
Plaintiffs motion to amend complaint
to add punitive damages count in wrongful
death action did not refer to new or different acts of misconduct but, rather, relied
upon different legal characterization of
same conduct; thus, motion to amend complaint wras not outside scope of notice of
intent to sue, where notice cited specific
allegations of defendant hospital's misconduct, including failing to diagnose decedent's dangerous mental condition and allowing him to possess razor. U.C.A.1953,
78-11-7, 78-14-8.
11. Physicians and Surgeons <$=> 18.20
Describing defendant's conduct as negligent conduct in notice of intent to sue did
not preclude describing conduct as grossly
negligent or reckless elsewhere in wrongful death action. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8.
12. Physicians and Surgeons 0=18.20
Law governing notice of intent to sue
does not require that claim for punitive

damages be expressed in notice of intent,
as long as it includes general statement of
nature of claim. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8.
13. Death <s=>9
Wrongful death statute is not required
to be strictly construed because it deviates
from common law. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-2.
14. Death <&=»93
Consistency with general tort law suggests that wrongful death statute should
be construed to permit punitive damages;
if the Legislature intended to prohibit
award of punitive damages, it could have
done so expressly, assuming that such action would be constitutional. Const. Art.
16, § 5; U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7.
15. Death @=>9
Primary purpose of wrongful death
statute is to compensate deceased's heirs.
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7.
16. Death 0=93
Purpose behind wrongful death statute
of compensating deceased's heirs is not inconsistent with general policy of permitting
punitive damages to punish a wrongdoer
and to deter particularly culpable, dangerous conduct. U.C.A.1953. 78-14-8.
17. Death <S=>93
Wrongful death statute permits recovery of punitive damages in appropriate
cases, in view of broad statutory language
which permits recovery for nonpecuniary
losses, libera! constructor: that ha.> bet:a
placed on that language, and desirability of
having rule of law in wrongful death cases
consistent with general tort law. U.C.A.
1953, 78-11-7.
18. Damages <s»87(l)
Although punitive damages may be
awarded in an appropriate case, general
rule is that only compensatory damages
are appropriate and that punitive damages
may be awarded only in exceptional cases.
U.C.A.1953, 78-11-7."
19. Damages <3=>91<1)
punitive damages should not be awarded to increase sorrow that defendants generally suffer or when an injury has been
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inflicted by error or inadvertence, or to
give plaintiff an in terrorem weapon in
settlement negotiations. U.C.A.1953, 7811-7.
20. Damages <3=»91(1)
Since punitive damages are not intended as additional compensation to plaintiff,
they must, if awarded, serve societal interest of punishing and deterring outrageous
and malicious conduct which is not likely to
be deterred by other means.
21. Damages <3=>91(3)
Simple negligence will never suffice as
basis upon which punitive damages may be
awarded; defendant's conduct must be malicious or in reckless disregard for rights of
others, although actual intent to cause injury is not necessary.
22. Damages c=>91(l)
To be liable for punitive damages, defendant must either know or should know
that his conduct would, in high degree of
probability, result in substantial harm to
another, and conduct must be highly unreasonable or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where high degree
of danger is apparent
23. Damages c=>87< 1)
Punitive damages should be awarded
only when they will clearly accomplish public objective not accomplished by award of
compensatory damages.
24. Damages e=>87( I)
Punitive d^vi<n, s ar^ not intended to
vent vindictiveness or to increase sorrow
and suffering that persons guilty of error
normally feel as result of the all too human
propensity to err, and even to blunder;
such damages may, however, be appropriate to take profit out of wrongdoing where
compensatory damages are small in relation to financial resources of defendant and
can be subsumed as cost of doing business.
25. Damages e»87(l)
Intended deterrent effect of awarding
punitive damages must be clear and in proportion to nature of wrong and possibility
of recurrence.

James E. Hawkes, Bob W. Warnick, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellant
Robert F. Orton, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
The issue on this appeal is whether punitive damages may be awarded in a wrongful death action. The case is here on an
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's
refusal to permit the plaintiff to amend its
complaint to seek punitive damages.
I. THE FACTS
Plaintiffs decedent, Robert Alan Behrens, was admitted to the defendant Raleigh Hills Hospital to undergo treatment
for alcohol abuse. On the third day of his
stay, a hospital employee allowed decedent
to use a razor to shave. Instead, decedent
used the razor to slash his wrists; he died
four days later.
Decedent's wife, individually and on behalf of their infant son. filed this action for
wrongful death seeking compensatory damages only. The jury trial resulted in a
judgment for plaintiff in the amount of
•S 100.000. However, the trial court granted
defendant's motion for a new trial because
of its failure to give a comparative negligence jurv instruction. That ruling is not
challenged.
After the motion for a new trial was
granted, plaintiff moved to amend her complaint lo include a claim for punitive damages. The matter was heard on oral argument, and the motion to amend was denied.
Because the precise basis for that denial is
not in the record, we examine first the
possible procedural grounds offered as a
justification for the ruling.
II.

PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS

A. Motion to Amend
[1] Defendant argues that the motion
to amend was properly denied for procedural reasons because it was not presented in
writing and was not accompanied by the
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proposed amended complaint. Although a
trial court may deny a motion to amend for
a movant's failure to present a written
motion and a proposed amended complaint,
see Utah R.Civ.P. 7(bXD; 3 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice 1115.12 (2d ed.
1983), that rule does not govern this case.
[2,3] Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a written motion to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs motion included the language to be
added to the complaint, i.e., "Plaintiff
prays for punitive damages in the amount
of $50,000." That motion was improperly
denied by the trial court. The motion was
renewed after the trial court granted a new
trial. The defendant did not object to plaintiffs failure at that time to file a proposed
complaint. Indeed, the defendant knew
precisely what the issues were with respect
to the motion to amend and filed a lengthy
and well-researched memorandum on the
issue of punitive damages. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs first motion to
amend was sufficient. It wTas again error
to deny the renewed motion.
Furthermore, this case must be viewed
against the backdrop of Utah R.Civ.P.
54(c)(1), which states that "every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." See also
Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752 (1978);
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d
297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). Cf Motivated
Management International
v. Finney,
Utah, 604 P.2d 467 (1979). As Professor
Moore states:
Rule 15 provides liberally for amendment
of pleadings and supplemental pleadings
to the end that litigation may be disposed
of on the merits. And Rule 54(c) continues the story by providing that, except as
to a judgment by default which shall not
be different in kind from or exceed the
amount prayed, every other final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled.
1. So in original; see 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages

While under Rule 8(a)(3), supra, every
pleading setting forth a claim for relief
should contain a demand for judgment,
this prayer for relief constitutes no part
of the pleader's cause of action; a pleading should not be dismissed for legal
insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that the claimant is entitled to no
relief, legal, equitable or maritime, under
any state of facts which could be proved
in support of the claim, irrespective of
the prayer for relief; and, except as to a
judgment by default, the prayer does
not limit the relief, legal, equitable or
maritime, which the court may grant
[Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.]
6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker,
Moore s Federal Practice *! 54.60 at 121214 (2d ed. 1983).
[4] Thus, if the plaintiff were able to
adduce the necessary foundational evidence
at trial, she could claim punitive damages
under Rule 54(c) without a formal
amendment to the pleadings. Case authorities support this proposition. In Guillen
v. Kuijkcndall, 470 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam), the court stated:
It is not necessary to claim exemplary
[i.e., punitive] damages by specific denomination if the facts show that the
wrong complained of was "inflicted with
malice, oppression, or other like circumstances of [aggravation] 1 ",
22 Am
Jur.2d Damages ** 29:>.
Accord Gilbreath v Phillips Petroleum
Co., 526 F.Supp 657 (W [) Okl 1()S0) (mt^r
preting Oklahoma law); Alexander v.
Jones, 29 F.Supp. 690. 692 (E.D Okla.1939)
(same). Cf Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F 2d
738 (5th Cir. 1982).
B. Statute of Limitations
[5,6] The defendant also asserts that
the claim for punitive damages is a new
claim for relief that is barred by the statute
of
limitations.
However,
an
amendment to include damages does not
import into a case a new and different
cause of action. Hjorth v Whit ten burg,
121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952). See
§ 293 at 389 (1965).
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also Johnson v. Brinkerhqff, 89 Utah 530,
57 P.2d 1132 (1936). Even the setting forth
of "an additional ground of negligence as
the cause of the same injury" is not a new
cause of action. Peterson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 79 Utah 213, 221, 8 P.2d
627, 630 (1932).
Other jurisdictions have also allowed a
claim for punitive damages to be added on
the ground that the claim raised no new
legal issues and therefore its addition did
not prejudice the other party. Owen v.
Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 75, 649 P.2d 278
(1982); Thomas v. Medesco, Inc., 67 F.R.D.
129 (E.D.Pa.1974); Hodnik v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad, 54 F.R.D. 184 (W.D.Pa.
1972); Walker v. Fleming Motor Co. Inc.,
195 Kan. 328, 404 P.2d 929 (1965). See
also Hernandez v. Brooks, 95 N.M. 670,
625 P.2d 1187 (App.1980). Accordingly, the
statute of limitation is no bar. See Rule
15(c); Peterson v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., 79 Utah 213, 8 P.2d 627 (1932); Thomas v. Medesco, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 129 (E.D.Pa.
1974).
[7-91 Defendant also argues that denial
of the motion was proper because the proposed amendment set forth additional allegations and claims outside the scope of
plaintiffs notice of intent to sue, which had
been filed prior to commencement of this
action. A notice of intent to sue, as required by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-14-8, is not
intended to be the equivalent of a complaint and need not contain every allegation
and claim set forth in the complaint. The
purpose of an intent to sue notice is to give
the parties an opportunity to discuss, and
hopefully to resolve, the potential claim
before they become locked into a lawsuit.
Although the notice must include "specific
allegations of misconduct on the part of the
prospective defendant/* that requirement
does not need to meet the standards required to state a claim for relief in a complaint. The parties need to give only general notice of an intent to sue and of the
injuries then known and not a statement of
legal theories.
[10-12J In the present case, the notice
cited specific allegations of the Hospital's

misconduct, including failing to diagnose
decedent's dangerous mental condition and
allowing him to possess a razor. The proposed amendment to the complaint does not
refer to new or different acts of misconduct; rather, the amendment relies upon a
different legal characterization of the same
conduct. Describing the defendant's conduct as negligent conduct in the notice of
intent does not preclude describing it as
"grossly negligent" or reckless. Nor does
§ 78-14-8 require that a claim for punitive
damages be expressed in the notice of intent, as long as it includes "a general statement of the nature of the claim."
HI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
The key substantive issue in this case is
whether the Utah wrongful death statute
allows for recovery of punitive damages or
only permits compensatory damages. The
relevant portion of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-11-7
states: "In every action under this [section]
such damages may be given as
under all the circumstances of the case
may be just." Whether this provision allows for recovery of punitive damages in a
wrongful death action is a question of first
impression in Utah.
The common law recognized no action for
the wrongful death of a human being
Lord Campbell's Act, which was enacted in
England in 1846 to override the common
law, created a statutory action for wrongful death. That act pro\ ided fur the recov ery of damages which the jury found resulted from the death. Comment, A Primer on Damages Under the Utah Wrongful
Death and Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah
L.Rev. 519. Although English courts have
restricted recovery under that act to pecuniary losses suffered by the sur\ivors,
American courts have not ruled consistently one way or the other Id.; 1 S Speiser,
Recovery For Wrongful Death § 31 at 103
(2d ed. 1975).
Most wrongful death statutes in the
United States, including Utah's, were modeled after Lord Campbell's Act. 1 S. Speis-
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er, supra, § 1:9 at 29; U.C.A., 1953,
§ 78-11-7 (Compiler's Notes). Some American jurisdictions adopted, expressly either
in their statutes or by judicial construction,
the pecuniary damage limitation of the
English act 1 S. Speiser, supra, § 3:1 at
106-09; 1974 Utah LRev., supra, at 520.
A majority of American jurisdictions allow
recovery of nonpecuniary damages, such as
mental anguish or loss of companionship, 1
S. Speiser, supra, § 3:1 at 113-15 and
§ 3:49 at 313-20. However, only some of
those jurisdictions limit damages to those
which are compensatory, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary damages or both,
while denying noncompensatory damages
aimed at punishing the wrongdoer. 1 S.
Speiser, supra, § 3:4; J. Stein, Damages
and Recovery, Personal Injury and Death
Actions § 183 at 361-64 (1972).

ther expressly nor impliedly allows for
such damages.

At bottom, the allowance of punitive
damages in wrongful death actions is a
function of the governing statute construed in light of legislative intent and
public policy. J. Stein, supra, § 183 at 360;
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 925 (1979).
In those jurisdictions where punitive damages are not allowed in wrongful death
actions, the rationale is generally that the
governing statute limits recovery to pecuniary losses. Some states have relied on the
canon of statutory construction that a statute in derogation of the common law must
be construed narrowly and, on that basis,
have refused to allow punitive damages.
On the other hand, the statutes in nearly
half the American jurisdictions, either expressly or by construction, allow recovery
of punitive damages in appropriate wrongful death actions, and this position represents the modern trend.2

[13] The Utah wrongful death statute,
implementing the constitutional provision,
although in derogation of the common law,
traditionally has been liberally construed
by the courts. See Jones v. Carvel/, Utah,
641 P.2d 105 (1982), and cases cited. Indeed, a liberal construction is supported by
one of our earliest statutes, U C.A.. 1953,
§ 68-3-2:

Defendant contends that the Utah statute, being in derogation of the common
law, must be strictly construed and that
the claim for punitive damages must consequently be denied because the statute nei2. See generally 1 S. Speiser, Recovery For
Wrongful Death § 3:4 (2d ed. 1975 & 1982
Supp.); J. Stein, Damages and Recovery, Personal Injury and Death Actions § 183 (1972 &
1982 Supp. § 183.6); Annot., Exemplary or Pu-

The Utah wrongful death act was originally passed by the Territorial Legislature
in 1874 to remedy the harsh effects of the
common law rule which did not recognize
wrongful death actions at all. Ch. 11
[1874] Laws of Territory of Utah 9, II
Compiled Laws of Utah § 2961 (1888). At
statehood, a cause of action for wrongful
death was guaranteed by the Constitution
which also prohibited any statutory limits
on the amount recoverable. Article XVI,
§ 5 states:
The right of action to recover damages
for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory
limitation

The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to
the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, unlike those wrongful death statutes
which disallow punitive damages because
those statutes are construed strictly, the
Utah wrongful death statute is not required to be strictly construed because it
deviates from the common law.
nitive Damages As Recoverable In Action For
Death, 94 A.L.R. 384 (1935), Comment, Punitive
Damages in Wrongful Death, 20 Clev.St L.Rev
301 (1971).
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The traditional, liberal construction of
the Utah statute has been applied specifically to the damages clause of the act
which provides for "such damages . . . as
under all the circumstances of the case
may be j u s t " U.C.A., 1953 § 78-11-7.
This Court, at an early date, construed the
statute to allow recovery of damages for
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses,
even though damages for nonpecuniary
losses are not expressly authorized by the
statute. E.g., Evans v. Oregon Short line
Railroad Co., 37 Utah 431, 439, 108 P. 638,
641 (1910); Corbett v. Oregon Short Line
Railroad Co., 25 Utah 449, 71 P. 1065
(1903). In Jones v. Carvell, supra, we
recently stated: "[T]he statute is broadly
phrased, and this Court has construed it
accordingly." Id. at 110.
Most commentators agree that absent an
express prohibition against recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions,
the position most consistent with fairness
and sound public policy is to allow punitive
damages where the circumstances warrant.
For example, in his comprehensive treatire,
Speiser comments:
Under existing systems, many jurisdictions do not allow recovery of punitive
damages in wrongful death actions, unless the statutes are fairly explicit in
sanctioning such recovery. This would
make sense in states (and there are a
few) that do not allow punitive damages
at all; But it makes no sense for a state
that allows punitive damages for a wilful, wanton, malicious, reckless or grossly negligent tort that results in personal
injury, emotional anguish or property
damage, to deny such punitive damages
where the injury victim happens to die.
Death is, after all, the final injury—the
ultimate insult. Such a result defies logic and distorts symmetry in the law.
2 S. Speiser, Recovery for
Wrongful
Death, § 15:14 at 487 (2d ed. 1975). Speiser also states:
The nature and quality of the wrongful
act should dictate whether its perpetrator should be compelled to respond in
more than compensatory damages—not

the fortuitous circumstance whether he
happens to injure or to kill his victim.
1 S. Speiser, supra, § 3:4 at 135. See also
K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 4.2(A)(3)
(1980); Comment, Constitutional Law—
Wrongful Death, 8 Cumb.L.Rev. 567, 574
(1977); Comment, Punitive Damages in
Wrongful Death, 20 Clev.St.L.Rev. 301,
304, 314 (1971).
[14] This state has traditionally permitted recovery of punitive damages in personal injury cases, e.g., Cruz v. Montoya,
Utah, 660 P.2d 723 (1983). Consistency
with general tort law suggests that the
Utah wrongful death statute should be construed to permit punitive damages. If the
Legislature intended to prohibit the award
of punitive damages, it could have done so
expressly, assuming that such action would
be constitutional under Article XVI, § 5.
[13,16] Defendant relies on language
in Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 168,
140 P.2d 772, 780 (1943), to support its
argument against punitive damages. In
Morrison, the Court stated: "Under our
wrongful death statute, [citation omitted],
the law does not seek to punish the wrongdoer, but simply to compensate the heirs
for the loss sustained." This language,
however, was directed to another issue.
The issue before the Court was recover}-' of
funeral expenses, not recover}' of punitive
damages. Certainly the primary purpose
of the statute is to compensate the deceased's heirs, but that is not its only purpose. Compensation is not inconsistent
with the general policy of permitting punitive damages to punish a wrongdoer and to
deter particularly culpable dangerous conduct.
Other jurisdictions with statutory language identical or similar to Utah's have
also construed that language to allow punitive damages. In Gavica v. Hanson, 101
Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980), the Idaho
Supreme Court construed an identical
wrongful death damage provision to allow
punitive damages:
Thus, while a wrongdoer may be liable
for punitive damages if he injures another, it is argued that punitive damages
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should nevertheless be withheld if a
wrongdoer so injures another as to cause
death. We find no logic in such a conclusion. If wrongful conduct is to be detarred by the award of punitive damages,
that policy should not be thwarted because the wrongdoer succeeds in killing
his victim.
Id. at 61, 608 P.2d at 864.
The West Virginia wrongful death statute provides that "the jury may award
such damages as to it may seem fair and
just." W.Va.Code, § 55-7-6 (1981). In
Bond v. City of Huntington, W.Va., 276
S.E.2d 539 (1981), the court construed that
language to permit recovery of punitive
damages. The court reasoned that "the
deterrence principle of punitive damages is
perfectly compatible with a wrongful death
claim," and perhaps even more appropriate
there than in actions for less severe injuries. "The fact that the wrongful death
statute never spelled out particular items
of damages has not precluded this Court in
the past from concluding that certain elements of damages could be obtained." Id.
at 545. See also Perry v. Melton, W.Va.,
299 S.E.2d 8 (1982).
Defendant cites several cases from other
jurisdictions that deny punitive damages in
wrongful death cases. We acknowledge
the division among the authorities on this
question; however, for the most part, contrary conclusions can be traced to material
differences in either the governing statute
or its legislative history.
[17] In sum, because of the broad language of the wrongful death statute which
permits recovery for nonpecuniary losses,
the liberal construction that has been
placed on that language, and the desirability of having the rule of law in wrongful
death cases consistent with general tort
law, we hold that the wrongful death statute permits the recovery of punitive damages in appropriate cases.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
[18-20] Although punitive damages
may be awarded in an appropriate case, the

general rule is that only compensatory
damages are appropriate and that punitive
damages may be awarded only in exceptional cases. It is not the point to allow
punitive damages to be awarded to increase
the sorrow that defendants generally suffer when an injury has been inflicted by
error or inadvertance, or to give a plaintiff
an in terrorem weapon in settlement negotiations. Since punitive damages are not
intended as additional compensation to a
plaintiff, they must, if awarded, serve a
societal interest of punishing and deterring
outrageous and malicious conduct which is
not likely to be deterred by other means.
See C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law
of Damages §§ 77-78 (1935); J. Stein,
Damages and Recovery, Personal Injury
and Death Actions § 183 (1972).
Our cases have generally held that punitive damages may be awarded only on
proof of "willful and malicious," conduct,
e.g., Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v.
Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293, 312 (1982); First
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591, 598 (1982);
Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41
(1980); Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d
354, 359 (1975), or on proof of conduct
which manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and disregard of, the
rights of others, Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 267, 277-78
(1982); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314,
327 (1979), especially where compensatory
damages may be simply absorbed as a cost
of business.
See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 908 (1979).
[21,22] Punitive damages should be
awarded infrequently. Simple negligence
will never suffice as a basis upon which
such damages may be awarded. "Punitive
damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and
the like, which constitute ordinary negligence." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 908 comment b at 465 (1979). A defendant's conduct must be malicious or in reckless disregard for the rights of others, al-

KENNECOTT CORP. v. INDUSTRIAL COftTN OF UTAH

Utah H87

Cite at 67S PJd 11*7 (Vimh 19S3)

though actual intent to cause injury is not
necessary. Branch v. Western Petroleum,
Inc., supra. That is, the defendant must
either know or should know "that such
conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another," Danculovich i?. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d
187, 193 (1979), and the conduct must be
"highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a
situation where a high degree of danger is
apparent" Id. at 191. See also J. Stein,
supra, §§ 186-187.
[23-25] Furthermore, punitive damages
should be awarded only when they will
clearly accomplish a public objective not
accomplished by the award of compensatory damages. They are not intended to vent
vindictiveness or to increase the sorrow
and suffering that persons guilty of an
error normally feel as a result of the all too
human propensity to err, and even to blunder. Such damages may, however, be appropriate to take the profit out of wrongdoing where compensatory damages are
small in relation to the financial resources
of a defendant and can be subsumed as a
cost of doing business. See generally
Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., supra; First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.
Feedyards, supra; Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, supra. The
intended deterrent effect must be clear and
in proportion to the nature of the wrong
and the possibility of recurrence.
Riverbed and remanded. Coato to appellant.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, OAKS and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

KENNECOTT CORPORATION, KENNECOTT MINERALS COMPANY
DIVISION, Plaintiff,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and Rose K. Georgas, widow of
Alex Demetrios Georgas, Defendants.
No. 19036.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 28, 1983.
Employee's widow brought workmen's
compensation action against employer to
recover benefits for death of employee who
allegedly fell, because of heart attack, into
tank in which he drowned while he was on
employer's premises during lunch hour, in
allowed place apparently getting fresh air
or drink of water. Administrative law
judge granted recovery, and Industrial
Commission denied review. Employer appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) personal comfort rule was
adopted; (2) personal comfort rule was applicable, and thus employee was in course
of his employment at time of fall; and (3)
idiopathic fall doctrine applied, and thus
employee's widow was eligible for benefits.
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation <£=>615
For purposes of statute providing for
workmen's compensation if employee is injured or killed by accident arising out of or
in course of his employment, course of
employee's employment is not limited simply to those places where employee's work
requires his presence. U.C A. 1953, 35-145.
2. Workers' Compensation <s=>652
For purposes of workmen's compensation eligibility, employee does not leave
course of employment by engaging in acts
ministering to his personal comfort, unless
extent of departure is so great that intent
to abandon job temporarily may be inferred, or unless method chosen is so un-
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arbitrators generally arc free to fashion
remedy appropriate to wrong, if they find
40 N.Y.2d 354
one,
but authentic remedy is compensatory
Joan G A R R I T Y , Respondent,
and measured by harm caused and how it
v.
may be corrected; these broad principles
L Y L E STUART, INC., Appellant.
are tolerable so long as arbitrators are
not thereby empowered to ride roughshod
Court of Appeals of New York.
over strong policies in law which control
July 6, 1976.
coercive private conduct and confine to
state and its courts infliction of punitive
sanctions on wrongdoers.
Author brought action to confirm arbitration award granting her compensatory 3. Arbitration <§=>56
and punitive damages against defendant
Court will vacate arbitration award
publishing company. The Supreme Court,
enforcing illegal agreement or one violaNew York County, Thomas C. Chimera, J.,
tive of public policy.
confirmed award, and publishing company
appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, 48 A.D.2d 814, 370 N.Y.S.2d 6, 4. Damages <&=»89(l)
affirmed and publishing company appealed.
At law, on civil side, in absence of
The Court of Appeals, Breitel, C. J., held
statute, punitive damages are available only
that arbitrator had no power to award puin limited number of instances.
nitive damages; that such award was violative of public policy; and that issue of
5. Damages <®=>87(l)
punitive damages was not waived.
Award of punitive damages is social
Order modified and, as so modified, exemplary "remedy" not private compensatory remedy.
affirmed.
Gabrielli, J., filed dissenting opinion in
which Jones and Wachtler, JJ., concurred.

6. Arbitration C=>29.6

1. Arbitration <$»29.6

Even if so-called "malicious" breach
of publishing contract would permit imposition of punitive damages by court or
jury, it was not province of arbitrators to
award punitive damages to author.

Arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by
parties; punitive damages is a sanction reserved to state, a public policy of such
magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion
to prevent its contravention; and, since
enforcement of award of punitive damages
as purely private remedy would violate
strong public policy, arbitrator's award
which imposes punitive damages should be
vacated.
2. Arbitration <3=>29.4, 29.6, 65.1, 63.2
Arbitrators generally are not bound by
principles of substantive law or rules of
evidence and thus error of law or fact will
not justify vacatur of award; furthermore,
353 H E 2d—50Va

7. Contracts S=>129(1)

Law does not and should not permit
private persons to submit themselves to punitive sanctions of the order reserved to
state; freedom of contract does not embrace freedom to punish, even by contract.
8. Contracts G=>I29(I)
Parties to publishing agreement had no
power to waive limitations on p m a t e l y assessed punitive damages and no power to
agree to such damages by failing to object
to demand for such damages in arbitration
award.
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9. Arbitral Ion <$»56
That arbitrator's award of punitive
damages, in violation of public policy, was
quite modest was immaterial.

Richard Goldsweig, Yonkers, and Jack
N. Albert, New York City, for appellant.
Donald S. Engel, New York City, for respondent.
BREITEL, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff author brought this proceeding
under CPLR 7510 to confirm an arbitration award granting her $45,000 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive
damages against defendant publishing company.
Supreme Court confirmed the
award. The Appellate Division affirmed,
one Justice dissenting, and defendant appeals.
The issue is whether an arbitrator has
the power to award punitive damages.
[1] The order of the Appellate Division should be modified to vacate the
award of punitive damages and otherwise
affirmed. An arbitrator has no power to
award punitive damages, even if agreed
upon by the parties (Matter of Publishers?
Assfn of N. Y. City [Newspaper Union],
280 App.Div. 500, 504-506, 114 N.Y.S.2d
401, 404-406). Punitive damages is a
sanction reserved to the State, a public policy of such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion to prevent its contravention.
Since enforcement of an award of punitive
damages as a purely private remedy would
violate strong public policy, an arbitrator's
award which imposes punitive damages
should be vacated.
Plaintiff is the author of two books published by defendant. While the publishing
agreements between the parties contained
broad arbitration clauses, neither of the
agreements provided for the imposition of
punitive damages in the event of breach.

A dispute arose between the parties and
in December, 1971 plaintiff author brought
an action for damages alleging fraudulent
inducement, "gross" underpayment of royalties, and various "malicious" acts designed to harass her. That action is still
pending.
In March, 1974, plaintiff brought a new
action alleging that defendant had wrongfully withheld an additional $45,000 in royalties. Defendant moved for a stay pending arbitration, which was granted, and
plaintiff demanded arbitration. The demand requested the $45,000 withheld royalties and punitive damages for defendant's
alleged "malicious" withholding of royalties, which plaintiff contended was done to
coerce her into withdrawing the 1971 action.
Defendant appeared at the arbitration
hearing and raised objections concerning
plaintiff's standing and the conduct of the
arbitration hearing. Upon rejection of
these objections by the arbitrators, defendant walked out.
After hearing testimony, and considering
an "informal memorandum" on punitive
damages submitted by plaintiff at their request, the arbitrators awarded plaintiff
both compensatory and punitive damages.
On plaintiffs motion to confirm the
award, defendant objected upon the ground
that the award of punitive damages was
beyond the scope of the arbitrators' authority.
[2] Arbitrators generally are not bound
by principles of substantive law or rules of
evidence, and thus error of law or fact will
not justify vacatur of an award (see Matter of Associated Teachers of Huntington
v. Board of Educ.} 33 N.Y.2d 229, 235, 351
N.Y.S.2d 670, 674, 306 N.E.2d 791, 795,
and cases cited). It is also true that arbitrators generally are free to fashion the
remedy appropriate to the wrong, if they
find one, but an authentic remedy is compensatory and measured by the harm
caused and how it may be corrected (A/a/-

GARRITY r. LYLE STUART, INC

NT.

795

CU«M353N.B.2dTO

itr of Staklinski [Pyramid Elec. Co.], 6
N.Y.2d 159, 163, 188 N.Y.S2d 541, 542, 160
N.E.2d 78, 79; see Matter of Paver &
Wildfoerster
[Catholic High
School
Ass'n.], 38 N.Y.2d 669, 677, 382 N.Y.S.2d
22, 26, 345 N.E2d 565, 569, and cases cited). These broad principles are tolerable
so long as arbitrators are not thereby empowered to ride roughshod over strong policies in the law which control coercive private conduct and confine to the State and
its courts the infliction of punitive sanctions on wrongdoers.
[3] The court will vacate an award enforcing an illegal agreement or one violative of public policy (see Matter of Associated Teachers of Huntington v. Board of
Educ, 33 N.Y.2d 229, 235-236, 351 N.Y.S.
2d 670, 674-675, 306 N.E.2d 791, 795, supra, and cases cited; Matter of Western
Union Tel. Co. [Atner. Communications
Ass'n], 299 N.Y. 177, 187, 86 N.E.2d 162,
167; Matter of East India Trading Co.
[Halari], 280 App.Div. 420, 421, 114 N.Y.
S.2d 93, 94, affd., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.
2d 213). Since enforcement of an award
of punitive damages as a purely private
remedy would violate public policy, an arbitrator's award which imposes punitive
damages, even though agreed upon by the
parties, should be vacated (Matter of Publishers' Ass'n of N. Y. City [Newspaper
Union], 280 App.Div. 500, 504-506, 114 N.
Y.S.2d 401, 404-406, supra; Domke, Commercial Arbitration, § 33.03; Fuchsberg, 9
N.Y. Damages Law, § 81, p. 61, n. 9; 14
N.Y.Jur., Damages, § 184, p. 46; cf. Local
127, United Shoe Workers of Amcr. v.
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 3 Cir., 298 F.2d 277,
278, 284).
Matter of Associated Gen. Contrs., N. Y.
State Chapter (Savin Bros.), 36 N.Y.2d
957, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 335 N.E.2d 859, is
inapposite. That case did not involve an
award of punitive damages. Instead, the
court permitted^rnforcement of an arbitration award of treble liquidated damages,
amounting to a penalty, assessed however

in accordance with the express terms of a
trade association membership agreement.
The court held that the public policy
against permitting the awarding of penalties was not of "such magnitude as to call
for judicial intrusion" (p. 959). In the instant case, however, there was no provision
in the agreements permitting arbitrators to
award liquidated damages or penalties. Indeed, the subject apparently had never ever
been considered.
[4,5] The prohibition against an arbitrator awarding punitive damages is based
on strong public policy indeed. At law, on
the civil side, in the absence of statute, punitive damages are available only in a limited number of instances (see Walker v.
Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 223 X.Y.S.2d
488, 490, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498). As was
stated in Walker v. Sheldon (supra):
"[p]unitive or exemplary damages have
been allowed in cases where the wrong
complained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives,
not only to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others who might otherwise be so prompted, from indulging in
similar conduct in the future." It is a social exemplary "remedy", not a private
compensatory remedy.
It has always been held that punitive
damages are not available for mere breach
of contract, for in such a case only a private wrong, and not a public right, is involved (see, e. g., Trans-State Hay & Feed
Corp. v. Faberge, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 669, 360
N.Y.S.2d 886, 319 X.E.2d 201, affg. on
mem. at App.Div., 42 A.D.2d 535, 344 N.Y.
S.2d 730; Van Valkenburgh, Nooger &
Neville v. Hayden Pub. Co., 33 A.D.2d 766,
767, 306 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 [breach of contract by book publisher, which failed deliberately and in breach of good faith to use
"best efforts" to promote plaintiffs books;
punitive damages denied], affd., 30 N.Y.2d
34, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 281 N.E.2d 142 [discussing the facts and particularly the
breach of fair dealing in greater detail],
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cert den., 409 U.S. 875, 93 S.Ct. 125, 34
L.Ed.2d 128; Restatement, Contracts, §
342; 14 N.YJur., Damages, § 183, pp. 4546).
[6] Even if the so-called "malicious"
breach here involved would permit of the
imposition of punitive damages by a court
or jury, it was not the province of arbitrators to do so. Punitive sanctions arc reserved to the State, surely a public policy
"of such magnitude as to call for judicial
intrusion" (Matter of Associated Gen.
Contrs., N. Y. State Chapter [Savin Bros.],
36 N.Y2d 957, 959, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555,
556, 335 N.E.2d 859, 860, supra ). The evil
of permitting an arbitrator whose selection
is often restricted or manipuiatable by the
party in a superior bargaining position, to
award punitive damages is that it displaces
the court and the jury, and therefore the
State, as the engine for imposing a social
sanction. As was so wisely observed by
Judge, then Mr. Justice, Bergan in Matter
of Publisher/ Ass'n of N. V. City (Newspaper Union), 280 App.Div. 500, 503, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401, 404, supra:

wrongs, they have had rather close judicial
supervision. If the usual rules were followed there would be no effective judicial
supervision over punitive awards in arbitration."
The dissent appears to have recognized
the danger in permitting an arbitrator in
his discretion to award unlimited punitive
damages. Thus, it notes that the award
made here was neither "irrational" nor
"unjust" (40 N.Y.2d p. 365, 386 N.Y.S.
2d p. 838, 353 N\E.2d p. 800). Standards
such as these are subjective and afford
no practical guidelines for the arbitrator
and little protection against abuse, and
would, on the other hand, contrary to the
sound development of arbitration law, permit the courts to supervise awards for
their justness (cf. Lentine v. Fundaro, 29
N.Y.2d 382, 386, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422, 278
N.E.2d 633, 635).

"The trouble with an arbitration admitting a power to grant unlimited damages
by way of punishment is that if the court
treated such an award in the way arbitration awards are usually treated, and followed the award to the letter, it would
amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial
power. In the usual case, the court stops
only to inquire if the award is authorized
by the contract; is complete and final on
its face; and if the proceeding was fairly
conducted.

Parties to arbitration agree to the substitution of a private tribunal for purposes of
deciding their disputes without the expense, delay and rigidities of traditional
courts. If arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the usefulness of
arbitration would be destroyed. It would
become a trap for the unwary given the
eminently desirable freedom from judicial
overview of law and facts. It would mean
that the scope of determination by arbitrators, by the license to award punitive damages, would be both unpredictable and uncontrollable. It would lead to a Shylock
principle of doing business without a Portia-like escape from the vise of a logic foreign to arbitration law.

"Actual damage is measurable against
some objective standard—the number of
pounds, or days, or gallons or yards; but
punitive damages take their shape from the
subjective criteria involved in attitudes toward correction and reform, and courts do
not accept readily the delegation of that
kind of power. Where punitive damages
have been allowed for those torts which
are still regarded somewhat as public penal
wrongs as well as actionable private

In imposing penal sanctions in private
arrangements, a tradition of the rule of
law in organized society is violated. One
purpose of the rule of law is to require
that the use of coercion be controlled by
ths State (Kelsen, General Theory of Law
and State, p. 21). In a highly developed
commercial and economic society the use
of private force is not the danger, but the
uncontrolled use of coercive economic
sanctions in private arrangements. For
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centuries the power to punish has been a
monopoly of the State, and not that of any
private individual (Kelsen, loc. cit.% supra),
The day is long past since barbaric man
achieved redress by private punitive measures.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate
Division should be modified, without costs,
to vacate so much of the award which imposes punitive damages, and otherwise affinned,
GABRIELLI, Judge (dissenting).

[7,8] The parties never agreed or, for
that matter, even considered punitive damages as a possible sanction for breach of
the agreement (see dissenting opn. below
by Mr. Justice Capozzoli, 48 A.D2d 814,
370 N.Y.S.2d 6). Here there is no pretense of agreement, although plaintiff author argues feebly that the issue of punitive damages was "waived" by failure to
object originally to the demands for punitive damages, but only later to the award.
The law does not and should not permit
private persons to submit themselves to punitive sanctions of the order reserved to
the State. The freedom of contract does
not embrace the freedom to punish, even
by contract. On this view, there was no
power to waive the limitations on privately
assessed punitive damages and, of course,
no power to agree to them by the failure
to object to the demand for arbitration (cf.
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 704, 65 S.Ct. 895, 900, 89 L.Ed. 1296,
affg., 293 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E2d 259 ["waiver" of right "charged or colored with the
public interest" is ineffective]; see, generally, 6A Corbin, Contracts, § 1515, pp.
728-732 [e. g., "waiver" of defenses to an
usurious agreement is ineffective]).
[9] Under
common-law
principles,
there is eventual supervision of jury
awards of punitive damages, in the singularly rare cases where it is permitted, by
the trial court's power to change awards
and by the Appellate Division's power to
modify such awards (see Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405, n. 3, 223 N.Y.S.2d
488, 491, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, supra).
That the award of punitive damages in this
case was quite modest is immaterial. Such
a happenstance is not one on which to base
a rule.

Although espousing a desire to obviate a
"trap for the unwary" and a "Shylock
principle of doing business without a Portia-like escape" (40 N.Y.2d p. 359, 386
N.Y.S.2d p. 834, 35^ N.E.2d p. 796 the
majority reaches a result favoring a guileful defendant and voids a just and rational award of punitive damages to a
wholly innocent and deserving plaintiff.
Stripped to its essence the defendant, by
willful and fraudulent guises, refused to
pay plaintiff royalties known to be due and
owing to her; forced her to commence actions claiming fraudulent acts and to enforce arbitration to redress the wrongs
done to her and to collect the sums rightfully due; and, finally, defendant waived
any objection to the claim for punitive
damages, deliberately refused to participate
in the arbitration hearing and abruptly left
the hearing without moving against the
claim for punitive damages or even so
much as offering any countervailing evidence or argument on the merits of plaintiff's claims. I cannot, therefore, join
with the majority and conclude, as they
now do, that the ultimate limit of the damages awardable to plaintiff is that bum
which was unquestionably due and owing
to her in any event under the royalty
agreement.
The basic issue presented for our determination is whether, in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant to a contract
containing a broad arbitration clause, an
award of punitive damages is violative of
public policy.
Plaintiff, the author of The Sensuous
Woman and The Sensuous Man, entered
into agreements with the defendant to publish the two books. The agreements con-
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tained identical, broad arbitration clauses
which provide:
"Any controversy or claim arising out of
this agreement or the breach or interpretation thereof shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award may
be entered in the highest court of the forum, State or Federal, having jurisdiction."
A dispute arose between the parties and
in December, 1971 plaintiff commenced an
action for damages against defendant
alleging that defendant and its principal
officer, Lyle Stuart, committed fraud in
inducing her to enter into the agreements,
substantially underpaid her royalties then
due, and engaged in nefarious business activities calculated to harass and annoy her.
Defendant moved for a stay of the action
pending arbitration. The decision on the
motion has been held in abeyance pending
trial of the fraudulent inducement issue,
which as yet has not been held due to protracted pretrial discovery proceedings.
In March, 1974 plaintiff commenced a
new and separate action asserting that defendant had wrongfully withheld an additional $45,000 in royalties during the first
half of 1973. Defendant obtained a stay
of that action pending arbitration and
plaintiff subsequently served a demand for
arbitration. The demand restated the
claim made in the March, 1974 complaint
and also contained an additional claim for
punitive damages allegedly resulting from
defendant's maliciously withholding royalties due plaintiff who charged that it was
done for the unjustifiable and vindictive
purpose of coercing plaintiff to withdraw
the pending 1971 action.

corporate officers, defendant promptly entered objections concerning the standing of
plaintiff to bring the proceeding and certain administrative matters. No objection
was addressed to the demand for punitive
damages. The objections were overruled,
and defendant's representatives walked out
of the hearing and refused to participate
any fufther in the arbitration proceeding.
None of the objections raised at the hearing have ever been renewed.
Following the departure of defendant's
officers and counsel, the arbitrators heard
extensive and, of course, unchallenged evidence from plaintiff. As a result, the arbitrators awarded plaintiff $45,000 on her
claim for royalties and $7,500 in punitive
damages plus interest and fees. When
plaintiff moved to confirm tlie award, defendant objected, for the first time, that an
award of punitive damages is violative of
public policy and beyond the scope of the
authority of the arbitrators. Special Term
confined the award and the Appellate Division upheld that determination. I would
affirm.

Defendant participated in the selection
of the arbitrators and appeared at the
hearing. Represented by counsel and two

In doing so, I would reject the notion
that this award of punitive damages is violative of public policy. We have only recently treated with a somewhat similar argument in Matter of Associated Gen.
Contrs., N- J7- State Chapter (Savin Bros.),
36 N.V.2d 957, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555, 335
N.E.2d 859. There we considered the effect of a public policy argument against
penalty awards with respect to an arbitration commenced by a national trade association in the construction industry against
one of its employer-members pursuant to
the provisions of a broad arbitration clause
contained in the association agreement.
Specifically at issue was whether an arbitration award of treble liquidated damages,
assessed in accordance with the express
terms of the agreement, was enforceable.*

• The agreement provided that where an arbitrator found that a member had violated the
terms of the agreement, damages were to
be awarded " "in an amount no less than
three (3) times the daily liquidated damage

amount provided for in each * * * heavy
and highway construction contract to which
the undersigned firm is a party within the
geographic area of the applicable labor contract * * * for each * * • day the

GAMUTS' v. LYLE STUART, I N C
Clt»M35SN.R.2d79»

We held that since the arbitration was in
consequence of a broad arbitration clause
and concerned no third-party interests
which could be said to transcend the concerns of the parties to the arbitration,
there was present (p. 959, 373 N.Y.S2d p.
556, 335 N.E2d p. 860) "no question involving public policy of such magnitude as
to call for judicial intrusion" (see, also,
Matter of Riccardi [Modern Silver Linen
Supply Co.], 36 N.Y2d 945, 373 N.Y.S2d
551, 335 N.E.2d 856; cf. Hirsch v. Hirsch,
37 N.Y2d 312, 372 N.Y.S.2d 71, 333 N.E.
2d 371). The Associated Gen, Contrs. case
may be contrasted with Matter of Aimcee
Wholesale Corp. (Tomar Prods.), 21 N.Y.
2d 621, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 237 N.E.2d 223.
where the issue to be arbitrated concerned
the enforcement of State antitrust law, a
matter which was, as we said in Aetna
Life & Cos. Co. v. Stekardis, 34 N.Y2d
182, 186, n., 356 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589, 313 X.
E2d 53, 54, "of overriding public policy
significance such as to call for judicial intervention dehors the provisions of CPLR
7503". Other policies, "especially those
embodied in statutory form" {Matter of
Aimcee, supra, 21 N.Y.2d at p. 629, 289 N.
Y.S.2d at p. 974, 237 N.E.2d at p. 227),
have also been accorded similar significance (see Matter of Knickerbocker Agency [Holz], 4 N.Y2d 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602,
149 N.E.2d 885 [liquidation of defunct insurance companies]; Durst v. A brash, 17
N.Y.2d 445, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806, 213 N.E2d
887 [usury law]; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 [Securities
Act of 1933 violation]; American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. Maguire Co., 2 Cir., 391
F.2d 821 [Federal antitrust law]).
The case at bar falls within the rationale
and rule of the Associated Gen. Contrs.
case. Controlling here, as there, is the
fact that the arbitration clause is broad indeed ; there are no third-party interests involved; and the public policy against punifirm complained of is found by the arbitrator
to have been in violation of its obligation.s'."
{Matter of Associated Gen. Contrs., supra,
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tive damages is not so commanding that
the Legislature has found it necessary to
embody that policy into law, especially one
that would apply to all cases involving
such damages irrespective of the amount
sought, the relative size of the award, or
the punishable actions of the parties. Or,
put another way, the public policy which
"favors the peaceful resolutions of disputes
through arbitration" (Associated Gen.
Contrs., supra, at p. 959, 373 N.Y.S2d at p.
556, 335 N.E.2d at p. 859) outweighs the
public policy disfavoring the assessment of
punitive damages in this instance, where
the unjustifiable conduct complained of is
found to be with malice. I would conclude, therefore, that any public policy limiting punitive damage awards does not rise
to that level of significance in this case as
to require judicial intervention.
The majority would distinguish the Associated Gen. Contrs. case (supra) upon
the thin ground that the enforcement of a
treble liquidated damages clause which was
applicable to numerous nationwide contracts that conceivably could have amounted to astronomical sums is not the equivalent of the enforcement of an award oi
penalty damages. However, as Mr. Justice
Greenblott specifically stated for the majority below in that case, and in an opinion
expressly approved by this court, the
amount of damages therein computed in
the arbitration bore "wo reasonable relationship to the amount of damages which
may be sustained" (emphasis added; 45
A.D.2d 136, 140, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378);
and a contract clause which is grossly disproportionate to the presumable damage or
readily ascertainable loss is a penalty
clause, irrespective of its label (Equitable
Lbr. Corp. v. IPA Land Development
Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 521-522, 381 N.Y.S.
2d 459, 462-463, 344 N.E.2d 391, 395-396;
Ward v. Hudson Riv. Bldg. Co., 125 N.Y.
230, 235, 26 N.E. 256, 257; see Wirth &
36 N.Y.2d p. 958, 373 N.Y.S.2d p. 555, 335
X.E.2d p. 859.).
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Hamid Fair Booking v. Wirth, 265 N.Y.
2\4, \92 N.E. 297; Uniform Commercia\
Code, $ 2-718, subd [1]; Restatement,
Contracts, § 339; 3 Williston, Contracts
[rev. ed.], | 779). In short. Associated
Gen. Contrs, is not only apposite but is
controlling. Conversely, Matter of Publishers' Assn. of N. Y> City (Newspaper
Union), 280 App.Div. 500, 504-506, 114 N.
Y.S2d 401, 404-406, decided in 1951, and a
predicate for the majority holding, has
been seriously questioned and said to be of
"doubtful validity" (8 Weinstein-KomMiller, N.Y.Civ.Prac, par. 7510.07) due to
the subsequent enactment of CPLR 7501
which intentionally broadened the scope of
arbitration and made awards therein enforceable "without regard to the justiciable
character of the controversy". Even the
court which authored Publishers' Asfn
now agrees that the issue there considered
was not properly framed (see Associated
Gen. Contrs., 45 A.D.2d at p. 142, 356 N.
Y.S.2d at p. 380, supra).

from these cases, therefore, is that only
wheTe the puttie interest ciearty supersedes
the concerns of the parties should courts
intervene and assert exclusive dominion
over disputes in arbitration (see Comment,
Judicial Review of Arbitration: Role of
Public Policy, 58 Nw.U.L.Rev. 545, 554555 J see, also, McLaughlin, Supplementary
Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.
Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR 7501,
Supp., p. 164; Note, 52 Col.L.Rev. 943,
945).

Nor can we hold, as defendant also
urges, that the arbitrators exceeded their
authority in awarding punitive damages to
plaintiff. Arbitrators are entitled to "do
justice. It has been said that, short of
'complete irrationality', 'they may fashion
the law to fit the facts before them'"
(Lentine v. Fundarot 29 N.Y.2d 382, 386,
328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422, 278 N.E.2d 633, 636,
quoting Matter of National Cash Register
Co. [Wilson], 8 N.Y.2d 177, m, 208 N.Y.
S.2d 951, 955, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305, and
An affirmance here would do no vioMatter of Exercycle Corp. [Maratta], 9
lence to precedents in this court. In at
N.Y.2d 329, 336, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 357, 174
least two varied circumstances we have
N.E-2d 463, 466; see, also, Matter of Specheld that although public policy would bar
trum Fabrics Corp. [Main St. Fashions],
a civil suit for relief, that same public poli309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416, affg., 285
cy was not of such overriding import as to
App.Div. 710, 139 N.Y.S.2d 612). The
preclude confirmation of an arbitration
award
made here was neither irrational
award (Matter of Staklinski [Pyramid
nor
unjust.
Indeed, defendant has not deBlec* Co.], 6 N.Y.2d 159, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541,
nied
that
its
actions were designed to ha160 N.E.2d 78; Matter of Ruppert [Egelrass
and
intimidate
plaintiff, as she
hofer], 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785,
148 N.E2d 129). In Ruppert was permit- claimed and the arbitrators obviously conted the enjoining of a work stoppage in a cluded. Hence, the award was within the
labor dispute by arbitration despite the fact power vested in the arbitrator.
that the issuance of such relief by a court
As viz tawt noted, pUintiii sought £VK\\vi&s prohibited by statute ^thw Civil Practive
damages as listed and set forth in the
tice Act, § 876-a). Similarly, in Staklinski, citing Ruppert, we upheld an arbitra- demand for arbitration, presenting of
tion award of specific performance of an course a threshold question to which deemployment contract -in the face of the fendant failed to respond and, in fact, sumpublic policy against compelling a corpora- marily refused to address himself. In eftion to continue the services of an officer fect, therefore, defendant's failure to act,
whose services were unsatisfactory to the respond or contest the claim is tantamount
board of directors. The rule to be distilled to a waiver of any objection thereto and,

RILEY T. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS MFG. CORP.
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indeed, it equivalent to an agreement to arbitrate the allegation now complained of.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate
Division should be affirmed.
JASEN, FUCHSBERG and COOKE,
JJ., concur with BREITEL, C J.
GABRIELLI, Jn dissents and votes to
affirm in a separate opinion in which
JONES and WACHTLER, J J., concur.
Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so
modified, affirmed.

i n MJMMI
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presented a claim, advance payments of
compensation had been made by the employer within three years of the presentation of the formal claim, liability could not
be shifted to the Special Fund; and that
advance payments of compensation made
by predecessor corporations were binding
on the current corporate employer of the
claimant
Affirmed.
I. Workmen's Compensation <8=»l 030.2
There is no express requirement, in
order to shift liability for workmen's compensation benefits to the Special Fund for
reopened cases, that there be a formal
opening of a claim or a prior formal
award. Workmen's Compensation Law §

25-a.
2. Workmen's Compensation <S=»I030.2
40 N.Y.2d 366
In the Matter of George RILEY, Respondent,
v.
AIRCRAFT PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION ot aL, Appellants,

and
Special Fund for Reopened Cam,
Respondent,
Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent.
Court of Appeals of New York.
July 8, 1076.
Employer and its insurer appealed
from order of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, which affirmed decision of
Workmen's Compensation Board that
award to claimant was not chargeable to
the Special Fund, for reopened cases. The
Court of Appeals, Breitel, C J., held that
although there is no express requirement
that there have beenji formal opening of a
claim or a prior award before liability can
be shifted to the Special Fund, where, although seven years had elapsed between
time of claimant's accident and time that
he became totally disabled and formally
353 N E 2d—SI

In the case of "stale" initial claims, i.
e., claims arising from old injuries without
there ever having been a formal opening
or award, it is consistent with objective of
statute creating the Special Fund for reopened cases to shift liability to the Special
Fund for an old accident and dormant
compensation matter. Workmen's Compensation Law § 25-a.
3. Workmen's Compensation <$»I030.2
Where, although seven years elapsed
between time of claimant's accident and
time that claimant became totally disabled
and filed formal claim for workmen's compensation, employer had made advance
payments of compensation within three
years prior to presentation of formal claim,
liability for the claim could not be shifted
to the Special Fund for reopened cases.
Workmen's Compensation Law § 25-a.
4. Workmen's Compensation <§=>I030.2
Initial "stale" workmen's compensation
claims are to be measured, for purposes of
shifting liability to the Special Fund, for
reopened cases, from the last payment of
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efforts to have the stock delivered were
exerted here.
Notwithstanding the caution demanded
of a trial court in ruling on a motion for a
nonsuit and of an appellate court in reviewing the ruling it is apparent that plaintiff's evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to him was insufficient and that
the ruling of the trial court was correct
Order and judgment affirmed.
WOOD, P. J.f and FOURT, J., concur.

STOTBO

GENERAL METALS CORPORATION, a
corporation, and Adel Precision Products,
a Division of General Metals Corporation,
Petitioners and Respondents,
v.
PRECISION LODGE 1600 OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, A.F.L.-C.I.O., an unincorporated
voluntary association, and Fred J. Goodman, Defendants and Appellants,
and
Daniel F. Fitzpatrlck, as a member, Business
Representative and on behalf of Precision
Lodge No. 1600 of the International Association of Machinists, A.F.L.-C.I.O., CrossPetitioner and Appellant.
Civ. 24051.
District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 3, California.
Aug. 5, 1960.
Petition to vacate an award of an
arbitrator under a collective bargaining
agreement. From an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Bayard
Rhone, J., vacating the award and denying
a petition for a confirmation, the union and
others appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Shinn, P. J., held that where pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement, grievance of an employee was referred to an im-

partial arbitrator and agreement required
the arbitrator to render his decision in writing not later than 15 days after taking the
matter under submission, award was properly vacated where it was not rendered
within the 15 days as required by the
agreement.
Order affirmed.
1. Arbitration and Award <&=>50
When the time for making an award
has been fixed by the agreement of the parties, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to
make an award after the time has expired
and it must be vacated upon proper application.
2. Labor Relations <§=460
Where, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, grievance of an employee was referred to an impartial arbitrator and agreement required the arbitrator to
render his decision in writing not later than
15 days after taking the matter under submission, award was properly vacated where
it was not rendered within the 15 days as
required by the agreement. West's Ann.
Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1287, 1288.
3. Labor Relations <£=479
Where an arbitrator under collective
bargaining agreement was without jurisdiction to act on date specified for failure
to render his decision within 15 days, it was
immaterial whether the employer suffered
prejudice by reason of the delay and the
award was a nullity and it was properly set
aside. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1287,
1288.

Rose, Klein & Marias, by Alfred M.
Klein, Los Angeles, for appellants.
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton,
Los Angeles, for respondents.
SHINN, Presiding Justice.
This is an appeal by Precision Lodge 1600
of the International Association of Machinists, and Fred J. Goodman from an order vacating the award of an arbitrator

OOLLISON r. THOMAS
Cite MB9 CaLBptr. «U
and denying a petition for confirmation of
the award.
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and General Metals
Corporation, the grievance of an employe
named Goodman was referred to an impartial arbitrator selected by the parties. Article VII, section 2 of the agreement provided: "Said arbiter shall render his decision in writing not later than fifteen (15)
days after he has taken the matter under
submission." The arbitrator took the matter under submission on May 9, 1958 and
rendered his decision in favor of Goodman
on July 10th. The company petitioned
the court to vacate the award and the Union
petitioned to confirm it Code Civ.Proc. §§
1287, 1288. The court ordered the award
annulled upon the ground that it had not
been rendered within IS days, as required by
the arbitration agreement.
[1,2] The decisive question presented
on the appeal is whether the court correctly vacated the award because it was not
rendered within the 15-day period. The
question must be answered in the affirmative. It has been the law of California
since 1866 that when the time for making
an award has been fixed by agreement of
the parties, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to make an award after the time has
expired and the same must be vacated by the
court upon proper application. Ryan v.
Dougherty, 30 Cal. 218; In re Abrams
and Brennan, 2 Cal.App. 237, 84 P. 363;
Matter of Silhman, 159 Cal. 155, 113 P. 135;
Willis Finance & Construction Co. v. Porter, 88 Cal.App. 523, 263 P. 842. This view
is in accord with the weight of authority.
See cases collected in 154 A.L.R. 1392. Appellants frankly concede that the provision
that the arbiter shall render his decision
within 15 days is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
[3] Appellants insist, however, that no
harm resulted. Since the arbitrator was
without jurisdiction to act on July 10th it
is immaterial whether the company suffered
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prejudice by reason of the tfefay. The
award was a nullity and it was properly set
aside.
The order is affirmed.
VALLfiE and FORD, JJ., concur.
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Edna M. COLLISON, as AdministratrixWlthvrbe-Will-Annexed of the Estate of
Masi* E. O'Brien, Deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
Louis Franklin THOMAS, Successor Administrator of the Estate of William P.
O'Brien, Deceased, Defendant.
Edna M. COLLISON, as AdmlnlstratrlxWith.The-Wlll-Annexed of the Estate of
Masi* E. O'Brien, Deceased, Plaintiff,
Crosa-Defendant and Appellant,
and
Charles T. Rippy, Cross-Defendant and
Appellant,
v.
Louis Franklin THOMAS, Successor Administrator of the Estate of William P. O'Brien,
Deceased, Defendant, Cross-Complainant
and Respondent.
Civ. 24567.
District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 1, California.
Aug 8, 1060
Rehearing Denied Aug. 29, 1960.
Hearing Granted Oct. 5, 1960.
Action to quiet title and to reform certain instruments in connection with the acquisition of title and for an accounting and
damages. The defendant filed a crosscomplaint. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Arnold Praeger, J., entered
judgment and plaintiff and cross-defendants
appealed. The District Court of Appeal,
Lillie, J., held that the evidence was sufficient to support implied finding that home-

7IH
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WashJM 32,308 P i d 689, where the parties
occupied comparable positions, and a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed.
[3] The plaintiffs' argument, in support
of the order granting a new trial, seems to
be that even if half of the Greenwood car
was on the wrong side of the road, the arc
of the turn the Bogue car was making was
such that the next fraction of a second
would have brought it over onto the plaintiffs' side of the road, and a collision would
have occurred even had the Greenwood car
been entirely on its own side of the road;
and it being astraddle of the center line
would, therefore, not have been a proximate
cause of the collision. That was likewise
the contention of the plaintiff in Zahler v.
Dittmer, supra.
The answer* given in that case, is likewise
applicable here. Whether the Bogue car
would have ultimately gone onto the plaintiffs' side of the road is a matter of speculation ; and what the consequences and result
of an entirely different collision would be,
if it had occurred, is likewise speculative.
The jury was, as we have indicated, warranted in finding that the negligence of
plaintiff Jean Greenwood, in driving on the
wrong side of the road, was a proximate
cause of the collision which did occur. No
cases are cited to support the plaintiffs'
theory of liability based on prospective negligence.
We have accepted the invitation to read
the record in this case, and have gone into
the merits only because there was some feeling that we had not heretofore made it clear
that a statement that "the evidence is not
suftcravX to s\\bmT\ t\vt \'^id\ct," dots T\O\.
comply with the requirement of general rule
of the superior court 16, as amended, that an
order granting a motion for a new trial give
"definite reasons of law and facts for so
doing."
The order granting a new trial is vacated;
and the trial court directed to reinstate the
verdict of the jury, and enter a judgment
thereon.
WEAVER, C. J., and MALLERY,
FINLEY and FOSTER, JJ., concur.

GEO. V. NOLTE 4 CO, a corporation,
Respondent,
v.
PIELER CONSTRUCTION CO., a corporatton, Appellant,
Geo. V. Nolte and Fred M. Harris, doing business as Geo. V. Nolte * Co., Additional
Respondents.
No. 34806.

Supreme Court of Washington,
Department 1.
April 9, 1958.

Action by subcontractor against construction corporation to recover balance
due for construction of sidewalks and
curbs. The Superior Court, Skagit County,
A. M- Ward, J., entered judgment in favor
of the subcontractor, and corporation appealed. The Supreme Court, Ott, J., held
that where corporation on September 2,
1954, notified subcontractor that corporation would withhold portion of balance due
for the construction work, subcontractor on
October 15 filed suit for balance due, corporation on January 4, 1955, filed answer
which alleged contract provided for arbitration before maintenance of civil action and
filed cross-complaint, subcontractor on February 6, 1955, made written offer to arbitrate, and lapse until subcontractor on
March 22, 1956, renewed offer to arbitrate
was attributable to filing of cross-complaint,
the lapsed time from notification of September 2, 1954, until renewal offer of
March 22, 1956, was not unreasonable, and
failure of subcontractor to offer to arli
trate prior to bringing action did not bar
subcontractor from maintenance thereof.
Affirmed.

I. contracts <3=>322(l)

When contracting parties have agreed
that condition of contract must be performed within reasonable time, party who
asserts time of performance to have been
unreasonable has burden to prove its unreasonableness.

QEO, V. NOLTB 4 0 0 . v. PIELEB OONSTBUOTION C a
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facts $»290
^Covenant in contract providing for
tion can be waived
Infracts <8=>227
^Waiver of condition of contract can
^accomplished, expressly or impliedly.

due for construction of sidewalks and
curbs, evidence supported finding that sub*
contractor in every respect performed provisions of contract

ontracts <8»I76(I)
If waiver of condition of contract is
aplished by implication, it is issue to
[£ determined by court, based upon facts
circumstances relied upon.

Lycette, Diamond & Sylvester, Lyle L.
Iversen, Seattle, for appellant
Sherwood & Forrest, Livesey, Kingsbury
& Livesey, Bellingham, for respondent

eCwitracts <S»284<3)
%t Where construction corporation on
September 2, 1954, notified subcontractor
that the corporation would withhold portion of balance due subcontractor for construction of sidewalks and curbs, subcontractor on October IS filed suit for balance
doe, corporation on January 4, 1955, filed
answer which alleged subcontract provided
Sor arbitration before maintenance of civil
action and filed cross-complaint, subcontractor on February 6, 1955, made written
offer to arbitrate, and lapse until subcontractor on March 22, 1956, renewed offer
was attributable to filing of the crosscomplaint, lapsed time from notification of
September 2, 1954, until renewal offer of
March 22, 1956, was not unreasonable, and
failure of subcontractor to offer to arbitrate prior to bringing action for balance
due did not bar subcontractor from maintenance of such action.
6. Arbitration and Award <3=82(4)
Where subcontractor requested arbitration with prime contractor for subcontractors claims for construction of streets,
curbs, sidewalks, utilities, site improvements, and landscaping, including rehabilitation expense of sidewalks and curbs, which
had been constructed by sub-subcontractor,
award of arbitrators adjudicated only
rights of subcontractor and prime contractor, and did not bar proceeding by subsubcontractor against subcontractor for
balance due under contract between subsubcontractor and subcontractor.
7. Contracts C=>322(4)
In action by subcontractor against construction corporation to recover balance

OTT, Justice.
Myers, Major & Co., a copartnership
(hereinafter referred to as Myers), was
the successful bidder for the construction
of a Federal housing administration project
at the Naval Air Station on Whidbey island. April 24, 1952, Myers, the prime
contractor, entered into a subcontract with
Pieler Construction Co. (herinafter referred to as Pieler) for the construction of
certain streets, curbs, sidewalks, utilities,
site improvements, and landscaping on the
project, for a total of $246,500.
On or about May 19, 1952, Geo. V.
Nolte and Fred M. Harris, doing business
as Geo. V. Nolte & Co. (subsequently incorporated and hereinafter referred to as
Nolte), entered into a written agreement
with Pieler to construct, according to the
plans and specifications, the curbing and
sidewalks of the Pieler subcontract, for
the flat sum of $40,152.25.
The prime contract provided that, if a
disagreement should arise between the parties thereto, such dispute must first be
submitted for arbitration as "a condition
precedent to any right of legal action that
either party may have against the other."
This provision was carried, by reference,
into the other contracts involved.
Nolte constructed the curbs and sidewalks, in full compliance with the plans
and specifications, nearly two years before
the completion of the prime contract, and
was paid $33,547.90 on account. The FHA
inspector refused to accept the curbs and
sidewalks because, in the interim, the sidewalks had become broken and cracked and
the curbs had sunk below the elevation
specified. The prime contractor, Myers,
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notified the subcontractor, Pieler, of the
FHA rejection. Pieler requested Notte tar
repair the damages and make the construction acceptable to the FHA inspector,
or Pieler would do it and charge Nolte for
i t Nolte insisted it had constructed the
curbs and sidewalks according to the plans
and specifications; that the sidewalks,
through no fault ol Nolte, had become
broken because of the activity of trucks
driving over the finished sidewalks without
proper protection; and that the curbs had
sunk because the engineers' plans had not
required adequate ballast before construction. Nolte refused to do the work again
unless the additional work and materials
would be paid for. Pieler notified Nolte
that it had elected to do the rehabilitation
work and would recover from the persons
responsible for the damage. The cost of
the rehabilitation was $7,082.22.
Pieler requested arbitration with Myers
for claims aggregating $34,223.60 as its
subcontractor, and included its claim for
rehabilitation expense of the sidewalks
and curbs. At the arbitration hearing,
Pieler called Mr. Nolte as its witness, who
testified that his company had performed
the contract with reference to the construction of the sidewalks and curbs in
accordance with the plans and specifications. No evidence was presented refuting
the Nolte testimony. The arbitrators denied $5,642.39 of Pieler's claim for these
items, for the reasons that there was some
evidence of improper impaction along the
line of the curbs, and they could not determine from the evidence what portion of
the damage to the sidewalks was due to
trucks driving over them as distinguished
from other causes and what portion of the
rehabilitation work was accomplished by
Meyers and what portion by Pieler. Pieler
permitted the judgment of award to become final.
September 2, 1954, Pieler informed Nolte
of the Myers-Pieler arbitrators' award and
notified Nolte that it was withholding the
amount disallowed from the balance due
Nolte. October 15, 1954, Nolte commenced
its first action (Island county cause No.

3364) to recover the balance due it from
Pieler. Pieter's affirmative answer, filed
January 4, 1955, alleged that its contract
with Nolte provided for arbitration as a
condition precedent to the maintenance of
a civil action, and that Nolte had not requested arbitration. Pieler also cross-complained against Nolte for sums due it under
the contract Nolte's written offer to arbitrate during the pendency of this proceeding, dated February 24, 1955, was refused by Pieler March 7, 1955. May 26,
1955, Nolte's reply to Pieler's answer alleged its offer to arbitrate had been refused. December 2, 1955, Pieler moved
for summary judgment, alleging that
Nolte's failure to arbitrate prior to bringing the action barred it from the maintenance thereof. March 5, 1956, the court
filed its memorandum opinion on the motion
for summary judgment, in which it held,
inter alia, that Pieler's cross-complaint did
not constitute a waiver of the arbitration
covenant because it had been pleaded affirmatively as a bar, and that Nolte's offer
to arbitrate was not timely because it did
not in fact precede the commencement of
the action but was subsequent thereto.
March 21, 1956, judgment was entered
dismissing both causes of action without
prejudice. There was no appeal.
Nolte renewed its written offer to arbitrate on March 22, 1956. It was refused
by Pieler March 26f 1956.
June 20, 1956, Nolte commenced the instant action to recover the balance due
from Pieler. From a judgment entered
in favor of Nolte, Pieler appeals.
Appellant's first contention on appeal \*
that Nolte's offer to arbitrate was not time
ly made and constituted a bar to any judgment for Nolte.
Article 40 of the "General Conditions"
of the American Institute of Architects
provided in part as follows: " * * * the
demand for arbitration shall be made within a reasonable time after the dispute has
arisen; * * *."
In Vance v. Mutual Gold Corp., 1940, 6
Wash.2d 466, 478, 108 P.2d 799, 805, we
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i definition of "reasonable time*
uch length of time as may fairly,
y, and reasonably be allowed
^ ^ q u i r e d , having regard to the na" ~ of the act or duty, or of the submatter, and to the attending ciritances,*,r
When contracting parties have
that a condition of the contract
be performed within a reasonable
the party who asserts the time of
formance to have been unreasonable
the burden to prove its unreasonableiiess.
[2-4] A covenant in a contract providing for arbitration can be waived.
fttgtt Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v.
take Washington Shipyards, 1939, 1 Wash.
id 401, 410, 96 P.2d 257; 3 Am.Jur. 887,
Arbitration and Award, § 56. A waiver
of a condition can be accomplished, expressly or impliedly. Puget Sound Bridge
& Dredging Co. v. Lake Washington Shipyards, supra. If a waiver is accomplished
by implication, it, likewise, is an issue to be
determined by the court, based upon the
facts and circumstances relied upon.
[5] Of the time that elapsed between
September 2, 1954 (the date a dispute arose
between Pieler and Nolte), and March 22,
1956 (the date Nolte renewed its offer to
arbitrate), all that is reasonably chargeable
to Nolte alone is from September 2, 1954,
to February 6, 1955 (the date of Noite's
first written offer to arbitrate). The remaining fourteen months' time lapse was
attributable solely to Pieler's filing of its
cross-complaint, which raised a bona fide
contention on the part of Nolte that a
waiver was thereby implied.
Applying the above rules to these circumstances, Pieler failed to establish the
elapsed time to be unreasonable; nor was
there any evidence that the elapsed time
chargeable to Nolte or to either of the parties caused Pieler any loss. We find no
merit in appellant's first assignment of
error.
337 P.2d—45H

Appellant next contends that the request
for arbitration was not timely made for the
reason that A r t 40, supra, provided in
part: " * * * in no case, however, shall
the demand [for arbitration] be made later
than the time of final payment, * * * "
and that the final payment referred to was
the final payment between Myers and
Pieler.
The A.I.A. articles were a part of the
Myers-Pieler contract; likewise, they were
a part of the Pieler-Nolte contract. In
interpreting the meaning of the A.I.A.
articles as they apply to the Pieler-Nolte
contract, the words "final payment" could
refer only to the final payment between
Pieler and Nolte. We find no merit in this
contention.
[6] Appellant next contends that Nolte
was a party to the original arbitration proceeding between Myers and Pieler, and
that, Nolte having taken no appeal from the
judgment of award, its claim was barred by
the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
With this contention we do not agree.
Pieler requested arbitration with M>crs.
The subject matter for arbitration was the
Myers-Pieler contract. The award of the
arbitrators adjudicated only the rights of
the parties to the M>ers-Pieler contract.
Nolte was not a party to the Mvers-Pieler
arbitration. The award of arbitration in
the Myers-Pieler contract was not a bar
to the instant proceeding because it lacked
concurrence of at least two of the required
elements. See Svmington v. Hudson, 1952,
40 Wash 2d 331, 243 P 2d 484.
[7] Finally, the court found that Nolte
in every respect performed the provisions
of its contract with Pieler. The findings
of the court are supported by the record.
We find no merit in appellant's remaining assignments of error.
The judgment is affirmed.
WEAVER, C J., and MALLERY,
DONWORTH, and HUNTER, JJ., concur.
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HIGHLAND CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants
and Respondents,
v.
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY
OF MARYLAND, Third Party
Defendant and Appellant
No. 17900.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 3, 1984.
Subcontractor who was successful bidder on concrete substructures and piping
work to be installed in coal handling facility filed suit against general contractor, and
owner of facility alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy,
quantum meruit, tortious interference with
contractual rights, business interference
and economic duress, as well as punitive
damage claims. General contractor counterclaimed for breach of contract and resulting damages for costs which it incurred
in substituting work to be performed by
subcontractor, and for losses due to winter
work and business reputation damages.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Christine M. Durham, J., granted a directed
verdict in favor of all defendants, and entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of
general contractor on its counterclaim.
Subcontractor appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) trial court
did not err in refusing to permit subcontractor to prove its damages under total
cost, quantum meruit, or "jury verdict"
theories; (2) subcontractor was not entitled
to punitive damages or business losses; (3)
trial court properly presented issues to jury
as instructions- covered theories of both
parties; (4) trial court did not err in excluding testimony of subcontractor's expert
witness, since subcontractor offered no
data upon which expert could base his opin-

ion; (5) trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding to general contractor
costs of depositions of subcontractor's witnesses; and (6) trial court erred in awarding owner of facility its costs since its
memorandum of costs was not timely.
Affirmed as modified.
1. Appeal and Error <s»927(7)
On review of a directed verdict, Supreme Court will view evidence in light
most favorable to party against whom verdict was directed, in order to determine
whether it established a prima facie case.
2. Damages <s=>184
Some degree of uncertainty in evidence
of damages will not relieve a defendant
from recompensing a wronged plaintiff;
however, plaintiff must show damages by
evidence of facts and not by mere conclusions, and items of damage must be established by substantial evidence and not by
conjecture.
3. Damages <s=>15
Whether general or special, damages
must be traceable to wrongs complained of.
4. Damages <®=>124(1)
Trial court in action by subcontractor
alleging breach of contract did not err in
refusing to permit subcontractor to prove
its damages under theory of total cost,
where nature of alleged losses did not
make it impossible or highly impractical to
determine them with a reasonable degree
of accuracy, subcontractor's bid or estimate was not realistic, and by its own
admissions and contradictory statements
on direct and cross-examination, subcontractor shouldered major portion of blame
for added expenses due to delays, excessive
costs and loss of work.
5. Damages <£=>191
Where subcontractor failed to prove
causation between its costs and breach of
any particular defendant, it was not entitled to present evidence under total cost
theory of damages.
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& Contracts <s»303U)
Performance under bid is not excused
because difficulties are encountered and
recovery under such circumstances is restricted to extra work only.
7. Damages <*=»117
Damages are controlled by contractual
remedies fashioned by the parties unless it
can be shown that work performed was so
different from work contemplated by the
contract that additional recovery in quantum meruit is warranted.
8. Implied and Constructive Contracts
<*=>65
Trial court in breach of contract action
brought by subcontractor did not err in
refusing to permit subcontractor to prove
its damages under quantum meruit theory,
where subcontractor's work was anticipated and work was performed in pursuance
of the contract; moreover, although subcontractor claimed it had been unjustifiably
terminated, it failed to prove in what r e
spects work performed by it differed from
work contemplated by the contract.
9. Damages e=»189
Trial court in breach of contract action
brought by subcontractor did not err in
refusing to permit subcontractor to prove
its damages under "jury verdict" theory of
recovery, where subcontractor erected insurmountable barrier to successful proffer
of damage evidence by its complete inability to make causal connection between its
losses on project and commissions or omissions of defendants or some of them.
10. Damages e=>89(2)
Punitive damages cannot be awarded
for breach of contract unless the breach
amounts to an independent tort.
11. Damages <^»23
Consequential damages will be awarded if losses resulting from a breach were
reasonably within contemplation of parties
when they entered into contract.
12. Damages <3=>189
Where claim for damages by subcontractor remained unsupported by sufficient

documentation to allow jury to reasonably
ai/er causa/ity between breaches of defendants and losses by subcontractor, claim of
business losses and consequential damages
did not rise to level of proof required to
permit recovery.
13. Contracts «=>353(1)
Trial court in breach of contract action
properly presented issues to jury, where
theories of both parties were covered by its
instructions.
14. Contracts <&=>323(1)
Dismissal of individual defendants
from breach of contract action was not
error, where there was no proffer of evidence of damages attributable to them personally.
15. Evidence <s=553(2)
Trial court in breach of contract action
brought by subcontractor property excluded testimony of subcontractor's expert witness with respect to hypothetical question
that tardy delivery of plans, unavailability
of construction sites, incomplete and defective j)lans and similar negative conditions
would have adverse effect upon man and
equipment hours, and that it was not practical or possible to quantify and assign a
dollar* value to each of such conditions,
wher$ subcontractor cited no data upon
which expert could base his opinion. Rules
of Evjd., Rule 56(2).
16. Costs <s=*193
Supreme Court will allow deposition
costs as necessary and reasonable where
development of the case is of such a complex nature that discovery cannot be accomplished through less expensive method
of interrogatories, requests for admissions
and requests for production of documents;
award of such costs should be narrowly
made to guard against abuse by those better financially equipped lest costs of seeking justice become prohibitive for the financially ill equipped.
17. Costs <s*154, 193
Trial court in breach of construction
contract action did not abuse its discretion
in awarding costs of depositions of subcon-
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tractor's witnesses to general contractor,
since complexity of case and theories of
recovery proposed by subcontractor made
it virtually impossible to obtain sufficient
information for preparation of case
through more conservative methods of discovery; moreover, depositions were used at
trial on cross-examination, both to impeach
veracity and to refresh memory.
18. Costs <*»203
Trial court erred in awarding prevailing defendant its costs when memorandum
of costs was not timely filed. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 54(dX2).
Merlin R. Lybbert and Rex E. Madsen,
Salt Lake City, for Highland.
Richard H. Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for
third party defendant and appellant.
James P. Cowley, Robert A. Peterson,
David A. Greenwood, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiff, Highland Construction Company, appeals from a directed verdict of no
cause of action for failure to introduce any
admissible evidence of the quantity of damages it allegedly had sustained under a
construction contract. The appeal is taken
against Dravo Corporation, Carbon County
Coal Company and its general partners,
Rocky Mountain Energy Company and
Dravo Coal Company, hereinafter collectively referred to as Carbon; Lamb Engineering & Construction Company (Lamb);
and Michael R. Lamb and James R. Lamb,
as well as Industrial Indemnity Company.
None of the other parties is before us on
this appeal for reasons not relevant to our
review.
Plaintiff was the successful bidder on
concrete substructures and piping work to
be installed in a coal handling facility under
construction near Hanna, Wyoming. On
March 26, 1979 Highland entered into a
written subcontract with Lamb which was
the general contractor for Carbon, owner
of the facility. The bid price was $1,097,325. Completion of the work under the

subcontract was scheduled for August 15,
1979.
On July 9, 1979 Lamb partially terminated Highland's work for its failure to comply with working schedules on four of the
concrete foundations under construction.
Highland was allowed to continue the remaining contract work, but was completely
terminated on December 27, 1979, after
three additional partial terminations by
Lamb in August, September and October of
that year.
Highland filed suit against Lamb, Carbon
and Lamb's surety, Industrial Indemnity
Company, Richard R. Lamb and James R.
Lamb, alleging breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, quantum meruit, tortious interference with contractual
rights, business interference and economic
duress, as well as punitive damage claims.
Lamb counterclaimed for breach of contract and resulting damages for costs
which it incurred in substituting work to be
performed by Highland, and for losses due
to winter work and business reputation
damages. The case was tried before a
jury. At the end of the liability phase of
its case, Highland proffered evidence on a
"total cost" theory and the opinion of its
expert that Highland's damages approximated its total expenditures on the job
(which included a built-in profit), less the
amount it had been paid by Lamb. No
allocation of damages among the various
defendants was made. Defendants objected to that proffer, the objection was sustained, and Highland rested without fu»*
ther proof of damages. Defendants then
moved the court for a directed verdict
which the court granted. Judgment was
entered in favor of all defendants, no cause
of action. The trial proceeded on Lamb's
counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict
on special interrogatories against Highland, awarding damages in the sum of
$242,660.25 as a result of Highland's
breach of contract.
Highland appeals, citing error by the trial court as follows:
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1. Failure to allow Highland to proceed
on total costs, quantum meruit, or "jury
verdict" theories, and ruling that Highland
was not entitled to loss of business or
punitive damages.
2. Refusal to accept some of Highland's
jury instructions, and the submittal to the
jury of a special verdict form favoring
Lamb's theories.
3. Ruling that there was no evidence of
improper conduct on the part of Michael R.
Lamb and James R. Lamb.
4. Exclusion of Highland's expert witness testimony.
5. Award of costs to defendants Lamb
and Carbon not contemplated by law.
I.
[1] The record before us is voluminous
and covers the entire liability phase of
Highland's case against Lamb which it
presented at trial stretching over a period
of two months. We have diligently reviewed the testimony adduced; however,
space will not allow but the briefest reference to some of the crucial points. We will
view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the party against whom the verdict was
directed, in order to determine whether
Highland had established a prima facie
case. Cruz v. Montoya, Utah, 660 P.2d
723 (1983) and cases cited therein; Lindsay
v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497
P.2d 28 (1972).
II.
Highland's first assignment of error is
the trial court's refusal to admit evidence
of damages based on total costs, quantum
meruit, and "jury verdict" theories. After
rejecting Highland's proffer, the court
made the following finding:
As to the defendant Lamb Engineering &
Construction Company, there is no evidence before the court that its conduct,
misconduct, actions, inactions and/or
breach of contract caused any damage to
any other party or parties to the aboveentitled action.

Highland contends that the court should
have allowed evidence that Highland's total
costs incurred for its partial construction of
the concrete structures and piping work
were $2,317,172.66, and that after a credit
of $413,763.04 paid by Lamb, Highland was
entitled to $1,903,409.62. Highland's bid to
Lamb was $1,097,325.
[2,3] It is true that some degree of
uncertainty in the evidence of damages will
not relieve a defendant from recompensing
a wronged plaintiff. Bastian v. King,
Utah, 661 P.2d 953 (1983) and cases cited
therein. However, it is also a general rule
of long standing that a plaintiff must show
damages by evidence of facts and not by
mere conclusions, and that the items of
damage must be established by substantial
evidence and not by conjecture.
Bunnell
v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 90, 368 P.2d 597
(1962); Bingham C. & L. Co. v. Board of
Ed., 61 Utah 149, 159, 211 P. 981 (1922).
And, whether general or special, damages
must be traceable to the wrongs complained of. Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater
Park City Corp., Utah, 592 P.2d 620
(1979).
Highland contends that as a result of the
nature of work to be performed it was
impossible for it to trace ascertainable and
quantifiable damages to the misconduct
and/or breach of the various defendants.
Therefore, the court below should have let
the total costs come in under one of the
three theories set out above, and allowed
the jury to calculate the amount due as
well as allocate percentages among the various defendants.
[4] 1. In support of its total cost theory, Highland refers us to several cases
which allowed recovery to the plaintiff under that method. All of them are distinguishable. Two major differences pervade
all of them: the contractor was either free
from fault (or his fault was insignificant)
and suit was brought against a single defendant who was blameworthy in causing
the contractor's cost overrun. In Thorn
Const. Co., Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transp.,
Utah, 598 P.2d 365 (1979), the court found
for the contractor because a specific false
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representation was made by the defendant's engineer's aide that borrow could be
used from a certain pit more than 1.7 miles
closer to the construction area than the pit
the contractor finally had to use. The
court allowed the excess cost for hauling
the borrow. This was determined by comparing the cost used by the contractor in
his bid estimate with his actual cost Conversely, here, Highland asks for compensation not just for extra work but for the
whole project, including the work done under the bid. It failed to trace its claimed
damages to breaches of any defendant.
In J.D. Hedin Construction Company v.
United States, 347 F.2d 236 (Ct.Cl.1965),
the primary cause for delay in construction
of a V.A. hospital was the government's
faulty piling specifications. This delay
forced excavations for the foundation to
stand open during a stormy period of
weather during which the excavations eroded. The contractor incurred extra costs in
remedying the effects of the erosion. Resort was had to the contractor's bid estimate which the court found to be reliable
and the contractor was allowed to recover
on a "total cost" theory the excess cost
actually incurred over his bid estimate.
The court expressed its dislike for the total
cost method and used it only on that one
item of damage because there were proper
safeguards: it was clear that the government alone was responsible for the damage
and the exact amount of damage was difficult to determine. The court specifically
rejected total costs on other items of damage that were "susceptible" to precise computation. In the instant case Highland
could not support its claim that damages
flowed from acts of or delays caused by
Lamb and/or Carbon, rather than from its
own fault. It did not try to tie in its claim
for damages with its estimate for any particular cost
In H. John Homan Co., Inc. v. United
States, 418 F.2d 522, 189 Ct.Cl. 500 (1969),
damages were quantified. The contractor
had incurred extra costs which were attributable to the government because it had
furnished an improper survey and faulty
specifications. The contractor was award-

ed the cost of labor and overhead in excess
of those items in its bid estimate. Conversely here, Highland was unable to show
what excess cost it had incurred because of
any particular act or inaction by any defendant Moreover, Highland did not attempt to compare its bid estimate for the
cost of any item with its actual cost for
that item.
The same fatal distinction is noted in
Moorhead Const. Co. Inc. v. City of
Grand Forks, 508 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir.1975).
There an inspection of the site would not
then have disclosed the difficult site conditions which caused the problems later encountered by the contractor. The trial
court ruled that proper soil conditions under Phase I were to be construed as an
implied warranty for the contractor to be
able to work on Phase II as anticipated.
Moreover, the contract provided for an equitable adjustment for latent physical conditions. We note that Highland was required to perform all extra work under
written change orders. The record is replete with statements that those portions
of the work performed under change orders were compensated and that despite
numerous requests by Lamb to submit
change orders on other occasions, Highland
repeatedly failed to do so. The record does
not indicate that Lamb was reluctant to
issue such change orders, but reveals that
it urged Highland to cooperate as Lamb
made two cents profit for every- ten cents
profit Highland made. All of Moorhead's
expenses were found to have been fully
documented and reasonably incurred, Id. at
101^; none of Highland were documented, despite repeated requests by the court
to do so when it had to reject as inadmissible summaries of costs prepared after the
initiation of the lawsuit. The Moorhead
court specifically noted that the trial
court's method of total costs was not the
preferred method for calculating damages,
but "that no other method was feasible and
the supporting evidence was substantial."
Id. at 1016. Four factors of proof were
advanced in Moorhead under which that
method would be acceptable:
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(1) [TJhe nature of the particular losses
make it impossible or highly impractical
to determine them with a reasonable degree of accuracy;
(2) the plaintiffs bid or estimate was
realistic;
(3) its actual costs were reasonable; and
(4) it was not responsible for the added
expenses.
Id. at 1016.
Compared to those guidelines, Highland's fact situation is distinguishable on
all but the third point. The record makes it
abundantly clear that all extra work performed by Highland was, at the time it was
incurred, highly susceptible to precise determination, if change orders had been issued, material invoices segregated, and
man-hours separately recorded.
Highland's own expert witness, Richard White,
dispelled all notions that the bid had been
carefully prepared. His testimony confirmed that it was not realistic. Highland
did not inspect the site before submitting
the bid and the costs of the various components of the job were not separately computed. The bid was more of a haphazard
guess than an estimate based on concrete
figures. White testified that a realistic bid
would have made allowances for remoteness of area, rocky soil conditions, housing
and transportation expenses, unfavorable
weather conditions at an altitude of 7,000
feet, and sundry other exigencies. None of
them was projected by Highland. By its
own admissions and contradictory statements on direct and cross-examination,
Highland shouldered a major portion of the
blame for delays, excessive costs and loss
of work.
In rejecting Highland's total cost theory
we look for support to similar cases where
the plaintiff had failed to quantify damages
and was not allowed to ignore the terms of
its bid. In Shocker Const Co. v. State,
Utah, 619 P.2d 1378 (1980) this Court rejected profits above bid as well as total
costs to the extent that the damages were
the result of problems plaintiff had with its
own internal operations and improper
equipment, or were associated with bad

weather. Id. at 1379. Also Thorn, supra,
was specifically distinguished in Shocker
as having been affirmed on the basis of
sufficient evidence in contrast to Shocker,
where plaintiff had failed specifically to
associate any portion of its cost with detrimental acts of the defendant. IcL at 1380.
In short, Highland failed to prove its
increased cost for each alleged problem or
breach caused by the defendants, failed to
compare its bid estimate with its actual
costs for each such problem or breach and
failed to prove that defendants were solely
responsible for its additional expense.
Highland wanted to shorten the process of
proof by introducing all of its costs for the
entire job. This it may not do.
[FJailure to make any satisfactory showing of the amount of damages flowing
from such breaches would require the
dismissal of such causes . . .
Recovery of damages for a breach of
contract is not allowed unless acceptable
evidence demonstrates that the damages
claimed resulted from and were caused
by the breach. "The costs must be tied
in to fault on defendant's part." [Citations omitted.] Boyajian v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1231, 1235, 191 Ct.Cl.
233, (1970).
[5, 61 The paucity of evidence on causally connected damages cannot be used by
Highland as a sword to ignore its bid and
recover its costs plus profit instead. The
record is barren of the necessary facts
from which the jury might have reasonably
found the extent or amount of damages
flowing from any misconduct of the multiple defendants. In addition, Highland
failed to prove causation between its costs
and the breach of any particular defendant.
See Boyajian v. United States, supra; Ruber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67
Cal.App.3d 278, 136 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1977).
Performance under the bid is not excused
simply because difficulties are encountered. Recovery under those circumstances is restricted to extra work only. L.A.
Young Sons Const. Co. v. County of
Tooele, Utah, 575 P.2d 1034 (1978).

1048

Utah

683 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

2. In the alternative, Highland contends
that the trial court should have allowed its
total cost under quantum meruit We disagree.
[7,8] Under Utah law damages are controlled by the contractual remedies fashioned by the parties unless it can be shown
that the work performed was so different
from the work contemplated by the contract that additional recovery in quantum
meruit is warranted. Allen-Howe Specialties v. U.S. Const, Inc., Utah, 611 P.2d 705
(1980); Mann v. American Western Life
Ins. Co., Utah, 586 P.2d 461 (1978). In this
case there was a contract clause requiring
Highland to submit all proposed extra work
in the form of written change orders so
that a contractual remedy existed under an
express contract. Highland's cases cited in
support of an award of quantum meruit
damages are all distinguishable. Quantum
meruit was the proper recovery where the
work was not anticipated under the contract and the contract could for all intents
and purposes be considered abandoned.
Lester N. Johnson Co., Inc. v. City of
Spokane, 22 Wash.App. 265, 588 P.2d 1214
(1978); V.C Edwards Contracting Co.
Inc. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash.2d 7, 514
P.2d 1381 (1973); Bignold v. King County,
65 Wash.2d 817, 399 P.2d 611 (1965); Wunderlich Contracting Company v. United
States, 240 F.2d 201 (10th Cir.1957), cert,
den. 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, 1 L.Ed.2d
859 (1957). Quantum meruit was also upheld where the subcontractor justifiably
ceased work or where the general contractor unjustifiably terminated the subcontractor. United States v. Algernon Blair,
Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.1973); Seaboard
Surety Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 139
(9th Cir.1966). By contrast, Highland's
work was anticipated and the work was
performed in pursuance of the contract.
Although Highland claimed it had been unjustifiably terminated, it failed to prove in
what respects the work performed by it
differed from the work contemplated by
the contract. Costs incurred in remedying
its own faulty work and in repairing its
own mistakes were not segregated from
those for which Lamb paid and from those

for which it did not pay but which actually
benefitted some or all of the defendants.
[91 3. We have carefully analyzed the
cases cited by Highland in support of its
"jury verdict" theory of recovery. We also
recognize that the Lamb-Highland contract
contained an equitable adjustment clause to
cover changed conditions. We deduce that
Highland was to give Lamb written notice
of those changed conditions as a prerequisite to such an adjustment, and that written estimates of the labor and material
costs, as well as the impact on the completion date were to be submitted in support.
We do not read the cases allowing "jury
verdict" recovery under similar equitable
adjustment clauses to stand for the proposition that the contract may be discarded in
its entirety. Instead, the equitable adjustment is the difference between the amount
the work would have cost absent unanticipated changes and the amount it did cost
as a result of the altered conditions. Fattore Co., Inc. v. Metropolitan Sewerage
Com\ 505 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1974), holding
the parties to the equitable adjustment
clause invoked by the plaintiff; Metropolitan Sewerage Com'n v. R.W. Const, 72
Wis.2d 365, 241 N.W.2d 371 (1976), rejecting summary of expenses and remanding
for an allocation of costs based upon failures of the respective parties; Dynalectron Corp. (Pacific Div.) v. United States,
518 F.2d 594, 207 CtCl. 349 (1975) ordering
both plaintiff and the government to share
costs where both parties shared responsibility for plaintiffs inability to perform Air
Force specifications for jamming devices in
electronic countermeasure systems.
In distinguishing these cases from Highland's situation, we are not unaware of
Highland's proffered admission that approximately $30,000 damages were the result of Highland's underbid on hoppers and
another $50,000 of Highland's own labor
inefficiencies. However, these conclusory,
unilaterally established sums were barren
of any supporting evidence and consequently could not constitute the basis for "jury
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verdict" damages of costs plus anticipated
profits, minus $80,000.

punitive damages and loss of business
must also be rejected. It is the general
Highland asks us to find the jury verdict rule in this forum that punitive damages
approach consistent with this Court's ra- cannot be awarded for a breach of contract
tionale and holding in Winsness v. MJ. unless the breach amounts to an indepenConoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P.2d 1303 dent tort. Jorgensen v. John Clay and
(1979). That case dealt with the issue of Co., Utah, 660 P.2d 229 (1983), and cases
whether money damages could be deter- cited therein. There is no evidence to that
mined from the lessee's failure to keep a effect in that portion of the record before
gasoline service station open 24 hours a us and we affirm the trial court's ruling on
day. Suffice it to say that the data sub- punitive damages. Highland's claim for
mitted to the jury in that case were meticu- business losses must fail for the same realously compiled to serve as a point of de- son that its claim for all other damages
parture for the jury's assessment of dam- fails.
Consequential damages will be
ages. Antipodal to that fact situation is
awarded if the losses resulting from a
the one here under review: Highland could
breach were reasonably within the contemexpress its loss of efficiency in percentage
plation of the parties when they entered
terms only. It offered no breakdown on
breaches of contract, and no breakdown of into the subcontract. Hadley v. Boxenbreaches allocated to the several defend- dale, 156 Eng.Reptr. 145 (Ex.1854). Highants. No evidence was adduced of re- land proffered a statement to the effect
quests for time extensions apparently al- that it suffered between $785,000 and
lowed under the contract; no evidence was $1,042,000 in damages. Where the claim
adduced on work beyond the scope of the for damages remains unsupported by sufficontract; no evidence was proffered break- cient documentation to allow the jury to
ing down the cost of Highland's own errors reasonably infer a causality between
and delays. By Highland's own admission breaches of defendants and losses by Highthrough counsel it was "absolutely unable land, a claim of business losses and conseto come up with something [in the nature quential damages cannot rise to the level of
of quantifiable elements of damages] that proof required to permit recoverywould be more than just a gut reaction."
Ill.
The insurmountable barrier Highland erect[13] We next consider Highland's coned to a successful proffer of damage evi- tention that the trial court committed error
dence was its complete inability to make in the giving of a special verdict form and
the causal connection between its losses on in its failure to submit proposed jury inthe project and the commissions or omisstructions on Highland's theories of defenssions of acts of the defendants or some ofes to Lamb's counterclaim.
them. Although we commend counsel for
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil ProceHighland for their valiant effort to harness
what evidence they had at their disposal, dure provides that "[n]o party may assign
Highland simply did not keep the proper as error the giving or the failure to give an
records necessary to enable a jury to have instruction unless he objects thereto. In
some methodology as a tool to properly objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to
discharge its function.
which he objects and the grounds for his
We therefore hold that the trial court did objection." See also Jensen v. Eakins,
not err in refusing to permit Highland to Utah, 575 P.2d 179 (1978). We have before
prove its damages under any of the three us only that portion of the record that
theories addressed above.
deals with Highland's case which was dis[10-12] Highland's related assignment missed by a directed verdict prior to the
of error, that the trial court improperly proceeding of the trial on Lamb's counterruled that Highland was not entitled to claim. There is thus nothing before us
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from which we can learn what the nature
of the objections was with respect to rejection of some of Highland's proposed instructions. All we have before us are the
instructions themselves with notations
made by the trial judge. Notwithstanding
the cited requirement of Rule 51, that same
rule also gives us the discretion, in the
interest of justice, to "review the giving or
failure to give an instruction." We have
reviewed the instructions cited to us by
Highland and conclude that the theories of
both parties were covered by those instructions submitted to the jury. We have also
reviewed the special interrogatories submitted to the jury on damages incurred by
Lamb for the completion of work left undone by Highland. In the absence of any
record on proper objections to exhibits supporting the cost of completion, we are relegated to assessing the propriety of the
instructions from their face. We note that
the jury answered all of the special interrogatories, reduced the cost of claimed capital to one-fourth and the fee of administering completion of the work to less than
one-fifth of the amounts asked for by
Lamb. Answering the special interrogatory on consequential damages, the-jury denied in its entirety an amount of nearly
$400,000. It would be difficult to suggest
that such discriminatory evaluation showed
prejudice to Highland. All instructions
considered together show that the trial
court properly presented the issues to the
jury. Gilhespie v. DeJong, Utah, 520 P.2d
878 (1974); Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah
631, 237 P.2d 834 (1951). We conclude that
Highland's claim of error in instructing the
jury is unfounded.
IV.
[14] The trial court's findings and judgment stated that "as to the defendants
Michael R. Lamb and James R. Lamb,
there is no evidence as to any improper
conduct, misconduct or breach of contract,
nor is there any other evidence before the
court upon which they could be found liable
to any other party or parties to the above
entitled action." Highland assails this ruling as not being supported by the evidence.

We have carefully considered the portions
of the record cited to us by Highland and
find several inconsistencies. Highland's
statement that there was a total termination of Highland's subcontract on July 10,
1979 by these individual defendants is not
supported by the record. There was a partial termination only on the fine coal reclaim tunnel, the loadout structure foundation, the transfer tower foundation and the
drive building # 1 foundation, on all of
which Highland was found to be in default
All other aspects of the work continued
under the contract. The only other reference to any misconduct was the taping of a
conference between Lamb and Highland
without Highland's knowledge. No evidence was adduced that Highland suffered
damages at the hands of these individual
defendants as a result thereof. There was
no proffer of evidence of damages attributable to them personally. We find no error
in their dismissal from the action.
V.
[15] Highland's next assignment of error deals with the exclusion of the testimony of Highland's expert witness, Richard
White, who was a potential bidder on the
coal facility project as a prime contractor.
Highland offered Mr. White's testimony as
an expert in the construction industry with
respect to a hypothetical question that late
delivery of plans, unavailability of construction sites, incomplete and defective
plans and similar negative conditions would
have an adverse effect upon man and
equipment hours, and that it was not practical or possible to quantify and assign
dollar value to each of those conditions.
The court sustained defendants' objections
on the ground that it would not be helpful
to the jury to ask the witness hypothetically "whether if plans were delivered late it
causes problems, and to have him say yes."
The court conceded that testimony would
be allowed if the witness could base his
opinion on the evidence given by other witnesses with respect to plan delays and other problems. The court found that those
witnesses up to that point had been "singu-
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lariy unable" to quantify damages. It suggested that Highland acquaint its expert
witness with the record for illustrations of
those elements supporting his testimony.
Highland declined to analyze the record,
stating that the proffer made was sufficient for the purposes intended. It cited no
data upon which the expert could base his
opinion.
The Utah Rules of Evidence in force at
the time of trial of this case 1 permitted
testimony by an expert in the form of an
opinion if those opinions were "(a) based on
facts or data perceived by or personally
known or made known to the witness at
the hearing, and (b) within the scope of the
special knowledge, skill, experience or
training possessed by the witness." Rule
56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, [Emphasis
added.] "The expertise of the witness, his
degree of familiarity with the necessary
facts, and the logical nexus between his
opinion and the facts adduced must be established."
Edwards
v.
Didencksen,
Utah, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331 (1979). See also
Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17
Utah 2d 221, 226, 408 P.2d 186 (1965).
Rule 56(2) and the case law support the
trial court's ruling. The testimony was
properly excluded so long as the witness
was unable to give his opinion based upon
data made known to him at trial, as, absent
personal knowledge of the facts, this was
the only ground on which the evidence
could have come in. We therefore affirm
the trial court's ruling on this issue.
VI.
Finally, Highland contends that costs
were improperly awarded to the defendants. Inasmuch as separate memoranda of
costs were filed by Lamb and Carbon, our
approach to the issue will be bifurcated.
[16] We first deal with the propriety of
the award to Lamb. Lamb's cost memorandum was filed on July 2, 1981, and
Highland's motion to have Lamb's bill of
1. The Utah Rules of Evidence were amended
effective September 1, 1983, to align them with

costs taxed was filed on July 9, 1981, within the seven-days' period allowed under
Rule 54(dX2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The total bill came to
$2,526.75, of which $2,280.75 was for depositions of Highland's witnesses. Highland
contends the cost of the depositions was
not awardable. Although there has been
some controversy on this question in our
forum, the majority of this Court has consistently held that the costs of depositions
are taxable ''subject to the limitation that
the trial court is persuaded that they were
taken in good faith and, in the light of the
circumstances, appeared to be essential for
the development and presentation of the
case." Frampton v. Wilson, Utah, 605
P.2d 771, 774 (1980) and cases cited therein;
Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Og~
den, 12 Utah 2d 235, 239, 364 P.2d 1029
(1961). In First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. v. Wright, Utah, 521 P 2d 563, 567
(1974), where we upheld the trial court's
denial of deposition costs, we stated that
"[t]he burden is upon the claiming party to
establish that they are necessary and reasonable, the determination of whether that
burden is met is within the sound discretion
of the trial court;
" For the guidance
of both the trial courts and counsel we
would allow deposition <"osts as necessary
and reasonable where the de\elopment of
the case is of such a complex nature that
discovery cannot be accomplished through
the less expensive method of interrogatories, requests for admissions and requests
for the production of documents
The
award ot costs should be narrowly made to
guard against abuse by those better financially equipped lest costs of seeking justice
become prohibitive for the financially ill
equipped.
[17] Even under this restriction, we
find no abuse of the discretion of the trial
court in awarding the costs of depositions
of Highland's witnesses. The complexity
of a construction case and the theories of
recovery sought to be used here made it
the Federal Rules of Evidence
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virtually impossible to obtain sufficient information for the preparation of the case
through more conservative methods of discovery. Moreover, the depositions were
used at trial on cross-examination, both to
impeach veracity and to refresh memory.
We therefore affirm the trial court's award
of costs to Lamb in its entirety.
[18] The award of costs to Carbon in
the amount of $12,712.46 is another story.
The findings and judgment on the directed
verdict against Highland were filed on
April 27, 1981. Carbon's memorandum of
costs was filed May 5, and Highland's motion to strike Carbon's costs, though signed
May 11, was not filed until May 15. Both
parties were thus outside the limitations
permitted by Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the
paramount issue presents itself: Did the
trial court err in awarding Carbon its costs
when the memorandum of costs was not
filed as required by the rules? We hold
that it did.
This court has previously held that an
unverified memorandum of costs filed within the five-day period did not entitle the
plaintiff to an award of costs, and that it
was error to permit the filing of a supplemental, verified memorandum thereafter.
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York
Terminal W. Co,} 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d
626 (1960). The rationale of the Court in
that decision that "[c]osts were not recoverable at common law, and the right to
recover them is purely statutory" (Id, at
216, 350 P.2d 626) is equally applicable
where no memorandum at all was filed
within the five-day period permitted by the
rule. Decisions under similar former statutory law support a strict construction of
this rule. Nelson, et ux. v. Arrowhead
Freight Lines, Limited, 99 Utah 129, 104
P.2d 225 (1940); Openshaw v. Openshaw,
80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932). The memorandum of costs should be stricken and
Carbon required to bear its own costs with
one exception. As the trial progressed
through the district court, Carbon ordered
and paid for a daily transcript of the testimony. When this appeal was filed by

Highland, it certified as part of the record
those transcripts and Highland has used
them extensively in this appeal. It is therefore equitable that Highland should reimburse Carbon for the transcripts at the rate
charged if they had been produced at the
conclusion of the trial in the usual manner
for appeal purposes and not on the more
expensive daily rate basis. We remand to
the district court to determine that cost and
we award that amount to Carbon as a cost
on appeal.
VII.
In sum, we reject Highland's various total cost theories to recover damages, as we
have consistently done in similar cases in
the past, where the costs were attributable
to work covered by the contract, either
under the bid, or through change order
provisions. Parties to a contract must re
main free to enforce the terms of their
agreement and the contractor must be held
to the terms of his bid, particularly where
he is unable to connect additional costs
with any particular breach on the part of
any particular defendant The issue of
quantifiable damages pervaded all other
issues presented by Highland on appeal.
With the exception of the award of costs
to Carbon, the judgment, as modified, is
affirmed in its entirety. Costs on appeal
are awarded to Lamb; no appeal costs are
awarded to Carbon except as heretofore
noted.
HALL, C.J., and CHRISTOFFERSEN,
VeNOY and GOULD, CALVIN, District
Judges, concur.
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., having disqualified themselves, do not participate
herein, CHRISTOFFERSEN and GOULD,
District Judges, sat.
STEWART, J., does not participate herein.
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ftoprem* Court & Colorado*.
reba^lWli
Stifearftt* Denied frebi 2*, I9««
L Mtf#«tto*aa*aw*f****2<4*
to- contractor's action against: subee»»
tractor for bneecfe oT contact to supply cast
atom ift* coflege buildinf, an arbitration
award waa. properly refused wbe» offered in
evidence by subcontractor, where arbitration
proceedings were betwee* subcontractor and
college and not between subcontractor and
contractor, and contractor was only a witness hi the proceedings^ since that did not
constitute him a- "party" on subject him to
liability under arbitrator's decisions
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition* for all other definitions of
"Party"*
1 Appeal and error <3=M0tl(l)
In contractor's action against subcontractor for breach of contract to supply cast
stone for college building, it was for the trial court to draw conclusions from conflicting
eridence, and those conclusions would not be
disturbed by the Supreme Court
En Banc
Error to District Court, El Paso County;
J. E. Little, Judge.
Action by George O. Teats against the
Hosek Manufacturing-Overland Foundry
Company, for breach of contract, wherein
defendant filed a cross-complaint. To review a judgment for plaintiff, defendant
brings error.
Affirmed.
Frank Seydel, of Denver, for plaintiff in
error.
Ben S. Wendelken, of Colorado Springs,
for defendant in error.
FRANCIS E- BOUCK, Chief Justice.
Reversal is herein sought of a district
court judgment for damages based upon a
subcontractor's alleged violation of its contract to supply cast stone of given specifications to Teats, the principal contractor,
plaintiff below and defendant in error here.
Teats sued the subcontractor, the plaintiff
in error Hosek Manufacturing-Overland
Foundry Company. The latter denied the

violation^ charged against rt, -affirmatively
alleged its full compliance with the specifications, and tHen charged negligence of
Teats himself to be the direct cause of
defects or injuries found in the materials
supplied. By cross-complaint the company
demanded the balance of the purchase
price.
?The alleged errors assigned by the company are (1) rejection of defendant's exhibit 5, purporting to be an arbitration
award, (2) refusal to give the jury each of
ten instructions tendered by the defendant,
(3) giving the jury an instruction not to
consider defendant's defense of arbitration, (4) refusing a new trial.
The subject matter relates to certain repairs and alterations made in a dormitory
building of Colorado College at Colorado
Springs. An appropriate contract had been
entered into by Teats and the college. It
called for a cast stone porch and arches.
Teats had received and accepted in due
course the bid of the defendant company for
supplying the materials in question.
[1] The assignments of error all focus
upon the single proposition that exhibit 5,
the so-called arbitration award, was a final
determination of the respective rights and
liabilities of Teats and the company.
The specifications underlying the contract between Teats and the college contained the following: "The General Conditions of the contract as prepared by the
American Institute of Architects shall become a part of these specifications as fully
as if herein written. A copy of these General Conditions may be examined at the
office of the Architect." These "general
conditions" include provisions for arbitration. The trouble with the alleged arbitration in the case at bar is that the proceedings were between the company and the
college, not between the company and
Teats. The Court cannot find fiom the
record that Teats was a party to the arbitration proceedings. He was a witness, but
that does not constitute him a party or subject him to liability under the decision of
the arbitrator. Neither the "general conditions" nor the code chapter on arbitration
could accomplish this result. It follows
that exhibit 5 was properly refused when
offered in evidence by the company.
[2] The arbitration award being properly rejected, there remains nothing but a
case of conflicting evidence. It was the
province of the trial court to draw conclusions from that evidence, and under a
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PHI LUPS %v PEOPLE.
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ft Department.
t ^rror to District Court, Jefferson Cotn>
*> Samuel W. Johnson, Judge.
^Calvin J. Phillips was convicted ota&>
^ I t , and he brings error.
Affirmed*
-Clarence O. Moore, of Denver, for plain-'
* in error,
j , ^yron G. Rogers, Arty. Gen., and Gerald'
f* McAuliffe, AssL Atty. Gen* for defends
^ t in error.

&AKKE, Justice.
* t*laintiff in error, defendant below, was
t°t*nd guilty of assault for shooting a fif-**n year old boy and sentenced to six
Rehearing Denied March S» 1941.
^ n t h s in jail. Reversal is sought on a
I. Criminal law <£=>365<l)
*** o f e r r o n
Where immediately after accused shot
Upon our own motion we dismissed the
jOrzi&tZ9&sr Mrtzte&&f joterAP AFQSV zr&Jjfa? ^ ^ for failure to prosecute, but subse^ntfy, on motion of plaintiff in error, it
and he with two deputies set out to arrest accused who was found near his truck m\ reinstated and we now elect to deterthe matter as submitted on typewritten
with two guns with him, testimony in prosecution for assault that as accused was s J^fs, without staying the execution of
^tence.
reaching for a gun, one of the deputies
overpowered him and brought him down and
vhe parties will be designated as in the
that both of accused's guns were loaded
below.
was not inadmissible as being testimony of
facts briefly stated are: On the afta separate and independent crime but was
p%on
of September 16, 1939, three boys,
admissible as part of the "res gestae".
a r Hons, Aday and Schwartz, whose homes
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
^ in Golden, went up on Table Mountain
Edition, for all other definitions of
• ^r Golden on a hunting trip. Each carM
Res Gestm".
^^i a 22-caliber rifle. As they walked
ra %g they shot at various targets—birds,
2. Criminal law ^=M78(!)
Where X-ray pictures showing bullet 0£^bits, etc. They entered upon the land
lodged in one of the witnesses were intro- tk defendant, who apparently had seen
duced in connection with the testimony of a ^ m and was approaching with a gun in
medical expert in prosecution for assault be^ crook of his arm. The boys stopped
growing out of shooting of prosecuting wit- t l Mind some rocks, but when defendant conkj ^ed to advance, they ran and tried to
nesses
accused, aa ballistics
expert therenesses by
oy accused,
oaiusucs expert
mere- niN
-___--,--„
.
,
e ln a w o o d e n
nearb
uaI
after called was competent to testify as to tluVe
**Yen and
** u*whin»
was a dog along
hey-started
>^
dieting off a very hard stone wall and at an £ en , thus reveahng their whereabouts to clej^dant Parsons was at the end of the
angle of some 45 degrees as compared with
the bullet shown in the X-ray pictures since w a /ert nearest defendant, and behind him
j Aday, with Schwartz near the opposite
qualification aa an expert to interpret X. Parsons testified to the following
c
o
n
ray pictures was not necessary.
.versation with defendant: "So I have
era y o u a t * ast ' e ^ **e s a ^ : 'Gome on,
3. Homlcltf* «=»34l
Where accused was charged with "as- o u t wl out of there/ And I went to crawl
sault to commit murder" and no particular i p ; My gun was lying on the ground and
ut my hand behind me to get up and he
degree of murder was involved and court's
instructions covered the crime of murder, £ re i, 'So pull a gun on me, will you?' and he
refusal to instruct on all degrees of murder gcj.d. Before hefired,I said, 'Don't shoot.' *
if error was not prejudicial since error if „jMwartz testified that defendant said?
r- pn't pull a gun on me or I, will shoot you
any was favorable to the accused.
ht through the heart."
110 P.2d—02
Supreme Court of Colorado,
reb. 10, 1941.
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4. Sales *»384(1)
While jury did find malice in buyer's
breach of contract for purchase of lambs
and returned a verdict of one dollar puni•.
tive damages, there was no pleading, arguJOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a corporament or evidentiary suggestion that refusal
tioa, and Aetna Casualty and Surety
of lambs rose to level of an independent
Company, a corporation, Defendants
tort; and thus award of punitive damages,
and Appellants.
and attorney fees as an element of them,
No. 1762L
was error.
Supreme Court of Utah.
5. Interest <*=>39(2)
Prejudgment interest may be awarded
March 3, 1983.
in a case where the loss is fixed as of a
particular time and the amount of the loss
Seller of sheep brought breach of con- can be calculated with mathematical accutract action against buyer and its surety. racy.
The Sixth District Court, Sanpete County,
Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment in favor 6. Interest <*»56
of seller, and appeal was taken. The SuSeller, the plaintiff in breach of conpreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) buyer tract action, was entitled to interest on
was not entitled to have venue changed to difference between what seller should have
Weber County, its principal place of busi- received under contract with buyer and
ness; (2) award of punitive damages, and what he actually received from another as
attorney fees as an element of them, was of date of last delivery.
error; and (3) seller was entitled to interest
on difference between what seller should
have received under contract with buyer
Richard L. Stine and Richard Campbell,
and what he actually received.
Ogden, Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellants.
Modified and affirmed.
Arthur H. Nielsen, Stephen L. Henriod
and Clark R. Nielsen, Salt Lake City, for
1. Venue <8=*7.5<2)
plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant buyer was not entitled to
have breach of contract action moved to
HOWE, Justice:
Weber County, Utah, its principal place of
This is a case of breach of contract for
business, where neither face of contract nor
implications drawn from it indicated that the purchase of sheep from Neil Jorgensen
buyer's obligation was to be performed in a (seller). John Clay and Company (buyer)
particular county of Utah. U.C.A.1953, 7&- and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
(buyer's surety) seek a reversal of the judgia-4.
ment entered against them and retrial on
2. Venue «=>7.5(7)
the basis of improper venue; or, in the
Venue in breach of contract action was alternative, they seek a remittitur in the
properly placed in county where plaintiff amounts of $21,400 awarded for attorneys*
seller was a resident, where plaintiff seller fees and $14,822.37 awarded for pre-judgsued on transitory cause of action and cause ment interest.
of action arose without state. U.C.A.1953,
Seller, who raises sheep for market, is a
78-13-6.
resident of Mt Pleasant, Sanpete County,
3. Damages <s=>89(2)
Utah. For many years he had dealt with
Generally, punitive damages cannot be the buyer who has its principal place of
business in Ogden, Weber County, Utah.
awarded for breach of contract.
Neil JORGENSEN, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
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Seller entered into a contract with buyer in
November of 1978 for the sale of 5,000
lambs at 66 cents per pound with a "weight
stop" l of 120 pounds. In early December,
seller entered into a second contract in
which buyer agreed to purchase 10,000
lambs at 70 cents per pound with no weight
stop and had the option to take delivery of
them between January and March 15,1979.
At this time most of seller's sheep were
pastured in Blythe, California, although
some were in Cedar City, Utah and in Mt
Pleasant, Utah. Shipments from Blythe on
the first contract began after Christmas
and continued into January of 1979. Shipping dates were agreed upon in advance of
each shipment so that seller or his representative could be present to supervise the
sorting, loading, and inspection of the
lambs. Because bad weather conditions developed in Blythe that winter, seller had to
move his lambs in order to save them.
Buyer, who was already obligated for shipment, agreed to reimburse seller for moving
the 10,000 lambs sold under the second contract to a feedlot in Ault, Colorado. The
feedlot is located near Monfort Company of
Greeley, Colorado, which is a packing house
to whom buyer had resold the lambs.
Even though the custom in the industry
and the parties' practice had been to notify
the owner prior to the shipment of livestock, buyer selected 2,421 of seller's lambs
and shipped them to Monfort from the
feedlot on February 5, 6, and 7, 1979 without advising seller. When seller protested,
buyer assured him that it would not happen
again. However, later in February buyer
shipped 1,096 more lambs to Monfort without advising seller. Seller was paid for
these but received no weight slips and he
claimed they were improperly weighed.
Consequently, seller advised the feedlot
owner not to release any more of his lambs
without notifying him.
At the next scheduled shipment, because
bad weather prevented him from flying into
Ault, Colorado, seller telephoned to autho-

rise the release of his lambs. He was told
that since he was not present, another owner's lambs had been substituted and
shipped. Later, two days before another
shipment was scheduled, he was informed
that buyer would not accept any more of
his lambs because buyer claimed that seller
had interfered with Monfort's slaughtering
schedule. In the interim the market had
fallen to 60 cents per pound; and, buyer
offered to take the lambs at that price with
a weight stop of 120 pounds. Seller gave
buyer until March 10 to honor the contract
but when buyer's only response was to raise
its offer to 63 cents per pound, seller resold
6,238 lambs to R.H. Rock Co. at a loss to
him of $166,566.40 which was in addition to
the unpaid freight charges of $22,000.00 for
shipping from Blythe. Further loss was
sustained by seller when buyer eventually
paid 5 cents per pound less than agreed
upon for 274 lambs which seller had delivered in February.
After filing a claim with buyer's surety,
seller brought suit in Sanpete County.
Buyer moved to change venue to Weber
County but the motion was denied, the trial
was conducted, and the jury returned its
verdict awarding plaintiff $191,463.40
($166,566.40 damages on the contract, $22,000.00 for freight from Blythe and 5 cents
per pound on the 274 lambs shipped in
February) and $100 punitive damages To
that verdict the trial court added pre-judgment interest of $14,822.37 and attorneys'
fees of $21,400.00.

1. A "weight stop" is a device used m the industry which puts a weight limitation on each
lamb so that any excess weight is not paid for

by the buyer It is disapproved by the Packers
and Stockyards Administration

VENUE
Buyer moved to change venue to Weber
County, its principal place of business, relying upon the following statutory provisions
of U.C.A., 1953:
78-13-4. Actions on written contracts.—When the defendant has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county of the state
and resides in another county, an action
on such contract obligation may be com-
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meaced and tried in the county where
pock obligation is to be performed or in
which the defendant resides.
7&-13-7. All other actions.—In all
other cases the action must be tried in the
county in which the cause of action arises,
Of in the county in which any defendant
resides at the commencement of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a corporation, any county in which
such corporation has its principal office or
place of business shall be deemed the
county in which such corporation resides
within the meaning of this section
Since § 78-13-7 applies only where no
other provision applies, we need not discuss
it here. Buyer cites several cases to support the applicability of § 78-13-4 to this
contract Simmons v. Hoyt, 109 Utah 186,
167 ?2d 27 (1946); Palfreyman v. Trueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943);
Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d 281
(1935); Atlas Acceptance Corp. v. Pratt, 85
Utah 352, 39 P.2d 710 (1935); Buckle v.
Ogden Furniture and Carpet Co., Utah, 61
Utah 559, 216 P. 684 (1923). In these cases
where written contracts to allegedly perform "an obligation in a particular county
of this state" had not explicitly or impliedly
indicated the place of performance, we resolved the ambiguity in favor of the defendant and held the venue to be at the
residence of the defendant, rather than the
place of performance. But that principle is
not reached here since this case is distinguishable.
[1] Unlike the cases cited in the above
paragraph, the contract involved here was
not one to perform an obligation in a particular county of this state or necessarily with,in this state at all. Most of the sheep were
pastured in California, had to be moved to
Colorado and were resold there. Buyer's
agents conducted transactions and communications with seller from Colorado and Ari2. 7 U.S.C. § 228b, Reg. of Sec. of Agriculture,
Packers and Stockyards Act, 9 C.F.R., Sec
201.43(b)(2)(h) states:
No
dealer purchasing livestock for
slaughter, shall mail a check in payment for
the livestock unless (a) the check is made
available for actual delivery and the seller or

zona. It was Colorado where buyer refused
to accept further deliveries which it had
agreed to take under the contract This
dimension of contract boundaries beyond
the territorial limits of Utah is not present
in the cases cited and relied upon by the
buyer.
Neither does the face of the contract or
implications drawn from it indicate that
buyer's obligation was to be performed in a
particular county of this state. The omission from the contract of a statement of the
place of performance as well as the surrounding factual setting of various out-ofstate locations for the parties' transactions
are considerations which lead to the conclusion that § 78-13-4 does not obtain in this
instance.
Even the fact that the parties contracted
in light of the Packers and Stockyards Act
is not helpful. The applicable provision2
suggests that Sanpete County might have
been the place of performance only if seller
had not been present to receive payment at
the time of delivery in California or Colorado. The application of the Packers and
Stockyards Act provision to the contract as
a fallback provision does not create an ambiguity concerning alternative places of
performance as buyer argues, either Its
language is quite clear In short, the application of this provision would not qualify
this contract under it.
[2] The applicable statute in this instance is the following:
78-13-6. Arising without this state in
favor of resident.—All transitory causes
of action arising without this state in
favor of residents of this state shall, if
action is brought thereon in this state, be
brought and tried in the county where
the plaintiff resides, or in the county
where the principal defendant resides, or
if the principal defendant is a corporahis duly authorized representative is not
present to receive payment, at the point of
transfer of possession of such livestock, on
or before the close of the next business day
following purchase of the livestock and
transfer of possession thereof
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tkm, then in the county where the plaintiff resides or in the county where such
corporation has an office or place of business, subject, however, to a change of
venue as provided by law.
There is no dispute that plaintiff sued on a
transitory cause of action. It is also clear
that this cause of action arose "without this
state." Colorado was where buyer took
possession of some of the lambs without
notice to seller and then later refused to
accept further deliveries. Buyer provides
no persuasive rationale for his argument
that while Colorado was the place of injury,
it was not the location where the right of a
cause of action arose. Because seller had
an option under § 78-13-6 to choose where
to bring suit, the district court had no prerogative to change venue to the county of
buyer's choice. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
Walker, Utah, 631 PM 860 (1981). As a
result, there was no error on this point
ATTORNEY'S FEES
There was no provision for payment of
attorney's fees in this contract. The trial
court awarded them as an element of punitive damages because the jury had found
malice.
In tort cases where conduct is willful and
malicious, we have allowed the award of
punitive damages. Elkington v. Foust,
Utah, 618 P.2d 37 (1980); Terry v. Zions
Co-op Mercantile Inst, Utah, 605 P.2d 314
(1979), Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354
(1975); Hofdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77,
505 P.2d 295 (1973); Powers v. Taylor, 14
Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963). In a
recent repossession case, Clayton v Crossroads Equipment Co., Utah, 655 P.2d 1125
(1982), we affirmed the award of punitive
damages on similar grounds.
Heretofore, we have not approved the
award of punitive damages for breach of
contract In First Security Bank v. Utah
Turkey Growers, Inc., Utah, 610 P.2d 329
(1980), we held that under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code remedies are applied
solely to compensate for actual losses—no
punitive awards are permitted. In Debry &
Hilton Travel v. Capitol Intern. Airways,

Utah, 588 P.2d 1181 (1978), we affirmed the
denial of attorney's fees in a breach of
contract action where punitive damages
were also denied. Palornbi v. D &C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969),
involved faulty workmanship in the performance of a contract for the installation
of aluminum siding where we held that
punitive damages were not justified but
awarded attorney's fees on a statutory basis. In Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 556, 230
P.2d 328 (1951), we held that an award for
attorney's fees as damages against an attaching creditor for depriving plaintiff of
possession of an automobile was erroneous.
See also Lyman Grazing Assoc, v. Smith, 24
Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905 (1970), a contract
action where malice was not found and
attorney's fees were not awarded.
[3] The general rule is that punitive
damages cannot be awarded for a breach of
contract Farris v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978);
Purington v. Sound West, 173 Mont. 106,
566 P.2d 795 (1977); Continental Nat. Bank
v. Evans, 107 Ariz. 378, 489 P.2d 15 (1971).
See 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 245 (1965).
See also: Restatement of Contracts § 342
(1982); Williston on Contracts § 1340 (Rev.
Ed., 1968); Sutherland on Damages, Exemplary Damages, § 391 (4th Ed., 1916).
However, we and other jurisdictions have
allowed punitive damages where the breach
of contract amounts to an independent tort.
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom,
Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982); Temmen v.
Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 22TI Kan. 45, 605
P.2d 95 (1980); Jackson v. Glasgow, Okla.
App., 622 P 2d 1088 (1980), Z.D Howard
Co. v. Cartwright, Okla., 537 P.2d 345
(1975); Gonzalez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 217
Kan. 262, 535 P.2d 919 (1975); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501 P.2d 368, 58
A.L.R3d 360 (1972).
We recognize the rule in some jurisdictions which, rather than requiring an independent tort, allows the award of punitive
damages if the contract was breached willfully and maliciously. Yacht Club Sales &
Service, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank, 101 Idaho
852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980); State Farm Gen-
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*ni Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 last delivery. Seller was entitled to interest
JK2d 798 (1974); Boiae Dodge Inc. v. Clark, on that difference. We find no error on
9* Idaho 902, 453 ?2d 551 (1966). Despite this point
dicta in some cases, we have not and do not
The judgment below is affirmed except
adhere to this rule.
as modified herein. No costs awarded.
[4] Therefore, while the jury did find
malice in the buyer's breach of contract and
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and
returned a verdict of $1.00 punitive dam- DURHAM, J J , concur.
ages, there was no pleading, argument or
evidentiary suggestion that the refusal of
the Iambs rose to the level of an independent tort Consequently, the award of pu( O §KEYNUMB£RSYSTEM>
nitive damages, and attorney's fees as an
element of them, was error in this case;
and, attorney's fees were not recoverable on
any other ground since there was no contractual or statutory basis for them. Devore v. Bostrom, Utah, 632 P.2d 832 (1981);
Joseph M KINKELLA, Plaintiff
BAR Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d
and Appellant
442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Blake v. Blake,
17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966).
Accordingly, we order that the award of
$1.00 punitive damages and the additional
$21,400 attorney's fees awarded as an element of punitive damages be remitted.

HJL (Jim) BAUGH and Dan Baugh,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 17967.

Supreme Court of Utah.
INTEREST
[5] Prejudgment interest may be
March 7, 1983.
awarded in a case where the loss is fixed as
of a particular time and the amount of the
loss can be calculated with mathematical
Homeowner brought suit for damages
accuracy. Anderson v. State Farm Fire on cost plus ^10% contract for remodeling of
and Casualty Co., Utah, 583 P.2d 101 (1978); home. The First District Court, Cache
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., Utah, 560 County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., held for
P.2d 315 (1977); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. contractors, and homeowner appealed. The
White Superior Co., Utah, 546 P.2d 885 Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
(1976); Jack B. Parson Construction Co. v. there was substantial compliance with rule
State, Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (1976).
of practice requiring that copies of proposed
[6] Buyer's argument that this is not findings of fact and conclusions of law be
such a case is unpersuasive. This is not an served on opposing counsel before being
instance such as a case involving personal presented to court for signature; (2) eviinjury, false imprisonment, wrongful death, dence adequately supported trial court's
defamation, or the like. Regardless of vari- finding that evidence tended to support
ability of the weight of the sheep, these contractors' cost figures; (3) finding on isdamages were mathematically calculated. sue of whether defendants were licensed
The jury awarded seller damages based contractors should have been made, but
court's failure to do so was not reversible
upon the difference between what seller
error; and (4) contractors were entitled to
should have received under the contract
contract price for their services.
with buyer and what he actually received
from R.H. Rock Company as of the date of
Affirmed.
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void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4),
not more than three months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of
a judgment or suspend its operation.
This Rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment
for fraud upon the court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these
Rules or by an independent action.

the substance of the claim was its concern
that defendant may have been confused as
to the effect of the stipulation for an
amended complaint 1 There is substantial
evidence in the record to support the fact
that plaintiff was the real party in interest,
and that defendant had knowledge thereof.

[1] The sequence of events recited ante
would indicate that the proper procedure
for setting aside the default in the instant
case would be under Rule 60(bXl)—mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect
This is true particularly in view of the late
filing of defendant's motion to dismiss.
However, because the time for setting aside
a judgment for this reason had expired
("three months after the judgment"), defendant attempts to construe the reason as
one falling within Rule 60(bX7), i. e., that
plaintiff is not the real party in interest. A
ruling of this kind is typically discretionary
with the trial court,3 its concern being only
with why a party failed to answer, not with
the merits of any defense he might offer.4

v.

[2] The trial court denied defendant's
motion on two separate bases: (1) the timeliness of the motion; and (2) the substance
of defendant's claim. It would appear that
the reason the trial court even considered

The trial court's decision is affirmed.
Costs to plaintiff.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
C. Robert DUNFIELD and Lynn S. Dunfield, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 16127.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 21, 1979.

In an action upon a contract claim, a
motion to dismiss on ground of res judicata
or collateral estoppel was granted by the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David B. Dee, J., and plaintiff appealed
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held
that where, in a previous case, court had
entered order allowing alleged assignor of
plaintiffs claim to be made party but such
alleged assignor had never been served nor
actually brought into action, and where
court had made no findings and thus it was

3. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah
2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Ney v. Harrison, 5
Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956).

(1973); See also Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).

4. Board of Education of Granite School District
v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 334 P.2d 806 (1963)
cited with approval in Airken Intermountain,
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65. 513 P.2d 429

5. It is conceivable that defendant expected yet
another amended complaint to be filed pursuant to the stipulation.
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reasonable to infer that there was no showing as to truthfulness of the allegation of
assignment, such alleged assignor was not
barred, either by res judicata or collateral
estoppel, from bringing the instant action
upon such contract claim.

the basis of those averments, which stood
undisputed, the defendants moved to dismiss the instant action on the ground of res
judicata or collateral estoppel. From the
trial court's granting of defendants' motion,
plaintiff appeals.

Judgment vacated and case remanded.

Essential facts appearing from the record
pertinent to the issue herein confronted are:
that in the prior action, the defendants
themselves denied that there had been any
assignment by plaintiff of its claim against
the defendants to Snellen Johnson. They
obtained an order making plaintiff here,
International Resources, a party to that
suit, but it was never served nor actually
brought into that proceeding. It is true
that at the conclusion of that trial, the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the plaintiff (Snellen
Johnson) had failed to prove the allegations
therein; and that the trial court granted
that motion and dismissed the complaint
with prejudice.

1. Judgment *»634, 713(2)
Distinction between res judicata and
collateral estoppel is that former applies
both as to issues which were actually tried
and those which could have been tried in
prior action, while latter does not apply to
issues that could have been tried in prior
case but were not
2. Judgment *=»707
Where, in first case, court entered order allowing alleged assignor of plaintiffs
claim to be made party but such alleged
assignor was never served nor actually
brought into action, and where court made
no findings and thus it was reasonable to
infer that there was no showing as to truthfulness of allegation of assignment, such
alleged assignor was not barred, either by
res judicata or collateral estoppel, from
bringing subsequent action upon such contract claim.
Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Farmington, for
defendants and respondents.

Particularly noteworthy are these facts:
that the motion to dismiss that suit, which
the court granted, was as against the plaintiff therein, Snellen Johnson; and that the
court's order recited that "International Resources had never been formally advised
that it had been joined as a party plaintiff
in the above entitled action, and no summons nor service of process ever having
been served on International Resources, International Resources is dismissed from the
case
"

CROCKETT, Chief Justice.
International Resources, a corporation,
sued the defendants for breach of a lease
agreement and for return of money it had
paid in advance thereon. Defendants filed
an affidavit which alleged: that one Snellen N. Johnson had sued the defendants in a
prior suit on the same claim; that therein
the said Johnson had alleged that the plaintiff, International Resources Corporation,
had assigned the claim to him; and that
that suit had terminated in their favor. On

The principle which underlies both the
doctrine of res judicata and its close relative, collateral estoppel, is that when there
has been a proper adjudication upon a controversy, and the judgment has become final, that should settle the matter and there
should be no further litigation thereon.
Concerning the doctrine of res judicata, it is
often said that both the parties and the
issues must have been the same; ! and also
that the judgment is conclusive, both as to
issues which were actually tried and those
which could have been tried in the prior

1. See 28 Am.Jur.2d 700.
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action.2 One of the reasons that it is said
that the parties must have been the same in
both actions is that before the rights of a
party are concluded by a judgment, he is
entitled to due process of law and an opportunity to contest the issue if he so desires.
[1] Though the related doctrine of collateral estoppel is based generally upon reasoning similar to that which underlies res
judicata, there is an important distinction
to be noted. The rationale of collateral
estoppel is that, even where the parties may
not have been the same, where a party has
had an issue adjudicated against him in a
prior case, he should be estopped from relitigating that issue in a subsequent case.3
But it is important to keep in mind this
distinction between the rule of res judicata
and that of collateral estoppel: while as
indicated above, the former applies both as
to issues which were actually tried and
those which could have been tried in a prior
action, the latter does not apply to issues
that merely "could have been tried" in the
prior case, but operates only to issues which
were actually asserted and tried in that
case.4 The primary reason for this is that if
the party against whom such a defense is
invoked was not a party to the prior action,
he would have had no choice as to litigating
an issue that merely "could have been
tried" in the prior suit; and if the material
issue was not actually asserted and determined, there is no basis upon which it could
be concluded that he had actually taken any
position on the issue and should now be
estopped from asserting a different position
in the instant suit.
[2] The position essayed by the defendants, in support of the trial court's ruling, is
that in the prior suit it was alleged that the
plaintiff in this suit (International Resources) had assigned its claim to the plaintiff in the prior suit, Snellen N. Johnson
(which allegation, incidentally, the defend2. Elliston v. Texaco, Inc.. Utah, 521 P.2d 379.
3. See Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485
P.2d 1044; Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 489 P.2d 65.
4. We so state in awareness of a concededly
overbroad statement in our case of Tracy Loan
and Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., et ai, 102

ants disputed); and that because that suit
terminated favorably to them, the plaintiff
herein is precluded from maintaining this
action on the ground of res judicata or of
collateral estoppel.
In applying what has been said above to
those contentions, these observations are
pertinent: res judicata is not here applicable because, even though the court entered
an order allowing plaintiff International
Resources to be made a party, it was never
served nor actually brought into the action.
It is significant that the allegation that
International Resources had assigned its
claim to the plaintiff in that suit, Snellen
Johnson, was the allegation of Snellen
Johnson, and not that of International Resources. Moreover, in its ruling in favor of
the defendants, dismissing the suit of Snellen Johnson, the court made no findings.
In thus rejecting Snellen Johnson's complaint, it is reasonable to infer that Johnson
made no showing as to the truthfulness of
his allegation that International Resources
had assigned its claim to him.
From what has been said above, it will be
seen that, whatever view is taken of the
two cases, it does not appear that plaintiff
International Resources has asserted any
different position in the prior case as to its
ownership of the claim against the defendants than that which it asserts here. It
therefore has not had the "full and fair
opportunity" it is entitled to for an adjudication on the question of whether it had
made an assignment of its rights to Snellen
Johnson, nor as to other issues which may
exist relating to the controversy between
itself and the defendants. It is therefore
necessary that the judgment of dismissal be
vacated and the case be remanded for such
further proceedings as may seem advised.
Costs to plaintiff (appellant).
MAUGHAN, WILKINS,
STEWART, JJ., concur.

HALL

and

Utah 509, 132 P2d 388, to the effect that one
would riot be "judicially estopped" unless the
parties and the issues are the same in the
instant and the pnor suit. Any misstatement
of the rule was corrected and superseded by
our decision in Richards v. Hodson, supra, note
3.
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fenae, and any amounts in mitigation must
be established by the employer. Pratt v.
Board of Education, supra. Where no salary agreement has been reached for the
damage period, the rate of pay for the
previous salary year should be used as the
base salary amount Brady v. Board of
Trustees, 196 Neb. 226, 242 N.W.2d 616
(1976).
In sum, we hold that, where the College
breached its contract with this employee by
originally discharging him without observing the formal termination procedures in
the College Personnel Manual, (1) even
though the College had good cause to dismiss the employee, it was under a contractual obligation to continue to pay his salary
until he was properly dismissed; and (2) the
College finally performed a proper dismissal
by substantially complying with the procedures in its Personnel Manual and therefore
is not obliged to reinstate the employee.
The judgment is affirmed. No costs
awarded.
HALL, C. J., and STEWART and HOWE,
JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments,
but died before the opinion was filed.
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LINDON CITY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION CO., a
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent
No. 17141.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 21, 1981.
City brought action against contractor
for declaratory judgment as to rights and

obligations of litigants. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif,
J., dismissed, and city appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C. J., held that: (1)
under provisions of contract, city was required to arbitrate prior to litigating disputes; (2) questions as to the interest rate
on delinquent payments and whether there
had been final payment by check which did
not include disputed interest were arbitrable; (3) Arbitration Act did not violate public policy; (4) Act does not deprive the city
of due process or its remedy by due course
of law; and (5) Act as applied to city was
not an unconstitutional delegation of a municipal function to a special commission.
Affirmed.
1. Arbitration <s=>7.5
Question of whether final payment had
been made under contract when the amount
paid did not include disputed interest and
question as to the rate of interest on delinquent contract payments were "disputes"
subject to arbitration under provision of
contract providing that all claims, disputes
and other matters in question arising out of
or relating to the contract documents or
breach thereof should be arbitrated, except
claims which had been waived by the making and acceptance of final payment
2. Arbitration <*=>9
Under contract calling for arbitration
of all disputes, city was required to seek
arbitration before bringing suit under the
Arbitration Act or the Declarator} Judgment Act. U.C.A.1953, 78-31-1 et seq., 7833-1 et seq.
3. Arbitration «=>7.1
Doubts as to whether the content of a
contract is arbitrable should be resolved in
favor of the parties' freedom to contract
4. Declaratory Judgment <*=»24
Purpose of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is to permit examination of legal documents and statutes to determine questions
of construction or validity arising under
such instruments. U.C.A.1953, 78-33-1 et
seq.
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& Arbitration « • *
There is no public policy or other reaJttr to prevent parties from agreeing to
arbitration.
£ Estoppel <fe»52.10(4)
Under constitutional guarantee that
every person shall have remedy by due
course of law for injury to his person or
property, party may intentionally and deliberately waive the ordinary and usual remedy to which he is entitled for the redress of
a wrong, provided that waiver is expressed
in the most unequivocal terms. ConstArt
I, § 11.
7. Arbitration * » 8
Arbitration removes a controversy
from the area of litigation but it is not an
ouster of judicial jurisdiction.
8. Arbitration <*=>2
Constitutional Law <*=>321
Provision of the Arbitration Act permitting valid and enforceable agreements
for arbitration of future disputes does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of remedy by due course of law for injury to
property. U.C.A.1963, 7&-31-1 et seq.;
ConstArt. 1, § 11.
9. Constitutional Law *=»251
Due process of law does not necessarily
require judicial action; the purposes of the
law may be effected by executive or administrative actions and still be valid if they
meet the requirements of due process.
ConstArt. 1, § 7.
10. Arbitration <*=»2
Constitutional Law <*=> 306(3)
Arbitration Act meets due process requirements. ConstArt 1, § 7; U.C.A.1963,
7&-31-1 et seq.
II. Municipal Corporations <*=»62
Arbitration Act, as applied to contract
involving municipality, does not unconstitutionally delegate a municipal function to a
special commission. ConstArt. 6, § 28;
U.C.A.1963, 78-51-1 et seq.
12. Municipal Corporations <*»1011
Absent statutory prohibition, municipal
corporation has the power to submit to arbi-

tration any claim asserted by or against i t
U.C.A.1953, 78-31-1 et seq.

Jackson Howard, John R. Merkling,
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant
Robert J. Dahl, Robert F. Babcock, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent
HALL, Chief Justice:
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
as to rights and obligations of the litigants
under a contract that included provisions
calling for arbitration of any disputes that
might arise out of the contract The contract was for construction of a facility for
the plaintiff, Lindon City, and resulted after the defendant, Engineers Construction,
was the low bidder on an advertised invitation for bids. Both parties agreed to the
arbitration by the designated American Arbitration Association. The entire contract
was prepared by the City and the arbitration provision was a condition necessary to
bind the parties to its terms.
Two disputes did arise: one as to the rate
of interest on delinquent contract payments, and the other as to whether there
had been a "final payment" by check that
did not include the disputed interest
Engineers claimed that payment had not
been made, and requested and gave notice
for arbitration according to the contract's
terms. Before the date of hearing, the City
refused to arbitrate and filed this suit for
declaratory judgment
The contract provisions that ar*> of vital
concern in resolving this litigation are reproduced as follows:
Section 30.1. All claims, disputes and
other matters in question arising out of,
or relating to, the CONTRACT DOCUMENTS or the breach thereof, except for
claims which have been waived by the
making and acceptance of final payment
as provided by Section 20, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association.
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This agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing
arbitration law. The award rendered by
the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in any court
having jurisdiction thereof.
Section 19.6 If the OWNER fails to
make payment 30 days after approval by
the ENGINEER, in addition to other
remedies available to the CONTRACTOR, there shall be added to each such
payment interest at the maximum legal
rate commencing on the first day after
said payment is due and continuing until
the payment is received by the CONTRACTOR
Section 20.1 The acceptance by the
CONTRACTOR of final payment shall be
and shall operate as a release to the
OWNER of all claims and all liability to
the CONTRACTOR . . . .
[1] It would appear that the "disputes"
mentioned above are particularly suited and
designed for determination by arbitration
by the very provisions insisted upon by the
City for inclusion in the very contract it
drafted and required as a condition for acceptance of bids. If not so intended to be
arbitrable, it is suggested that few, if any,
situations or "disputes" would survive for
arbitration under such a superficial conclusion. We are of the opinion that a claim,
followed by denial of the interest agreed
upon and whether final payment under the
contract had been made, are "disputes" under the plain, clear wording of the contract
provisions set out above, and we so hold.
[2] The only question, therefore, is
whether the plaintiff City was premature in
filing for declaratory judgment—not
whether such a suit is impermissible under
any circumstances because of the arbitration agreement We are convinced that
before the plaintiff filed this suit, it was
bound by its promise, first, to seek arbitration, then to litigate, if it could under its
contract, or under either the Arbitration
Act 1 or the Declaratory Judgment Act.2
1. U.C.A., 1953, 78-31-1, et seq.

The plaintiff asserts that the trial court
held that it had no "standing" in court,
while defendant contends the trial court
held the suit to be "premature." The statements of the court indicate that it adjudged
that the suit was premature. Whatever
term is or was used, it connotes the conclusion that in any event the parties covenanted to arbitrate first; otherwise, the provisions therefor would make no sense. There
is no question before this Court as to filing
suit after arbitration failed, and therefore
we need not discuss it except to say that, in
fact, the Arbitration Act itself provides for
such litigation in U.C.A., 1953, 78-31-13:
The arbitrators may on their own motion, and shall by request of a party to
the arbitration:
(1) At any stage of the proceedings
submit any question of law arising in the
course of the hearing for the opinion of
the court, stating the facts upon which
the question arises, and such opinion
when given shall bind the arbitrators in
the making of their award.
(2) State their final award, in the form
of findings of fact, for the opinion of the
court on the questions of law arising on
the hearing.
The trial court decided the suit was premature, as do we. Resort to the arbitration
process has not been had, as agreed, and the
arguments as to what the declaratory judgment says or does, are not germane here
Neither are those touching the jurisdiction
of the arbitrator or issues determinable by
the arbitrator in the first instance, such as
"future" versus "present" disputes, whether
the contract complies with the Arbitration
Act, and whether the 1977 amendment to
the Act or its predecessor prevailed. The
decision of the trial court cannot be interpreted other than to say that none of the
above matters can properly be heard by the
court prior to arbitration.
[3] As to whether the content of a contract is arbitrable, doubts should be resolved in favor of the parties* freedom to
2. U.C.A.. 1953, 78-33-1, et seq
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contract1 As was stated in King County v.
Boeing Company:4
Arbitration is a contractual remedy for
the settlement of disputes by extrajudicial means. It is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties, and "provides a
means of giving effect to the intention of
the parties, easing court congestion, and
providing a method more expeditious and
less expensive for the resolution of disputes." There is a strong public policy in
favor of such a remedy, but it should not
be invoked to resolve disputes that the
parties have not agreed to arbitrate.
*
*
*
*
*
*
Arbitration clauses should be liberally
interpreted when the issue contested is
the scope of the clause. If the scope of
an arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause should be
construed in favor of arbitration unless it
can be said that it is not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the asserted
d i s p u t e . . . . If an arbitrable issue exists,
the parties should not be deprived of the
benefits of the agreement for which they
bargained. [Citations omitted.] 5
There is nothing in the contract here that
is unclear, ambiguous or vague, and even if
there were, the parties have agreed to arbitrate such things first There is nothing in
the contract that an average, literate person would not be able to read and interpret
such as to demand a judge's decision rather
than a competent arbitrator.
[4] The purpose of the Declaratory
Judgment Act f is to permit examination of
legal documents and statutes to determine
questions of "construction or validity" arising under such instruments. There is no
reason, however, why an arbiter appointed
and authorized consensually by the parties
cannot examine such instruments for the

same reasons, as a condition precedent to a
formal lawsuit 7
[5] There appears to be no "public policy" or other good reason why persons effectively and by contract, should not be able to
agree to an out-of-court settlement It is
accomplished frequently by stipulation,
binding concessions, accord and satisfaction,
covenant not to sue, by indemnity contract,
and by other honorable and legal means.
The trend toward such inter se agreements without resort to litigation, reflects a
good, practical way to resolve disputes.
This very case appears to be a typical example of such attempted avoidance of the cost
and protraction this case itself already has
engendered. It would appear that in this
case the City may have sought lower construction costs and Engineers, a more remunerative margin of profit, by entertaining
the arbitration process.
Plaintiffs remaining point on appeal
challenges the constitutionality of the Arbitration Act, which permits the parties to
"[a]gree to submit to arbitration any controversy which may arise in the future."
We note at the outset that 1) plaintiff does
not support the point by any substantial
meritorious argument, and 2) that many of
our sister state courts have held similar acts
to be constitutional.
Without satisfactory proof otherwise,
constitutionality is generally presumed.8 In
Branch v. Salt Lake County,9 the Court held
as follows:
The first legal principle to be observed
is that there is a presumption that a
statute is valid and constitutional; and
one who questions it has the burden of
convincing this court of its unconstitutionality.

4. 18 Wash.App. 595, 570 P.2d 713 (1977).

7. Gary Excavating v. Town of North Haven,
164 Conn. 119, 318 A.2d 84 (1972); Ozdeger v.
AJtay, 66 Ill.App.3d 629, 23 HLDec. 446, 384
N.E.2d 82 (1978).

5. 570 P.2d at pp. 717-718.

8.

3. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S.
574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

6. Supra, note 2.

Washington County v. State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133 P.2d 564 (1943).

9. 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969).
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[6,7] Under Article I, Section 11, a party may intentionally and deliberately waive
the ordinary and usual remedy to which a
party is entitled for the redress of a wrong,
but such waiver should be expressed in the
most unequivocal terms.13 Although Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance
Company M alludes to this constitutional revision, this Court has consistently ruled that
an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
was enforceable for reasons of public policy.
In Johnson v. Brinkerhoff** this Court stated that the Utah statute (R.S. Utah 1933,
104-36-1) did not apply to agreements to
arbitrate future disputes, and that such
agreements were held to oust the courts of
jurisdiction.1*

what the legislature declared it to be; and
although the rule that commercial arbitration contracts were against public policy
had long been criticized, it was too firmly
imbedded to be overturned without legislation. In the Barnhart case,18 this Court
held that inasmuch as the legislature had
not amended the arbitration statute, we
would adhere to the law as previously established and would decline to enforce an
agreement for arbitration of controversies
which might arise in the future. In two
concurring opinions, Justices Henriod and
McDonough expressed the view that there
was no reason parties should not be able to
enter freely and voluntarily into a binding
arbitration agreement, but it was the prerogative of the legislature to amend the
statute to so provide. The legislature responded to the clarion opinions expressed by
members of this Court and amended the
statute to permit valid and enforceable
agreements for arbitration of future disputes. This amendment does not violate
Article I, Section 11, Constitution of Utah.

[8] In Latter v. Holsum Bread Co.,11 this
Court ruled that in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes was unenforceable on the
ground that it denied to the parties judicial
remedies and was, therefore, contrary to
public policy. In a concurring opinion, Justice Wolfe stated that public policy was

[9] Plaintiff contends the amendment
violates the due process clause of Article I,
Section 7, Constitution of Utah. Such an
argument is not persuasive. In Christiansen v. Harris,19 this Court observed that due
process of law does not necessarily require
judicial action. The purposes of the law,
especially as to property, may be effected

10. "All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party."

14. 16 Utah, 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965).

Plaintiff contends the amendment violates Article I, Section 1 1 l f and Article I,
Section 7 1 1 of the Constitution of Utah.
Plaintiff further argues that the application
of the amendment to a party that is a
municipal corporation violates Article VI,
Section 28 of the Constitution of Utah.12

11. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law."
12. 'The Legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or
interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, .
or to
perform any municipal functions."
13. Bracken v. DahJe, 68 Utah 4S6, 499, 251 P.
16 (1926).

15. 89 Utah 530, 544, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936).

16. Such a phrase and the ensuing rule of !a*
have been subject to some ridicule, 6A Corbin
on Contracts, Sec. 1431, p. 381. An agreement
to arbitrate future disputes has no effect upon
the jurisdiction of the court, although it may
affect the court's action. Arbitration removes
the controversy from the area of litigation. It
is no more an ouster of judicial jurisdiction
than a compromise and settlement or a covenant not to sue, each of which disposes of
issues without litigation. Id., Sec. 1432, p. 383.
17.

108 Utah 364, 368, 160 P.2d 421 (1945).

18. Supra, note 14.
19.

109 Utah 1, 7, 163 P.2d 314 (1945).
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by executive or administrative action, and
still be valid if they meet the requirements
of due process. The requirements are "that
no party can be affected by such action,
until his legal rights have been the subject
of an inquiry by a person or body authorized by law to determine such rights, of
which inquiry the party has due notice, and
at which he had an opportunity to be heard
and to give evidence as to his rights or
defenses."
[10] A survey of Chapter 31, Title 78
reveals that the Arbitration Act more than
fulfills all these requirements. In addition,
there are provisions for action by the courts
to affirm, modify, correct or vacate an
award.
[11] Finally, plaintiff claims that the
1977 amendment violated the proscription
of Article VI, Section 28 as a delegation to
a special commission of a municipal function. Specifically, plaintiff argues that to
enforce the binding arbitration clause it
included in the contract would be tantamount to subjecting a municipal corporation to the interest of a group antagonistic
to the public with no responsibility to the
public
[12] Absent a statutory prohibition, a
municipal corporation has the power to submit to arbitration any claim asserted by or
against it This power is based on the right
to contract and the right to maintain and
defend suits.* The arbitration clause in
the instant case did not involve a delegation
of unlimited discretion to an ad hoc panel of
private persons to make basic governmental
policy.21 The contract specified the rights
and duties of both parties, and the arbitration clause applied only to disputes about
compliance with terms fixed by the contract. Such a clause was not an abdication
of the municipality's duties towards new
matters which might arise in the future,

but only constituted a present agreement
that disputes which might arise under the
contract would be arbitrated.2* We therefore conclude and hold that the Arbitration
Act is constitutional.9
The judgment is affirmed with costs to
respondent

20. 20 A.L.R.3d 569, Anno.: Power of municipal
corporation to submit to arbitration, Sec. 2(a)v
pp. 572-574; Sec. 4(a), pp. 579-582.

22. City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd Wright
Foundation, 20 Wis.2d 361, 122 N.W.2d 409,
416-418, 20 A.L.R.3d 545 (1963).

21. Compare Salt Lake City v. International A&.
sociation of Firefighters, Utah, 563 P.2d 786
(1977).

23. See annotation in 55 A.L.R.2d 432 in support
of this conclusion. See also, Berkowitz v. Arbib, 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).

STEWART, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments,
but died before the opinion was filed.

STATE of Utah in the Interest of: ORGILL, Evan Leonard (04-08-67) Orgill,
Bart Wells (01-04-71) Persons under 18
years of age.
Appeal of Joyce THOMASON.
No. 17456.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept 22, 1981.
Mother appealed from order of the
Second District Court, Weber County, Calvin Gould, J., which terminated parental
rights. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held
that: (1) evidence sustained determination
that mother had abandoned children, and
(2) evidence sustained determination that
mother was unfit by reason of conduct and
emotional condition to retain parental
rights.
Affirmed.
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15T Conn.'382
Ctartac* T. MARSALA

v.
VALVE CORPORATION OF AMERICA.
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Jan. 8,1960.

Application to vacate arbitration
award in favor of employer in dispute as
to propriety of employer's discharge of employee. The Superior Court, Fairfield
County, Tedesco, J., vacated award and
employer appealed. The Supreme Court,
King, C. J., Ldd that where parties had not
in writing expressly waived requirement
that award be made within 60 days after
arbitrators were empowered to act, arbitration award which was made more than 60
days after start of arbitration hearing was
of no legal effect, though award was made
within 60 days after parties' summation
briefs for hearing were mailed to arbitrators.
No error.

1. Contracts <8=>284<l)

469

& Arbitration and Award 4=>50
Where parties to arbitration proceeding had not in writing expressly waived requirement that award be made within 60
days after arbitrators were empowered to
act, arbitration award which was made
more than 60 days after start of arbitration hearing was of no legal effect, though
award was made within 60 days after parties' summation briefs for hearing were
mailed to arbitrators. C.G.S.A. §§ 31-98,
52-408 et seq., 52-413, 52-414, 52-416, 5241&
6. Arbitration and Award €=>50
Statutory provision that arbitration
award made more than 60 days after arbitrators have been empowered to act shall
have no legal effect unless parties expressly extend time in writing is mandatory and
not merely directory and it is beyond powers of parties to arbitration proceeding to
modify except in manner provided for in
statute. CG.S.A. § 52-416.

Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Stamford, with
whom, on the brief, was John A. Sabanosh,
Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Arbitration agreements are to be favorably construed.

Lawrence J. Merly, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

2. Arbitration and Award <$=>!

Before KING, C. J., and ALCORN,
HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ

Person can be compelled to arbitrate
dispute only if, to extent that, and in manner in which, he has agreed to do so.
3. Arbitration and Award <3=>3I
Agreement for arbitration of dispute
may contain special provisions covering
conduct of arbitration proceedings.
4. Arbitration and Award &=>3I
In absence of special provisions governing conduct of arbitration proceedings,
proceedings are governed by applicable
provisions of general arbitration statutes.
C.G.S.A. §§ 52-408 to 52-424.

KING, Chief Justice.
This was a proceed^g brought b> t^e
plaintiff, under § 52-418 of the General
Statutes, which provides in material part,
that the Superior Court "shall make an order vacating * * * [ a n arbitration]
award upon the application of any party to
the arbitration: * * * (d) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made".
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as its personnel manager under a
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contract dated May 17, 1965, which provided, inter alia, that the contract of employment could not be terminated by either
party except for "just cause"; that, if a
dispute arose as to what constituted "just
cause", it should be determined by a threemember board of arbitration; that one
member of such board should be chosen by
each party; and that the two thus chosen
should themselves choose the third arbitrator.
On December 9, 1966, the plaintiff was
discharged on the ground that he had been
disloyal. On December 12, he requested
arbitration of the dispute as to the propriety of his discharge. The plaintiff chose
John V. Turk, Jr., as his arbitrator, the defendant chose Philip H. Smith, an attorney, and the two chose, as the third arbitrator, Peter Seitz. The selection of the
three arbitrators was completed on January
30, 1967.
None of the arbitrators was ever sworn,
as required by General Statutes § 52-414,
although at some point in the proceedings
the parties attempted orally to waive that
statutory requirement.
On February 22, the arbitrators scheduled the arbitration hearing for May 10.
The plaintiff, on February 21, had made
application to the Superior Court, apparently pursuant to General Statutes § 52412, for the taking of a deposition of Philip Sagarin, an officer of the defendant,
and on March 20, the plaintiff filed in the
Superior Court a notice that Sagarin's deposition would be taken on April 10. On"
March 22, the defendant asked the plaintiff
for alternate dates for the taking of the
Sagarin deposition, and it was rescheduled
for April 20, at which time it was taken.
The arbitration hearing was held on the
scheduled date, May 10, both parties participating and represented by counsel, and the
hearing was completed on that day. At
the close of the hearing, in response to an
inquiry of arbitrator Seitz as to the method of summation, the plaintiffs attorney
stated that he would like to have briefs ex-

changed, and it was agreed that briefs
should be exchanged not later than June
13, which was done, and copies were
mailed to the arbitrators on that day.
On August 8, the plaintiff's attorney received by mail the award, which consisted
of a majority award in favor of the defendant and signed by arbitrators Seitz
and Smith and a minority award, in favor
of the plaintiff, signed by arbitrator Turk.
On August 29, the plaintiff filed the
aforesaid application to vacate the award.
The relevant specific grounds were (a)
that the award was not rendered within the
statutory period of "sixty days from the
date on which * * * [the] arbitrators
* * * were empowered to act", as required by General Statutes § 52-416, and
(b) that the arbitrators, prior to hearing
testimony and taking evidence, were not
sworn as required by General Statutes, §
52-414 and there was no written waiver of
this requirement. The court, after hearing, entered judgment vacating the award
on the ground that it had not been rendered within the statutory time limit, and,
in effect, it held that the date on which the
arbitrators "were empowered to act" within the meaning of § 52-416 was not later
than May 10, 1967, which was the date on
which the arbitration hearing was held and
the evidence concluded. From the judgment vacating the award the defendant appealed.
[1-4] Arbitration agreements are to be
favorably construed by the courts. Gaer
Bros., Inc. v. Mott, 144 Conn. 303, 307, 130
A.2d 804, 65 A.L.R.2d 749, and cases cited.
But a person can be compelled to arbitrate
a dispute only if, to the extent that, and in
the manner in which, he has agreed so to
do. Visselli v. American Fidelity Co., 155
Conn. 622, 624, 237 A.2d 561; Frager v.
Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 155 Conn.
270, 274, 231 A.2d 531, and cases cited.
While the agreement for the arbitration of
a dispute may contain special provisions
governing the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings, in the absence of such special
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provisions the arbitration proceedings are
governed by the applicable provisions of
oor general arbitration statutes. 1 McCaffrey v. United Aircraft Corporation,
147 Conn. 139, 141, 157 A2d 920. These
statutes consist of §§ 52-408 through 5242* and are contained in what is now
chapter 909 of the General Statutes. Neither party makes any claim that the provisions of chapter 909 are not applicable or
that the agreement to arbitrate contained
any special provisions relevant or material
to the present controversy. Chapter 909
was first enacted as chapter 65 of the Public Acts of 1929 and, with some changes,
was taken from the Uniform Arbitration
Act first promulgated in 1925. Since that
time a new Uniform Arbitration Act has
been promulgated, differing considerably
from the original act and reflecting
changes and improvements suggested by
experience in arbitration proceedings under
the original Uniform Act. 9 Uniform Laws
Annotated (1957) 76.
It is provided in General Statutes § 52414 that, "[b]efore hearing any testimony
or examining other evidence in the cause",
the arbitrators "shall be sworn to hear and
examine the matter in controversy faithfully and fairly and to make a just award
according to the best of their understanding, unless the oath is waived in writing by
the parties to the arbitration agreement".
Here, the arbitrators were not sworn, and
there was an oral, but not a written, waiver of that requirement. The statute expressly requires that the waiver be in writing. Since for the reasons hereinafter
pointed out that the court was not in error
vacating the award because it had not been
rendered within the sixty-day time limit, it
is unnecessary to determine the efficacy of
I. In chapter 560 of the General Statutes,
which is not applicable to this proceeding, there are certain special statutory
provisions regarding the arbitration of
labor disputes before the board of mediation and arbitration. See cases such as
Banbury Robber Co. v. Local 402, etc.,
145 Conn. 53, 55, 138 A.2d 783; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v.
Shapiro, 138 Conn. 57, 68, 82 A.2d 345.

the parties' attempted oral waiver of the
requirement of the oath.
[5] We turn now to the phrase "empowered to act" since it is clear that the
sixty-day period ran from that time, whatever that time was.2 In the first place, it
is important to note that, although what is
now General Statutes § 52-4,16 was taken
from § 8 of the original Uniform Arbitration Act, the Uniform Act provided that
the sixty-day period should run from the
time the arbitrators were appointed, while
in the Connecticut statute the phrase "empowered to act" was deliberately substituted. This makes it clear that "empowered
to act" does not refer to the time when the
arbitrators are appointed as seems to be
suggested at one point in the defendant's
brief.
Although the arbitrators may, prior to
taking the oath, perform some ministerial
acts such as assigning a time for a hearing
or granting a postponement, under General
Statutes § 52-414, as hereinbefore noted,
"[bjefore hearing any testimony or examining other evidence in the cause, the arbitrators * * * shall be sworn".
Under the quoted provisions of § 52-414,
it is clear that chapter 909, construed as a
whole, contemplates that the arbitrators
shall not be empowered to take testimony
or evidence until they have been sworn or
until the oath has been waived in writing.
Since the taking of testimony or evidence
is indispensable to the performance by the
arbitrators of their duties, it is clear that
they must be "empowered to act" within
the contemplation of the statute not later
than the time when the taking of testimony
and evidence begins. Here, the hearing
2. The ambiguity in the phrase "empowered to act", the differing interpretations
which have been put upon it, and the
nc?d for a clarifying amendment are all
pointed out in Siegel, "Time Limits for
an Arbitration Award in Connecticut,"
30 Conn.B.J. 3G0.

472

Conn.

254 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

began, and indeed was completed, on May
10. We conclude that May 10 was the latest date on which it could be said that the
arbitrators became "empowered to act'* as
envisioned in the statute. This, in effect,
was what the court held. Of course the
parties could not, by their failure to comply with the terms of the statute as to the
oath, change the procedure which chapter
909 contemplated would be followed, and it
is this contemplated procedure as set forth
in the chapter which must be considered in
construing the phrase "empowered to act".

days after the arbitrators have been empowered to act] shall have no legal effect
unless the parties expressly extend the time
in which such award may be made, which
extension or ratification shall be in writing". This clearly makes the provision
mandatory and not merely directory and,
as such, beyond the powers of the parties
to modify except in the manner provided
in the statute itself. All this is brought
out in International Brotherhood of Teamsters etc. v. Shapiro, 138 Conn. 57, 68, 82
A.2d 345.

The defendant makes the claim that, until arbitrators had heard the testimony and
evidence and received the briefs, they were
not "empowered to act" since they could
not render a valid award at any prior date.
We find little merit in this claim. It
amounts to one that "empowered to act"
means "empowered to decide". Had the
General Assembly meant any such thing, it
would have used language apt to express
such a concept. Indeed, in proceedings under chapter 560 of the General Statutes before the board of meditation and arbitration involving a labor dispute, the General
Assembly made clear in the applicable statute that the time in which a decision must
be rendered runs from the time "a matter
has been fully heard". General Statutes §
31-98; Danbury Rubber Co. v. Local 402,
etc., 145 Conn. 53, 58, 138 A.2d 783.

The mandatory character of § 52-416 is
further reinforced by § 52-413, which, after authorizing the arbitrators to postpone
the hearing or to adjourn it from time to
time, provides that "no postponement or
adjournment shall extend the time as prescribed in section 52-416, or the time, if
any, fixed in the arbitration agreement, for
rendering the award".

The award was not rendered until August 8, 1967, which was well over sixty
days, and, indeed, almost three months, after the latest date on which the arbitrators
could have become "empowered to act" under the construction which we have given
that phrase. It follows that the award, under the express wording of the statute, had
"no legal effect". General Statutes § 52416.
[6] The defendant claims that in any
event the plaintiffs conduct must be held
to have constituted a waiver of any delay
in the rendition of the award. Section
52-416 expressly provides that "[a]n
award made * * * [more than sixty

Sections 52-413 and 52-416, taken together, permit the parties to exercise their
common-law right to fix, in the agreement
for arbitration, the time in which the arbitrators must render their award. Section
52-416 also permits the parties, in writing,
to extend the time in which the award may
be made or to ratify a late award. Here,
however, there was no express extension
or ratification in writing. Indeed, there
was not even an oral express extension or
an oral ratification of the late award.
There was, it is true, conduct of both parties which was irreconcilably inconsistent
with a compliance with the provisions of
the statute as to the time of the rendition
of the award. Except for the drastic,
mandatory provisions of the applicable
statutes, as previously pointed out, it is
quite probable that we could, and would,
find that each party, by his conduct, had
waived the sixty-day time limit. See note,
154 A.L.R. 1392, 1403. Certainly, we find
nothing to commend in this plaintiff's conduct in seeking to have the award vacated
under § 52-416. But the express provisions of the applicable statutes, and especially the provision in § 52-416 that the
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award, under the circumstances of this
case, "shall have no legal effect", preclude
our finding any waiver or estoppel. The
conclusion of the trial court that the award
must be vacated was not only not erroneous but was the only conclusion which it
could reach under the provisions of our applicable general arbitration statutes.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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157 Conn. 295
Josephine WILLAMETZ

v.
GUIDA-SEIBERT DAIRY COMPANY
et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Dec. 17, 1968.
Action for property damage and injuries sustained when plaintiff's automobile
was struck in rear by defendant's truck allegedly as a result of negligence of defendant's driver-agent. The Superior Court,
Hartford County, Pastore, J., rendered
judgment pursuant to jury verdict in favor
of defendants and plaintiff appealc!. The
Supreme Court, House, J., held that where,
if plaintiff's son and not plaintiff was operator of automobile, there was not only
variance in factual aspect of case as pleaded by plaintiff but also complete failure of
proof of material allegation to prejudice of
defendants giving of supplemental charge
that if plaintiff was not operator of automobile or if jury was unable to determine
from evidence if she was operator, they
should return verdict for defendants was
not error.
No error.
254 A 2d—30V*

i» Trial $»296(7)
In automobile accident case wherein
plaintiff claimed that she was driving her
automobile and defendants claimed that
plaintiff's son, whose license had been suspended, was driving, instruction to disregard that portion of charge which related
to principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and which was withdrawn from jury
cured any possible error.
2. Trial e=349(2)
Submitting interrogatories to jury for
a purpose of ascertaining their decision on
contested issue as to identity of operator of
plaintiff's automobile after recalling jury
to revoke prior instruction and to instruct
that if they should find that plaintiff was
not driver of automobile or if they were
unable to determine whether plaintiff or
her son was the driver their verdict should
be for defendants was within discretion of
court and did not unduly pinpoint the issue.
3. Trial <3=>348
Primary purpose of interrogatory to
jury is to elicit determination of material
facts and to furnish means of testing correctness of verdict rendered.
4. Judgment <S=?248
Right of plaintiff to recover is limited
to allegations of his complaint.
5. Judgment <3=>249
Plaintiff may not allege one cause of
action and recover on another.
6. Trial <S»3I2<2)
Where, if plaintiff's son and not plaintiff was operator of automobile, there was
not only variance in factual aspect of action for injuries sustained when plaintiff's
automobile was struck in rear by defendant's truck as pleaded by plaintiff but also
complete failure of proof of material allegation to prejudice of defendants, giving
of supplemental charge that if plaintiff
was not operator of automobile or if jury
was unable to determine from evidence if
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!£5V the order denying appellant's motion
for new trial herein is affirmed.
K A U F M A N , P . J., and S H O E M A K E R ,
| „ concur.
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PATRICK J. RUANE, INC., a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K. E. PARKER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 19083.

District Court of Appeal, First District,
Division 1, California.
Oct. 20, 1960.

Action for breach of contract was
brought by subcontractor against general
contractor to recover amount allegedly due
subcontractor for performance of the contract. The Superior Court, County of
San Francisco, Herman A. van der Zee,
J., rendered judgment in favor of the subcontractor, and the general contractor appealed. The District Court of Appeal,
Dunivvay, J., held that provisions of subcontract that subcontractor agreed to be
bound by general conditions of specifications and all conditions of prime contract
insofar as they were applicable to subcontractor's work did not obligate subcontractor to repair plaster, which was allegedly defective, at subcontractor's own
expense, if damage to plaster was caused
either by inadequate plans and specifications, or by general contractor, or by another subcontractor.
Judgment affirmed.

I. Arbitration and Award <S=>86
Contracts C=>332(l)

In action for breach of contract by
subcontractor against general contractor
to recover amount allegedly due subcon-
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tractor under subcontract, complaint alleging the making of the subcontract and
full performance by subcontractor, and answer admitting contract, but denying allegation of performance, and pleading as a
separate defense that dispute arose as to
whether work had been completed by subcontractor in accordance with plans and
specifications and that matter was submitted to arbitration and was decided
against subcontractor by arbitrators were,
on their face, sufficient pleadings. West's
Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 457.
2. Appeal and Error <3=>654

Where parties referred to a pretrial
order at trial, but no pretrial order was
included in either transcript, and appellant's contentions on appeal were based
in part on claimed insufficiency of complaint in relation to proof, District Court
of Appeal on its own motion would order
a copy of the pretrial order made a part
of the record on appeal. West's Ann.Superior Court Rules, rule 8.4(a).
3. Trial C=>54(l)
In action for breach of contract by subcontractor against general contractor to
recover amount allegedly due subcontractor under subcontract, letters, which hid
been written by subcontractor to general
contractor, and which were offered in evidence by general contractor without limiting the purpose of the offer, were evidence of truth of subcontractor's statements therein that exterior stucco job had
been done by subcontractor in accordance with specifications in color and texture as selected by architect and that materials used were those specified with no
deviation from specifications, and that
stucco was applied under inspection of
owner's representative and was inspected
and passed, and that job was acceptable
to owners and architect on completion.
4. Contracts C=>322(4)

In action for breach of contract by
subcontractor against general contractor to
recover amount allegedly due subcontractor
under subcontract, evidence was insufficient
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to establish that defects in exterior stucco
work done by subcontractor were caused by
improper scheduling of work by general
contractor during improper weather conditions,

the arbitration, or as to subject matter
not submitted to the arbitrators.

& Appoal an* Error <S=93I(I)

11. Contracts 0=322(3)
In action for breach of contract by
subcontractor against general contractor
to recover amount allegedly due subcontractor under subcontract, evidence established performance of subcontract by subcontractor.

On appeal by defendant, District Court
of Appeal would accept evidence favorable
to plaintiff.
6. Contracts €=>33
Provisions of subcontract between subcontractor and general contractor that subcontractor agreed to be bound by general
conditions of specifications and all conditions of prime contract insofar as they
were applicable to work of subcontractor
were valid and binding on subcontractor.
7. Contracts <3=I98<2), 199(1)
Provisions of subcontract between general contractor and subcontractor that subcontractor agreed to be bound by general
conditions of specifications and all conditions of prime contract insofar as they
were applicable to subcontractor's work did
not obligate subcontractor to repair plaster,
which was allegedly defective, at subcontractor's own expense, if damage to plaster
was caused either by inadequate plans and
specifications, or by general contractor, or
by another subcontractor. West's Ann.Civ.
Code, §§ 1643, 1650, 1654, 1655.
8. Arbitration and Award 0=82(4)
Where issue between subcontractor
and general contractor as to alleged defects in plaster work done by subcontractor \va* not submitted to arbitrator^, though
subcontractor agreed to submit such issue,
and general contractor deliberately withheld that submission, and arbitration was
as to the responsibility as between general
contractor and county for defects determined by the architect to exist in plaster,
award of arbitrators was not binding on
subcontractor.
9. Arbitration and Award <£=>82(4, 5)
An arbitration award is not res judicata as to a person who is not a party to

10. Arbitration and Award 0=29
An arbitrator has no legal right to
decide issues not submitted to him.

12. Contracts ^=287(1), 289
Generally, where construction contract requires that work be done to satisfaction of architect and that satisfaction
of architect be evidenced by his certificate to that effect, giving of such a certificate is a condition precedent to right of
general contractor to recover from owner,
but if architect is satisfied with the work
and arbitrarily refuses to issue the certificate, necessity for production of certificate
is dispensed with.
13. Contracts C=>320, 346(2)
Contractor, who pleads performance
of contract in action against owner, need
prove only substantial performance, and
owner is allowed an offset for deficiencies
in the work.
14. Contracts 0=284(2)
Condition of contract that third party,
such as an architect, shall take some action
is to be construed against party relying: on
it, and will be held to be a covenant,
rather than a condition when term* of
contract can be so construed.
15. Contracts 0=303(4)
If defendant by his own act has prevented performance by plaintiff of condition of contract, defendant may not rely on
plaintiff's failure to perform such condition.
16. Contracts 0=335(2)
In action for breach of contract by
subcontractor against general contractor
to recover amount allegedly due subcontractor under subcontract, rule that excuse
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p r &3ure of performance of contract must
l^.pleaded did not apply, where subcontracj | £ pleaded performance and proved subgiatial performance and that defects in
iraontractor's work were caused by genft^I contractor.
|R Contract! <3»289
In action for breach of contract by
iubcontractor against general contractor
to recover amount allegedly due subcontractor under subcontract, evidence that
Refects appeared in exterior stucco work
M subcontractor and that architect rejected the exterior stucco work was evidence
t>f nonperformance on part of subcontractor but was not under the subcontract
conclusive as between subcontractor and
general contractor.

Johnson & Stanton, Gardiner Johnson,
Hiram S. Dillin, San Francisco, for appellant.
Lloyd J. Cosgrove, John G. Evans, San
Francisco, for respondent.
DUNIWAY, Justice.
Action for breach of contract. Plaintiff had judgment and defendant appeals.
Appellant Parker had the general contract
for the construction of the new Hall of
Justice and Records Building at Redwood
City; respondent ("Ruane") had the subcontract with Parker for the plastering.
Although the judgment is for $8,272.01,
with interest, no claim of error is made
as to $1,204.66 thereof. Error is claimed
as to $5,400, representing the cost to
Parker of painting exterior stucco, and as
to $1,667.35, representing the cost to
Parker of patching cracked interior plaster. Parker claims that an arbitration
award is determinative in his favor, as to
the exterior stucco, and that, as to both
items, Ruane pleaded performance, but
proved only nonperformance plus an excuse for nonperformance. We have concluded that the judgment must be affirmed.

The Contracts
In his subcontract, Ruane agrees to do
«+ * * j n a workmanlike manner, as
required by and in strict accord with
said plans and specifications and details
illustrative thereof as approved by the
Contractor, and to the satisfaction, of the
Contractor, all Lathing and Plastering, i. e.,
all work outlined in Part 1, Sections 16 and
17 of the Specifications." Ruane also
agrees "to prosecute [the work] * * *
in full accord with the requirements of the
general construction as determined by the
Contractor * * * " Parker has the right,
if Ruane fails to perform, to do the work
at Ruane's expense. It is further provided that "The Sub-Contractor acknowledges familiarity with the general conditions of the aforesaid specifications and all
conditions of the original contract between
the Owner and Contractor and agrees to
be bound thereby insofar as they are applicable to this particular work; * * * "
The subcontract relieves Parker of liability
to Ruane for delay, but not from other
liabilities.
The material portions of the general
conditions of the prime contract are, as to
duties of Parker to the owner, to: determine when and where materials and labor
will next be needed (9c), coordinate the
various types of work and inform subcontractors (9d), notify subcontractors to
furnish and set their work in place (9f),
safeguard the work against weather, etc.
(9/), provide needed heat "as necessary
to protect all materials against injury from
dampn^s and cold," and specified1!}',
"[f]rom the beginning of the application
of plaster and during the setting and
curing period, provide sufficient heat toproduce a temperature in the spaces involved not less than 50° Fahrenheit"
(9n, 2), furnish, for the architect's approval, samples of materials, including
"plaster and lathing materials." Such materials are not to be used without the architect's approval (9r, 2 and special conditions, 13a). Subcontracts are to be approved by the architect (10a). 'The Con-
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tractor shall bind every Sub-contractor, and
every Sub-contractor agrees to be bound
by the terms of the Contract Documents
to carry out their provisions insofar as applicable to their work" (10c), but there
is no contractual relation between the subcontractor and the county (lOd). The contractor is required to " [ d ] o all necessary
patching of damaged, cracked or defective
plaster, leaving all plaster work in perfect condition." (Specifications, § 17-09.)
As to the architect, the entire work is
under his jurisdiction. One of his functions is to "pass upon merits of materials
and workmanship." H e is "to make written decisions in regard to all claims of the
Owner or Contractor and to interpret the
Contract Documents on all questions arising in connection with the execution of
the work." His decisions or interpretations are subject to arbitration (14, 14b).
All material and workmanship are subject
to the architect's inspection, and he has
"the right to reject defective material and
workmanship" or require their correction.
Rejected workmanship shall be satisfactorily replaced with proper material without
charge (15a). Final payment to the contractor is to be made upon a certification of
completion by the architect (17f, g ) .
The Pleadings
[1] The complaint alleges the making
of the contract in general terms only, and
full performance on Ruane's part. The
answer admits the contract and denies the
allegation of performance. It also pleads
in substance, as a separate defense that
a dispute arose as to whether the work
had been completed in accordance with
"the plans and specifications" and that
this matter was submitted to arbitration
and decided against Ruane by the arbitrators. These are, on their face, sufficient pleadings (Code Civ.Proc. § 457).
It is also true, however, that they successfully conceal the real issues to be
tried.

The Pre-Trial Order
[2] No pre-trial order is included in
either transcript, but the parties referred
to a pre-trial order at the trial. Because
the pre-trial order, "where inconsistent
with the pleadings, controls the subsequent
course of the case" (Rule 8.8, Rules for
the Superior Courts), and because Parker's
contentions on appeal are based in part
on claimed insufficiency of the complaint
in relation to the proof, we have on our
own motion ordered a copy of the pre-trial
order made a part of the record on appeal. Cf. the remarks of Ashburn, J., as
to our status as parens patriae in Burnstein v. Zelman, 182 Cal.App.2d
, 5
Cal.Rptr. 829. Unfortunately, the pretrial order contributes nothing to the clarification of the issues or to the solution
of the problem relating to the pleadings
presented by appellant Parker. It appears
to us to be a totally useless document.
Cf. Arch Rib-Summerbell Steel Fabricators
v. Lubhner, 183 CaI.App.2d
, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 94; C^llison v. Thomas, Cal.App.,
6 Cal.Rptr. 911. It quotes verbatim the
pre-trial statements of the parties, which
are no more specific than the pleadings,
but does not at any point attempt to state,
with any particularity or at all, the actual
issues to be tried. Had the pre-trial judge
delved into the matter at all, he could
have discovered the true nature of the
controversy, settled the issues to be tried,
required such amendments to the pleadings
as might be required (Rule 8.4(a)) and
eliminated the contention as to the pleadings nuw p i e c e d upon us. He did none
of these things.
The Real Issues
The issues developed at the trial are
these: It is conceded that Ruane did all
of the work required by the contract, the
controversy being only, in the instance of
the exterior plaster, as to (a) whether he
was bound to repair the defects that admittedly appeared, regardless of their
cause, or (b), if not, whether the defects
were the result of defects in his work, or
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jft*) whether the arbitration award w a s
conclusive against him; and, in the inataace of the interior plaster, (a) whether
hfe. was bound to repair cracks that adUlittedly developed, regardlesss of their
cause, or (b), if not, whether they were
caused by Ruane's faulty workmanship or
j y Parker's improperly heating the building.
The Findings
The court found that Ruane performed
all the conditions stated in his contract,
that the arbitration did not decide the
question before the court although Parker
tofd Ruane that the arbitrators would decide it, and that the award does not bind
or estop Ruane.
The Trial
The conduct of the trial was in many respects as informal as the pre-trial conference must h a \ e been. Ruane's case in
chief was very brief. Counsel put in evidence his subcontract with Parker and the
specifications of the prime contract. H e
obtained a stipulation that the building had
been accepted by the county and notice of
completion filed. H e proved that the contract price, under the subcontract, except
for the amount sued for, had been paid.
Mr. Ruane then testified:
"Q. Has all of the work under this subcontract, that is the lathing and plaster
work, been performed by \ o u r company?
A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And the job to your knowledge has
been completed? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And a notice of completion has
been filed?
A. Yes, sir." On crossexamination, Parker elicited the information that the exterior was repainted before acceptance and that this was not
done by Ruane. Counsel then agreed that
the arbitration related solely to the exterior plaster, and Ruane rested.
The Facts as to the Exterior Plaster
Counsel for Parker showed that the
architect rejected the exterior plaster or
stucco "because of stains, leaching and
splotches." He showed that, after the
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arbitration (to be described in more de->
tail hereafter), Ruane refused to remedy
the defects.
[3] In showing the negotiations leading up to the arbitration, Parker offered
in evidence, without limiting his offer, a
letter from Ruane dated December 14,
1955, in which the latter asserted that the
exterior job was done "in accordance with
specifications in color and texture as
selected by the architect. The materials
used were those specified with no deviation from the specifications. The stucco
was applied under the inspection of the
owner's representative and as each area
was completed, was inspected and passed
before removal of the scaffold." The letter also asserts that the job was "acceptable to the owners and architect upon
completion." A like assertion appears in
another letter, dated July 19, 1956, similarly offered by Parker.
Having been
offered by Parker, without any limitation
as to the purpose of the offer, these letters are evidence of the truth of Ruane's
statements therein, and may be considered
in support of the findings of the court.
Nelson v. Fernando Xelson & Sons, 5
Cal.2d 511, 518, 55 P.2d 859; Merchant
Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 28 Cal.2d 594, 170 P.2d 923. To
that extent, Parker has supplied what
might otherwise be a deficiency in Ruane's
proof.
When Parker's counsel finished his proof
relating to the exterior stucco, it was
agreed that Riume should pioceed in rebuttal on that issue. He offered in evidence
another letter, dated April 25, 1956, making a similar but briefer assertion. No
objection was made.
[4] Ruane points to a statement in one
of the architect's letters, offered by Parker
and received without limitation or objection, that " [ i ] t [the leaching, etc.] is all
due probably to application of stucco in
improper weather conditions," and to testimony of Parker on cross-examination that
Parker scheduled the work that Ruane was
to do. Counsel apparently thinks this evi-
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dence is a sufficient showing' that the defects were caused by improper scheduling by Parker. We disagree. To so
hold would stretch the doctrine that a
finding must be sustained, if there is any
substantial evidence to support it, too far.
The evidence as to scheduling is at most
equivocal, and in our judgment proves
nothing. However, as we shall see, this
point is immaterial.
The Arbitration
The arbitration was handled through the
American Arbitration Association, no
method being prescribed by the contract.
Two of its forms of "submission/' almost
identical in form, were signed. One,
signed by Ruane alone, dated May 19, 1956,
reads in material part, as follows:
"Michael Goodman, architect for the
Hall of Justice and Records Building, Redwood City, California has rejected the
exterior stucco because of stains, leeching
[sic] and splotches and has demanded that
we remedy the features objectionable to
him.
"K. E. Parker maintains that the installation of the exterior stucco was performed in accordance with plans and specifications in first class and workmanlike
manner and that the leeching [sic] is
something beyond his control, and for
which he is not responsible.
"Since a difference of opinion exists regarding the responsibility for this alleged
condition, the parties hereto wish to submit the matter of responsibility to arbitration."
The other, signed by Parker and the
county, but not by Ruane, dated May 22,
1956, is identical except that, in the first
paragraph, the words "we remedy" have
been rubbed out and the words "K. E.
Parker remedy" have been inserted, and
in the third paragraph, the word "alleged" does not appear. Parker did not
present to the arbitrators the "submission,"
dated May 19, signed by Ruane, although
he told Ruane that he would. The court

found that this was done secretly, and in
violation of Parker's representations to
Ruane. Thus there was submitted to the
arbitrators only the question of "responsibility" as between the county and Parker.
Their award reads: "The responsibility
* * * rests with the contractor, K. E.
Parker." Following the award, Parker,
claiming that the arbitrators had decided
against Ruane, demanded that Ruane remedy the defects. He refused to do so,
stating, in a letter to Parker: " * • *
nowhere do we find that the responsibility
for the deficiency or for remedying the
deficiency has been placed specifically
against our firm or the work or materials
installed by our firm." Parker's position
as stated in his testimony is: "No, there
was no arbitration with me. I had no
arbitration. He had a contract with me
to satisfy the architect. There was no
arbitration between Mr. Ruane and I."
The Facts as to the Interior Plaster
[5] On this issue, the parties are in
agreement that both "normal" and "abnormal" cracking developed. It is also agreed
that Ruane did considerable patching of
cracks. The evidence as to when the
"abnormal" cracking developed, and what
caused it, is in sharp conflict. The evidence favorable to Ruane, which we must
accept on this appeal, indicates that the
lathing and plastering were properly installed, in a good and workmanlike manner, and in accordance with the plans
and specifications. It further indicates
that the "abnormal" cracking developed
over a week-end, when the central heating
was first turned on, and during which
temperatures inside the building rose to
over 80°, and that such improper heating
caused the cracks. It further indicates that
the heating was done under the direction
and control of Parker. These are the
cracks that Ruane refused to repair, and
that Parker had repaired by another subcontractor. The architect, or his representative, refused to accept the job until
the cracks were repaired. Some of the
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foregoing evidence came in as part of
ftrker's case; some came in as rebuttal
$gf Ruane. No objection was made to this
procedure except that, in connection with
iffac heating, on cross-examination of Park*
tt, his counsel did object to one question on
tiie ground that the matter was "beyond
the issues in this case."
So far as appears from the transcript,
counsel for Parker did not, either when
Raane rested or at any time thereafter
during the trial, raise the contention on
which he now relies, that Ruane pleaded
performance but proved nonperformance
plus an excuse therefor, and that a judgment supported by such pleading and
proof cannot stand. Cf. Wyman v. Hooker, 2 CaLApp. 36, 41, 83 P. 79. He elected
to stand upon two propositions: that the
architect's demand that the leaching and
splotches, and the cracks, be repaired, requires, as between Ruane and Parker, that
Ruane do the repairs at his expense, regardless of the cause of the defects, and
that the arbitration placed responsibility
upon Ruane.
The Contractual Relation of the Parties
[6] The case before us requires a determination of the effect of the language
of the subcontract whereby Ruane agrees
to be bound by "the general conditions of
the aforesaid specifications and all conditions" of the prime contract "insofar as
they are applicable to this particular work."
Of course these provisions are valid and
binding on Ruane. Enochs v Christie,
137 CaI.App.2d Supp. 887, 291 P2d 200;
Gray v. Cotton, 166 Cal. 130, 134 P. 1145;
Trottier v. M. H. Golden Construction Co.,
105 Cal.App.2d 511, 515-516, 233 PJ2d 675.
The question is, what are the effects of
these provisions?
Essentially, Parker takes the position that
they mean that, as to the plastering, Ruane
stands in Parker's shoes, for all purposes,
vis-a-vis the county. This would mean
that Ruane cannot recover if the architect's final certificate is withheld because of
objection to the plastering work, regard8 Cal.Rptr.—25

less of who or what caused the defects
therein. It also would mean that Ruane
is bound by any arbitration between the
county and Parker relating to the plastering even though the question of responsibility, as between Parker and Ruane, was
not submitted to the arbitrators. We do
not agree. We think that Parker's argument goes too far, and disregards the limiting language in the subcontract, that
Ruane is bound by the prime contract
"insofar as * * * applicable." Parker's position would put Ruane completely
at the mercy of Parker and the county and
its architect, any of whom could, under
such an interpretation, cause or require him
to re-do what is in fact proper work, or
pay for the doing of it by Parker, even
if Ruane's work, after its proper completion, were to be damaged by Parker or by
another of his subcontractors, or by agents
of the county, or if the specifications themselves were defective.
[7] Basically, what Ruane undertook
to do was the lathing and plastering work
called for by the prime contract, in accordance with the plans and specifications,
which he did not prepare. In doing the
work, he had to install the lathing and
plastering in a building which he neither
designed nor built; that work was to be
done by Parker or by other subcontractors
of Parker. Specifically Parker, not Ruane,
was to heat the building in such a way as
to protect rather than to damage Ruane's
plaster. Parker scheduled the work of
his subcontractors, including Ruane.
Ruane did not warrant the adequacy or
sufficiency of the specifications. Even an
architect does not do that. Pancoast v.
Russell, 148 Cal.App.2d 909, 913, 307 P.2d
719, and see Atowich v. Zimmer, 218 Cal.
763, 25 P.2d 6; Mannix v. Tryon, 152 Cal.
31, 91 P. 983; Wyman v. Hooker, supra,
2 Cal.App. 36, 39, 83 P. 79; Simmons v.
Firth, 33 Cal.App. 187, 189-190, 164 P.
807; Roebling Const. Co. v. Doe Estate
Co., 33 Cal.App. 397, 408, 165 P. 547.
Ruane would have breached his contract
if he had concluded that they were inade-
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quate and had undertaken, on his own responsibility, to disregard them for that
reason.
The subcontract provides that
Ruane "shall not deviate from the said
plans, specifications and details except on
written order of the Contractor." It would
be unreasonable to construe his obligation, which was also Parker's under the
specifications of the prime contract, to repair the plaster, as including an obligation to do that work at his own expense
where the damage was caused either by inadequate plans and specifications (Wyman
v. Hooker, supra, 2 Cal-App. 36, 39, 83
P. 79) or by Parker or one of his other
subcontractors.
On that question, the
contract documents are silent.
It may be that a party can, by contract,
place himself in such a position as Parker
asserts, a question that we need not now
consider. But we would be reluctant so
to hold in any case where the language
does not compel such a result. "A contract must receive such an interpretation
as will make it
* * *
reasonable
* * * " Civil Code, § 1643. "Particular
clauses of a contract are subordinate to
its general intent." Civil Code, § 1650.
"Stipulations which are necessary to make
a contract reasonable * * * are implied * * *." Civil Code § 1655. It is
significant, we think, that Ruane relieved
Parker from liability to him for delay, but
not from any other liability, especially
since the subcontract is on Parker's printed
form. Cf. Civil Code, § 1654.
The relationship of the architect to the
prime contractor is different from his relationship to the subcontractor. As the
representative of the owner, his responsibility is to see that the building is completed properly, in accordance with his
plans and specifications. H e can, therefore, reject any part of the work as not
in accord therewith, but subject to arbitration. However, it is immaterial to him
whether the defect was caused by the
prime contractor or one or more subcontractors. H e looks solely to the prime
contractor for performance, since the con-

tract documents make it clear that there
is no contractual relationship between the
owner and any subcontractor. It is not
surprising, then, that nowhere in the contract documents is he given any authority
or responsibility for deciding disputes between a subcontractor and the prime contractor. That is not his function. It follows, we think, that arbitration between
the prime contractor and the owner, as to
a decision of the architect, does not determine such a question, absent an express
agreement that it shall do so. Nothing in
the contract documents provides for the
arbitration of such a question.
Many cases in this state, none of which
has been cited by counsel for either party,
recognize that under contracts similar
to those before us, a subcontractor can recover from the prime contractor for work
properly done by the subcontractor, even
though the prime contractor may not be
able to recover from the owner because
the latter or his architect has rejected the
same work. The cases also recognize the
differences that we have stated between
the relationship of the owner's architect to
the prime contractor and his relationship
to the subcontractor. Manmx v. Tryon,
supra, 152 Cal. 31, 39-41, 91 P. 083 [plastering subcontract, plaster discolored, judgment for subcontractor affirmed] ; Libber
v. Fairbanks, 70 Cal.App 326, 233 P. 74:
Frank T. Hickey, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Jewish Community Council, 12S Cal.App.
2d 676, 683, 276 P.2d 52; Fielding £
Shepley, Inc. v. Dow, 72 Cal.App.2d 18, 20,
163 P.2d 908; C. F. Bolster Company v.
J. C. Bocspflug, etc., Co., 167 Cal.App 2d
143, 334 P.2d 247.
In the Mannix case, the court said, as
to the subcontractor: "Pie did not agree
generally to plaster the dwelling, which
would leave to him the selection of the
materials and the method of doing the
work. His agreement was to do it in a
way that the owner and the original contractor had designed, according to the
specifications which they had agreed on.
H e had no discretion in the matter. When
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tef followed strictly those specifications,
«»ed exactly the materials they called for
% the composition of the mortar and hard
ferish, and applied them in a workmanlike
b a n n e r , he did all his contract called for.
H e did not contract for results, but only to
do the work in a specified way. If the
jusual result of white walls and ceilings
did not follow, he was not responsible for
it, unless there was some default on his
part in furnishing the materials called
for in the specifications or in doing the
work with them. The court found, and
the evidence fully sustained the finding,
that the plaintiff had not been remiss in
either particular.
Under these circumstances, as he made no express warranty
as to results, and plastered and hard
finished the rooms with the materials
specified in the contract, and did the work
skillfully, he did all that he had contracted to do." 152 Cal. at Pages 40-41,
91 P. at page 987.
The Arbitrator's Award Did Not
Bind Ruane
[8] The issue between Ruane and Parker was not submitted to the arbitrators
although Ruane agreed to submit it.
Parker deliberately withheld that submission. The arbitration was as to the responsibility as between Parker and the
county for defects determined to exist by
the architect. His determination would not
fix responsibility as between Ruane and
Parker. Certification by a third person,
such as the architect, as to performance
or nonperformance by a party, as a binding
determination, is limited to those matters,
which, by the contract, are to be certified
to. Brandenstein v. Jackling, 99 Cal.App.
438, 444, 278 P . 880; American-Hawaiian
Engineering & Const. Co. v. Butler, 165
Cal. 497, 517-518, 133 P. 280. Such certification is not binding where the contract
does not make it so. C. F. Bolster Company v. J. C. Boespflug, etc., Co., supra,
167 CaI.App.2d 143, 153, 334 P.2d 247;
Gray v. Cotton, supra, 166 Cal. 130, 135—
136, 138, 134 P . 1145; Kinkle v. Fruit
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Growers Supply Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 102,
108, 146 P.2d 8 ; Vaughan v. County of
Tulare, 56 Cal.App. 261, 266, 205 P. 21.
Referring to an architect's certificate
^ to certain delinquencies in a contractor's
performance, the court said: "But, springing from the nature of such certificates,
their power for weal or woe, and the fact
that they contemplate forfeitures and the
right of rescission, the terms of the certificates themselves are strictly construed."
American-Hawaiian Engineering & Const.
Co. v. Butler, supra, 165 Cal. 497, 512, 133
P . 280, 286.
[9,10] The arbitration being as to a
decision of the architect, which did not decide the question here involved, it follows
that the arbitration decided nothing as between Ruane and Parker. An arbitration
award is not res judicata as to a person
who is not a party to the arbitration, or as
to a subject matter not submitted to the
arbitrators. Pancoast v. Russell, supra, 148
Cal.App.2d 909, 914, 307 P.2d 719. An
arbitrator "has no legal ri^ht to decide
issues not submitted to him." Crofoot v.
Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App 2d 156,
184, 260 P.2d 156, 171; and see William
B, Logan & Associates v. Monogram Precision Industries, 184 Cal.App 2d
, 7
Cal.Rptr. 212.
Of course, Ruane and Parker could have
submitted the question between them to
arbitration, and Ruane thought that they
did, but Parker saw to it that Ruane's intention so to do was frustrated.
Under
these circumstances he is in no position
to ask us, as he does, to hold that the
axvard binds Ruane.
The Rule of Pleading on Which
Parker Relies Does Not Apply
[11] Parker asserts that Ruane proved
nonperformance, plus an excuse therefor,
when he pleaded only performance. He
does not claim that performance in accord with the plans and specifications was
not shown, and in any event we think that
such performance was shown. It seems
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that Roane's statement that "the work
* * * [has] been performed" is sufficient to make a prima facie case. Thomas
Havcrty Co. v0 Jones, 185 Cal. 285, 296297, 197 P. 105, 110. If it was not, further evidence was produced to the same
effect, by both parties, without objection
as to the order of proof or as to who was
doing the proving. What was proved,
then, was performance, not nonperformance.
Parker relies on the rule that "a recovery
on proof of excuse for nonperformance
cannot be had on an allegation of full performance." Kirk v, Culley, 202 Cal. 501,
506, 261 P. 994, 996. The cases in which
the rule has been applied do not involve
the question here presented, namely, a
contention by a subcontractor that he has
performed in full compliance with the
plans and specifications, and a rejection of
his work by the architect for defects that
appeared in the subcontractor's work
thereafter.1 Parker asserts that his own
satisfaction with Ruane's work, and the
architect's approval of it, are conditions
precedent to Ruane's right to recover, that
Ruane's own proof showed that Parker was
not satisfied and that the architect rejected Ruane's work, requiring Parker to
repair it before he would accept the job.
I. Downs v. Atkinson, 207 Cal. 259, 277 P.
723 (Highway contractor took employee
off highway job because state engineer
objected to him. Employee was ready to
perform at all times. The court did not
apply the rule, but sustained recovery by
the employee on a complaint alleging performance. Followed in Pavno v. Pnt^e
Studioe, Inc., 6 CahApp.2d 136, 141, 44
P.2d 598, and Overton v. Vita-Food
Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 372, 210 P.
2d 757); Kirk v. Culley, 202 Cal. 501,
261 P. 994 (action for attorney's fees);
Kroteer v. Clark, 178 Cal. 736, 174 P.
657 (contract to sell real property);
Herdal r. Sheeny, 173 Cal. 163, 159 P.
422 (action by prime contractor against
the owner); Peek v. Steinberg, 163 Cal.
127, 124 P. 834 (contract for employment) ; Estate of Warner, 158 Cal. 441,
111 P. 352 (ante-nuptial agreement);
Bocke v. Baldwin, 135 Cal. 522, 65 P.

Actually, it was Parker, not Ruane, who
proved some of these facts, but they are
not disputed by Ruane. Ruane's position,
essentially, is that if he showed that he
performed according to the specifications,
he has proved his case.
[12] Parker relies on the general v rule
that, where a contract requires that work
be done to the satisfaction of the architect, to be evidenced by his certificate to
that effect, the giving of such a certificate
is a condition precedent to the contractor's
right to recover. Coplew v. Durand, 153
Cal. 278, 279, 95 P. 38, 16 L.R.A.,N.S.,
791; Ahlgren v. Walsh, 173 Cal. 27, 31,
158 P. 748; Tally v. Parsons, 131 Cal. 516,
63 P. 833. But even in an action by the
prime contractor against the owner, if the
architect is satisfied with the work, and
arbitrarily refuses to issue the certificates,
"the necessity for the production of the
certificate is dispensed with." Coplew v.
Durand, supra, 153 Cal. 27$, 281, 95 P. 38,
39, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 791; and cf. Philbrook
v. Mercantile Trust Co., 84 Cal.App. 187,
197, 257 P. 882; American-Hawaiian Engineering & Const. Co. v. Butler, supra,
165 Cal. 497, 515-516, 133 P. 280; Simmons v. Firth, supra, 33 CaLApp. 187, 164
P. 807.
459, 67 P. 903 (attorney's fees) : Owen v.
MpAflo. 104 Cal 179, 37 P. 923 (attorney's fees); Daley v. Ross, 86 Cal. 114,
*24 P. 867 (brokerage); Rylee v. De Fini,
134 Cal.App.2d Supp. 877, 285 I\2d 115
(brokerage); Swanson v. Thnrber, 132
Cal.App.2d 171. 281 P.2d 642 (brokerage) : Martin v. Chtrnaba^rT, 124 CaLApp.
2d 648, 269 P.2d 25 (brokerage); Iteminger v. Edlon Mfg. Co., 114 CaI.App.2d
240. 250 P.2d 4 (sale); Ayoob v. Ayoob,
74 Cal.App.2d 236, 237, 168 P.2d 462 (antenuptial agreement); Atkinson v. District Bond Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 738, 43 P.
2d 867 (contract to buy street bonds—
dictum); Barnhart v. Blackburn, 137 Cal.
App. 240, 30 P.2d 424 (exchange of properties) ; Stehli Silks Corp. v. Director,
86 Cal.App. 591, 261 P. 313 (sale); McNulty v. New Richmond Land Co., 44 Cal.
App. 744, 187 P. 97 (purchase of real
property).
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p f f * think that the rule invoked does not
Hgbrfre a reversal here, for a number of
Nstaims:
tflKrff; It has been held that, where a
jfantiff fails to plead a condition and the
gi&ion for its nonfulfillment, but this delict is supplied by the answer, there was
IT mere variance, which did not mislead
&* defendant, so that Code of Civil Proiti&tre, § 469 applies. Antonelle v. Kennedy 4 Shaw Lumber Co., 140 Cal. 309,
32&-321, 73 P. 966, and see the annotations to section 469, in Deering's and West's
Annotated Codes. Here, the defect was not
supplied by the answer, except as to the
arbitration, but it was supplied by the
proof, part of which came from Parker
himself.
This is an application of the broader
rule that when a case is tried on the
assumption that a cause of action is stated,
that certain issues are raised by the pleadings, that a particular issue is controlling,
neither party can change this theory for
purposes of review on appeal. Reid v.
Overland Machined Products, 183 Cal.App.
2d
, 7 Cal.Rptr. 34, and cases there
cited.
Second: It has been held that, where the
plaintiff consistently claims that he has
performed, and at no time admits nonperformance or claims an excuse therefor,
the rule does not apply, even though the
defendant attempts to show the latter.
Mills v. Geo. A. Moore & Co., 39 Cal.App.
94, 96, 178 P. 304. So, too, error in overruling a demurrer on the ground that the
complaint of a contractor did not show
either that the required certificate of an
engineer was given, or that there was an
excuse for its not being given, is not
prejudicial when at the trial the facts are
shown without objection. Simmons v.
Firth, supra, 33 Cal.App. 187, 189, 164 P.
807; Const., Art. VI, § 4i/£; Code Civ.
Proc. § 475.
Third: The rule has not been applied to
the satisfaction of the owner or architect
in the case of building contracts or subcontracts. There is good reason for this.

So far as the satisfaction of Parker is
concerned, it has been repeatedly held that
performance of a building contract which
is satisfactory to a reasonable person is
performance of the contract, even if the
owner is in fact, not satisfied. Thomas
Haverty Co. v. Jones, supra, 185 Cal. 285,
296, 197 P. 105; Scott Co., Inc. v. Rolkin,
133 Calj\pp. 209, 23 P2d 1065; cf. Collins
v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 47 Cal2d 875, 882,
306 P2d 783; Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal2d
119, 123, 330 P2d 625; Leboire v. Royce,
53 Cal2d 659, 672, 2 Cal.Rptr. 745; Tiffany
v. Pacific Sewer Pipe Co., 180 Cal. 700,
702-704, 182 P. 428, 6 A.L.R. 1493. Under
such circumstances, pleading of performance is sufficient. The subcontractor need
not plead that the prime contractor was or
was not satisfied. Fielding & Shepley, Inc.
v. Dow, supra, 72 Cal.App.2d 18, 21, 163
P.2d 908.
[13] This is in part because of the
special nature of building contracts, under
which the contractor's work becomes a part
of the owner's real property, and is of such
a character that it cannot be restored in
case the owner rescinds, so that the owner
retains the benefit of it. It is long established law in this state that the contractor
who pleads performance, need prove only
substantial performance, defendant being
allowed an offset for deficiencies in the
work. Thomas Haverty Co. v. Jones,
supra, 185 Cal. 285, 289, 197 P. 105, and
cases cited; Atowich v. Zimmer, supra, 218
Cal 763, 76&-76Q, 25 P 2d 6 As the court
said in Joseph Musto Sons-Keenan Co. v.
Pacific States Corp., 48 Cal.App. 452, 458,
192 P. 138, 140: "a substantial performance is performance."
See Shell v.
Schmidt, 164 Cal.App.2d 350, 356, 330 P.2d
817; Shumway v. Woolwine, 84 Cal.App.
220, 223-224, 257 P. 898; Brown v. Aguilar,
202 Cal. 143, 147, 259 P. 735.
[14,15] It is also the rule that a condition that a third party shall take some action (such as action by the architect here)
is to be construed against the party relying
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npon it, and will be held to be a covenant,
rather than a condition, when the terms of
the agreement can be so construed. Antonelle v. Kennedy & Shaw Lumber Co.,
supra, 140 Cal. 309, 315-316, 318, 73 P. 966.
In the case before us, an architect's certificate is not unequivocally made a condition precedent to Ruane's right to recover,
nor is it provided, as it often is in building
contracts, that the architect's decision is
final or conclusive. Moreover, if the defendant, by his own act, has prevented performance of a condition, he may not rely
upon it. Ibid, 140 Cal. at page 316, 73 P.
at page 968; cf. Lucy v. Davis, 163 Cal. 611,
614-615, 126 P. 490; Victoria S. S. Co. v.
Western Assur. Co., 167 Cal. 348, 353, 139
P. 807; San Diego Construction Co. v.
Mannix, 175 Cal. 548, 556, 166 P. 325;
Alpha Beta Food Markets v. Retail Clerks,
45 Cal.2d 764, 771-772, 291 P.2d 433;
Wyman v. Hooker, supra, 2 Cal.App. 36, 40,
83 P. 79; Pacific Allied v. Century Steel
Products, Inc., 162 Cal.App.2d 70, 79-80,
327 P.2d 547.
[16] Where the plaintiff pleads performance, and proves substantial performance, including proof that the defects in
his work were caused by the defendant, the
rule that excuse for failure of performance must be pleaded does not apply. It
was directly so held in the case of a plastering contract, in Smith v. Mathews Construction Co, 179 Cal. 797, 800-801, 179 P. 205.
See also Conrad v. Foerst, 54 Cal.App. 277,
201 P. 795; Shumway v. Woolwine, supra,
84 Cal.App. 220, 225, 257 P. 898.
It has been held that in the case of a
building contract, even the prime contractor may plead performance, although the
architect's certificate was withheld, and may
prove that the certificate was wrongfully
withheld. See Needham v. Sisters of
Mercy, 59 Cal.App. 341, 344-345, 210 P.
830, 831, where the court said: 'The rule
is that an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious refusal of the architect to give the
certificate required by the contract excuses
the contractor from producing such a cer-

tificate as a condition precedent to the recovery of the payment due, and the allegation of due performance of all conditions
on the part of the contractor is a sufficient
allegation to put this matter in issue and to
permit the contractor to offer evidence
showing the reason the certificate had not
been produced. The better practice, of
course, is to allege the excuse for the failure to present the certificate, as in other
cases of nonperformance. But the neglect
to do so is not a sufficient ground for reversal when the trial of the issue has been
had and a good and sufficient excuse has
been proved." In so holding, the court relied upon Antonelle, supra, and upon Wyman v. Hooker, supra, 2 Cal.App. 36, 40, 83
P. 79. Cf. Philbrook v. Mercantile Trust
Co., supra, 84 Cal.App. 187, 197, 257 P. 882;
Simmons v. Firth, supra, 33 Cal.App. 187,
164 P. 807.
Roebling Const. Co. v. Doe Estate Co.,
supra, 33 Cal.App. 397, 165 P. 547, was an
action by a contractor for the contract price
of certain concrete work. The contract required a certificate of acceptance by the
architect or a writing by the architect stating a just and true reason for not issuing
a certificate, and stating the defects to be
remedied. The complaint alleged full performance, and a refusal by the architect to
certify. The court found that the contractor had fully performed, according to specifications. It also found that the materials
used were inspected and approved by the
architect, and that the work was done under
his inspection and with his approval. (The
letters put in evidence by Parker show the
same things here, as to the stucco.) The
concrete afterward checked and cracked.
The court also found, in substance, that the
defects were not the fault of the contractor,
but were caused by improper specifications.
There was no claim that the architect's certificate was withheld fraudulently, or in
bad faith. In affirming a judgment for the
contractor, the court said: "It seems to us
that, when the plaintiff agreed 'to furnish
the necessary labor and materials, includ-
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gftools, implements and appliances, re*
and perform and complete in a
like manner * * * all floors
roof slabs * * * and other works
4&Ctwn and described,' etc., its engagement
1p«M to do this, as the contract specifically
.provides, 'in conformity with the plans,
^drawings and specifications for the same
by Havens and Toepke, the authorarchitects employed by the owner,
* *' and 'under the direction and supervision and subject to the approval of
said architects.' This interpretation, we
iirink, is, as the contract provides, 'within a
fair and equitable construction of the true
intent and meaning of said plans and specifications/ Where, in the erection of a
tmilding, the owner agrees to pay a certain
Sum for doing a certain part of the work
and specifically provides the kind of materials to be used and the manner in which
they are to be used and stands by and directs and afterward approves the work,
the risk of its serving the purpose intended
by the owner is clearly upon him/' 33 Cal.
App. at pages 407-408, 165 P. at page 552.
The court further held that, the trial judge
having found that the plaintiff performed
according to plans and specifications, a further finding as to the cause of the defects
that appeared was immaterial and unnecessary: "We cannot see that it was essential
to the finding of the court that plaintiff had
fully performed its contract, to make a finding as to the improper proportions of sand
and cement in the mixture required by the
specifications, as the cause of the defects
in the floor* If, a* WP hold, plaintiff contracted only to furnish the materials and
do the work in compliance with the plans
and specifications and in good and work-
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manlike manner, the cause of the defects
would be immaterial." 33 Cal.App. at page
409, 165 P. at page 551. In reaching its
conclusions, the court followed City Street
Imp. Co. v. City of Marysville, 155 Cal.
419, 101 P. 308, 23 L.Rj\.,N.S., 317, and
Coplew v. Durand, supra, 153 Cal. 278, 95
P. 38, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 791.
The foregoing case, we think, is directly
in point, as to the exterior stucco. As to
the interior plaster, Ruane proved that he
did the work according to the plans and
specifications, i. e., that he performed, and
that the damage and rejection by the architect were caused by Parker. Thus, again,
Ruane proved performance, not nonperformance plus an excuse.
[17] There is no contention that Parker
was misled; no claim that he did not have
ample opportunity to meet the issues as
they actually developed at the trial; no
suggestion that he might have been able to
produce other evidence if Ruane's pleading
had alleged what Parker says it should
have. As to the exterior stucco, Parker
elected to stand on the arbitration. As to
both items he also stood upon the admitted
fact that defects did appear after the work
was done and upon rejection of the work
by the architect. The appearance of the
defects and the rejection by the architect
were evidence of nonperformance, but were
not, under the contract, conclusive as between these parties. For all of these reasons, and under the cited cases, we hold that
the pleading and the proof were sufficient.
Affirm od
BRAY, P. J., and TOBRINER, J., concur.
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3. Arbitration <*=»7X6
The Supreme Court would ignore all
assertions of fact in brief as to what went
on in arbitrator's hearing for which there
was no reference to the record and no support in the record, and would base its decision solely upon the facts shown in the
record.
4 Arbitration «=>89
The testimony or affidavit of an arbitrator is appropriate evidence to show what
matters were or were not presented to and
considered in arbitration.

Professional legal corporation filed a
5. Arbitration *=>L2
petition and motion to confirm an arbitraThe policy of Utah law favors arbitrator's award in a controversy with a client
tion
as a speedy and inexpensive method of
over legal fees. The Third District Court,
adjudicating
disputes.
Salt Lake County, James S, Sawaya, J.,
granted the petition and motion, and denied 6. Arbitration <s=» 73.7(1)
client's motion to vacate its judgment
Judicial review of arbitration awards
Client appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, should not be pervasive in scope or susceptiJ., held that: (1) client's motion to vacate ble to repetitive adjudications; it should be
the arbitrator's award, filed after the strictly limited to the statutory grounds and
award was confirmed, was out of time, and procedures for review. U.C.A. 1953, 78-31(2) rule governing motions for new trial or 1.
amendment of judgment applied where the
district court proceeding was only a hearing 7. Arbitration <s=>77(2)
Provision of Arbitration Act that moon a motion to confirm an arbitration
award, and thus, by appearing generally in tions to vacate, modify, or correct shall be
the arbitration proceeding and in the hear- served within three months is a statutory
ing on legal corporation's motion to confirm maximum, not a guaranteed minimum that
the award, client submitted to the jurisdic- permits the filing of such motions after the
tion of the district court and could not granting of a motion to confirm. U.C.A.
contest that jurisdiction as a basis for a new 1953, 78-31-18.
trial.
8. Arbitration <s=>77(2)
Motion to vacate arbitrator's award
Affirmed.
once the court had entered a judgment confirming the award was out of time. Rules
1. Arbitration <$=»!£.&
Time for appeal of order confirming an Civ.Proc., Rules 59, 73(a); U.C.A. 1953, 78arbitrator's award ran from order denying 31-15 to 78-31-17, 78-31-19.
timely motion to alter or amend that judg- 9. Arbitration <s=»77(l)
ment under rule governing new trials and
Rule governing motions for new trial
amendments of judgment Rules Civ.Proc., or amendment of judgment applied where
Rules 59, 73(a).
district court proceeding was only a hearing
on a motion to confirm an arbitration
2. Attorney and Client *=>143
award. U.C.A.1953, 78-31-15 to 78-31-17;
Lawyers are forbidden from entering Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 59, 59(aX7).
into fee agreements that are clearly excessive of what is reasonable for the service 10. Arbitration «=>72J
Motion for new trial or to amend
performed. ABA Code of Jud.Conduct,
judgment could not be used in proceeding
DR2-106(A, B).
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to confirm arbitrator's award to review
matters addressed to the hearing before the
arbitrator. U.CJL1953, TO-31-15 to 7&31-17; Rules Civ.Proa, Rule 59.
1L Appearance <*»19(1)
By appearing generally in an arbitration proceeding and in a hearing on plaintiffs motion to confirm the award, defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the
district court and could not contest that
jurisdiction as a basis for a new triaL
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 59, 73(a); U.C.A.
1953, 78-31-15 to 78-31-17, 78-31-19.
Paul H. Proctor, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
David Ko Robinson, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent
OAKS, Justice:
The district court confirmed the award of
an arbitrator in a controversy between a
professional corporation and a client over
legal fees. The client's appeal seeks a remand to determine whether the fees met
the standard of "reasonableness" specified
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
question not considered by the arbitrator.
At issue are the meaning of provisions of
the Arbitration Act, U.C.A., 1953, §§ 7831-1 to -22, and the procedures to be followed in confirming awards under it
So far as pertinent to this controversy,
the written retainer agreement provided
that the client would pay specified hourly
rates for legal services and that any disputes arising from the relationship would
be settled by arbitration pursuant to the
ru)es of the American Arbitration Association. When a dispute arose, the plaintiff
corporation first filed a civil action against
the defendant for $7,145.25 in legal fees,
but almost immediately thereafter abandoned the action and referred the matter
for arbitration." Both parties were represented by counsel in the arbitration proceeding, which concluded with a $5,306.41
1. Pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a), the time for
appeal of the October 17, 1981, order confirming the award of the arbitrator runs from the
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awa*d in favor of the plaintiff, plus a direction that the defendant also reimburse
the plaintiff for the $150 administrative fee
paid to the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator, John P. O'Keefe,
signed the award on May 21, 198L
On June 2, 1981, the plaintiff filed in the
district court a petition and motion to confirm the award of the arbitrator. The petition and motion was accompanied by a
signed and notarized copy of the arbitrator's award and an accompanying affidavit
authenticating that document and relating
it to plaintiffs controversy with defendant
Defendant's counsel was duly notified. After several continuances, the petition and
motion was heard and granted on October
1» 1981. The written order confirming the
award and granting judgment against defendant in the amount assigned therein was
signed on October 17, 1981.
[1) On October 20, 1981, defendant filed
a motion whose meaning and effect provide
the principal issue on this appeal. The motion was explicitly "[pjursuant to Rule 59
• • and . . . Section 78-31-16/* In pertinent part, it asked the court to vacate its
judgment on two grounds: (1) the arbitrator ''improperly refused to hear evidence
pertjnent and material to the controversy"
and (2) the court "is without jurisdiction
over the defendant in this action" because
the plaintiff "failed to comply with the
jurisdictional provisions of [the Arbitration
Act]/' This motion was heard and denied
by n written order dated March 25, 1982,
and the defendant took this timely appeal.1
[2J 1. Motion to Vacate. Defendant's
first argument concerns the relationship betwe$n the fee provisions in the retainer
agreement and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Defendant cites ample authority to demonstrate that lawyers' fee
agreements are subject to the corrective
authority of the court and to the constraints
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In te Hansen, Utah, 586 P.2d 413, 416
orqer denying appellant's timely moUon to alter
or amend that judgment under Rule 59
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(1978); Herro, McAndrews A Porter r. Ger*(fixed1 by the agreement at $50 per hour for
lmrdt, 62 WisJM 1TO, 214 N.W^d 401 (1974); office work, $6ft per hour for court work,
Horton v. Butler, La.CtApp.f 387 So.2d and $20 per hour for paralegals) and the
1315 (1960); Stanton v. Saks, S.D., 311 amount of time expended on the represenN.WJM 584 (1981); Kiser y. Miller, 364 tation.
F.Supp. 1311 (D.D.C1973), modified on othDefendant argues that the arbitrator's
er grounds, 517 F2A 1237 (D.CCir.1974).
award
should have been vacated on the
Lawyers are forbidden from entering into
statutory
ground that the arbitrator was
fee agreements that are "clearly excessive" a
guilty
of
misconduct . . . in refusing to
of what is "reasonable" for the service per*
hear
evidence
pertinent and material to the
formed. Utah Code of Professional Recontroversy."
§ 78-31-16(3); Giannopuhs
sponsibility DR 2-106(A) & (B) (1970).
v. Pappas, 80 Utah at 449-50, 15 P.2d at
[3] Plaintiff does not contest these 356. Plaintiff maintains that defendant
propositions, but maintains that the reason- lost the opportunity to raise this objection
ableness of its fees is not before us on this
in the district court or in this Court because
appeal. In arguing this point, both parties
the record shows (as it does) that defendant
encumber their briefs with assertions of
fact about what went on in the hearing did not raise this objection until after the
before the arbitrator for which there is no court had confirmed and entered judgment
reference to the record and no support in on the arbitrator's award. This issue turns
the record. We ignore all such matters and on a matter of statutory interpretation of
base our decision solely upon the facts the respective functions of the motion to
confirm and the motion to vacate.
shown in the record.
[4] The parties waived recording of the
[5,6] The Territory and State of Utah
arbitration hearing. The only information have had statutory provisions for arbitrain the record about that hearing is con- tion of disputes since 1884. Bivans v. Utah
tained in the arbitrator's affidavit, filed Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 53 Utah
with plaintiffs opposition to the postjudg601, 607, 174 P. 1126, 1128 (1918). The
ment motion to vacate. The testimony or
policy of our law favors arbitration as a
affidavit of an arbitrator is appropriate evispeedy
and inexpensive method of adjudidence to show what matters were or were
cating
disputes.
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80
not presented to and considered in arbitraUtah
at
449,
15
P.2d
at 356. To that end,
tion. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442,
the
Legislature
amended
the Arbitration
453-54, 15 P.2d 353, 357 (1932). Here, the
Act
to
permit
valid
and
enforceable
agreeaffidavit shows that both parties were repments
for
arbitration
of
future
as
well
as
resented by counsel at the arbitration hearpresent
disputes.
§
78-31-1.
We
held
that
ing and that instead of challenging the accuracy of plaintiffs time and cost records, amendment constitutional in an opinion
defendant challenged the reasonableness of that reaffirms the strong public policy in
the total charge on the basis that the repre- favor of arbitration as an approved, practisentation was not as successful as she had cal, and inexpensive means of settling disexpected.2 When defendant's counsel "at- putes and easing court congestion. Lindon
tempted to cite the Utah Bar Association's City v. Engineers Construction Co., Utah,
Code of Professional Responsibility," the ar- 636 P.2d 1070 (1981). To serve that policy
bitrator excluded the provisions of the Code and achieve those objectives, judicial review
from consideration as "not germane to the of arbitration awards should not be pervadispute." Defendant's counsel took no ex- sive in scope or susceptible to repetitive
ception to that ruling. The arbitrator stat- adjudications; it should be strictly limited
ed that his award was based on the evi- to the statutory grounds and procedures for
dence submitted to him on the agreed fees review.
2. See Wamn v. Warren, Utah, 655 P2d 684

(1982).
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This spirit permeates our decisions on judicial review of arbitration awards. Thus,
fa BSVBDS v. Utah Lake Land, Water &
Bower Co., supra, we declared that as a
general rule "awards will not be disturbed
» account of irregularities or informalities,
or because the court does not agree with
the award, so long as the proceeding has
been fair and honest and the substantial
rights of the parties have been respected."
li 53 Utah at 612-13,174 P. at 1130. Accord, Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah 8,14,91 P.
683, 684 (1907). In the Bivans case, we also
held that the court should not consider any
objection to the appropriateness of evidence
offered in the arbitration proceeding where
there had been no objection that would
allow the alleged defect to be cured in that
proceeding. 53 Utah at 614-15, 174 P. at
1131o Similarly, in Giannopuloa v. Pappas,
80 Utah at 449,15 P 2d at 356, we declared:
Ordinarily a court has no authority to
review the action of arbitrators to correct
errors or to substitute its conclusion for
that of the arbitrators acting honestly
and within the scope of their authority.
The statute has provided a method by
which an award thus made may be given
legal sanction and reduced to judgment
&

4

[§1 78-31-15. Confirmation or modification
by court on motion.—At any time within
three months after the award is made, unless
the parties shall extend the time in writing,
any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court for an order confirming the award, and
the court shall grant such an order, unless
the award is vacated, modified or corrected
as provided in the next two succeeding sections [78-31-16, 78-31-17]. Notice in writing of the motion must be served upon the
adverse party, or his attorney, five days before the hearing thereof.
[§] 78-31-16. Vacating by court—Grounds.
—In any of the following cases the court
shall, after notice and hearing, make an order
vacating the award, upon the application of
any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbe-

by summary proceedings in the nature of
a motion filed in court The statute also
has designated the grounds by which the
award may be vacated or set aside, and it
is generally held that no other grounds
than those specified can be taken advantage of in such proceeding. [Citations
omitted; emphasis added]
See Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah at 16, 91 P.
at 685. These general principles guide us in
interpreting the intent of the various statutory provisions for judicial review.
In successive provisions whose entire text
is set out in the footnotes, our Arbitration
Act permits a motion to confirm an arbitrator's award within three months3 and a
motion to vacate4 and a motion to modify
or correct5 within the same period of time.
§ 78-31-18. The relationship among these
remedies when more than one is pursued is
crucial in this case, which turns on whether
a motion to vacate can be brought forward
after the court has already granted a motion to confirm the award. We conclude
that it cannot.
Section 15 directs that the court "shall
grant" the order confirming the award "unless the award is vacated, modified or corhavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Where an award is vacated, and the time
within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired, the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by
the arbitrators.
5.

[§] 78-31-17 Modification
by
courtGrounds.—In any of the following cases the
court shall, after notice and hearing, make an
order modifying or correcting the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property,
referred to in the award.
(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded
upon a matter not submitted to them.
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy
The order must modify and correct the
award so as to effect the intent thereof
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rected" as provided in sections 16 and 17.
In context, including the specific requirement of written notice to the adverse party,
this section apparently contemplates that
any motions to vacate, modify, or correct
will be before the court when it rules on the
motion to confirm. This is the procedure
exemplified in the leading case of Giannopuloe v. Pappaa, supra, where the motion to
vacate was filed along with a verified answer to the motion to confirm. 80 Utah at
446, 15 P.2d at 354-65. This same procedure was followed under our earlier arbitration statute in Richards v. Smith, 33 Utah
at 13, 91 P. at 684, and is specified under
the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration
Act (an improved, modern version of the
Act adopted in Utah in 1925). Audette &
Sons, Inc. v. LaRochelle, Me., 373 K3A 1226,
1227 (1977).
[7] This construction is further confirmed by the provision directing entry of a
conforming judgment or decree upon granting of an order "confirming, modifying, correcting or vacating an award/' § 78-31-19,
since that direction apparently contemplates that the court would consider such
motions together rather than in succession.
Otherwise, the procedures, hearings, and action of the court in the motion to confirm
could be held for naught and the whole
process repeated. We do not readily infer a
legislative intent to squander scarce judicial
time in this manner. Although there is no
express provision to this effect, we hold
that the fair intendment of the Arbitration
Act bars the filing of motions under sections 16 and 17 once the court has entered a
judgment confirming the award under section 15.* This construction facilitates the
limited scope of review and the considerations of finality sought to be served by our
policies on judicial review of arbitration
awards.
6. Section 78-31-18, which provides that motions to vacate, modify, or correct shall be
served within three months, is not to the contrary. For the reasons discussed in the text,
we interpret that provision as a statutory maximum, not as a guaranteed minimum that permits the filing of such motions after the granting of a motion to confirm.
Section 78-31-18 is inapplicable or the facts
of this case in any event, since defendant's

[8] For the reasons explained above, defendant's motion to vacate the arbitrator's
award was out of time. The order denying
that motion will be affirmed.
[9] 2. Motion for New Trial. Plaintiff
contends that the motion for new trial or to
amend the judgment under Rule 59 does
not apply where the district court proceeding was only a hearing on a motion to
confirm an arbitration award We disagree. As is evident from the content of
sections 15 to 17 of the Arbitration Act,
§§ 78-31-15 to -17, the proceedings leading to confirming, vacating, or modifying
an arbitrator's award can involve evidentiary hearings as well as legal questions. As it
relates to the issues of fact and law in the
district court proceedings, the content of
Rule 59 is fully applicable. This interpretation is confirmed by Giannopulos v. Pappas,
supra, where the relief given by our decision was to grant a new trial of the district
court proceeding to confirm or vacate the
arbitrator's award.
[10] At the same time, however, Rule 59
should not be applied to alter the nature of
the district court proceeding, which is simply a proceeding to confirm or vacate or
modify the arbitrator's award. That is the
only "trial" to which the motion for new
trial is addressed. It is not addressed to the
hearing before the arbitrator. Viewed in
that light, some of the grounds for relief
under Rule 59 are inapplicable to a district
court proceeding to confirm, vacate, or
modify an arbitrator's award, but others
are fully applicable.
[11] In this case, we find no circumstances in the proceedings of the district
court that apply to any of the grounds for
new trial under Rule 59. Defendant's claim
that the district court was without jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to comply with
motion to vacate was filed more than three
months after the arbitration award was filed or
delivered. Such a delay has also been held to
constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the
award under the comparable provision of the
Uniform Arbitration Act. Schroud v. Van C.
Argiris & Co., 78 IU.App.3d 1092, 1095, 34 III.
Dec. 428, 430, 398 N.E2d 103, 105 (1979).
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the jurisdictional provisions of the Arbitra- Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, Don
tion Act would, if correct, constitute an V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment for plain"error in law" under Rule 59(aX7), but this tiffs, and defendant appealed. On motion
claim is without merit By appearing gen- of plaintiffs to dismiss appeal, the Supreme
erally in the arbitration proceeding and in Court, Hall, CJ., held that although 30-<lay
the hearing on plaintiffs motion to confirm period for filing a notice of appeal from
the award, defendant submitted to the jurdenial of motion for new trial on November
isdiction of the district court and cannot
13, 1981, was extended to December 14,
contest that jurisdiction as a basis for a new
trial. Barber v. Calder, Utah, 522 ?2d 700, 1981, because December 13, 1981, fell on a
702 n. 4 (1974); Johnson v. Clark, 131 Mont Sunday, where notice of appeal was not
454,311 P.2d 772 (1957). The application of filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court
this general rule on civil actions to a district until December 16, 1981, which was two
court proceeding to confirm, vacate, or days beyond the one-month period of limitamodify an arbitrator's award is consistent tion for filing, and mailing of a copy of the
with the general rule that such proceedings notice of appeal on December 10, 1981, did
are summary proceedings that can be com- not constitute a filing, appeal was untimely
menced by motion or petition, without ser- and the Supreme Court was thus deprived
vice of summons or formal pleadings. Cut- of its appellate jurisdiction.
ler Associates, Inc. v. Merrill Trust Co., Me.,
Appeal dismissed.
395 A.2d 453, 455 (1978).
The other contentions of the parties are
all subsumed in the foregoing rulings.
The judgment confirming the arbitrator's
award and the order denying the posttrial
motions are affirmed. Costs to respondents.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Richard A. ISAACSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent
v.
Clair DORIUS, Defendant and Appellant
Lawrence W. LYNN, Plaintiff
and Respondent
•.

Clair DORIUS, Defendant and Appellant
Ho. 18166.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 17, 1983.
Suits were instituted for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. The

Stewart and Howe, JJ., dissented and
filed opinions.

1. Appeal and Error s=>428(2)
Although 30-day period for filing a
notice of appeal from denial of motion for
new trial on November 13, 1981, was extended to December 14, 1981, because December 13, 1981, fell on a Sunday, where
notice of appeal was not filed with the clerk
of the Supreme Court until December 16,
1981, which was two days beyond the onemonth period of limitation for filing, and
mailing of a copy of the notice of appeal on
December 10, 1981, did not constitute a
filing, appeal was untimely and the Supreme Court was thus deprived of its appellate jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 63-37-1, 782-4; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <s=>428(l)
Statute that any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any
payment required or authorized to be filed
or made to the state of Utah or to any
political subdivision thereof which is transmitted through the United States mail shall
be deemed filed or made and received by
the state or political subdivisions on the
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78-31-1

Application to be in wiiting.
Hearings—Time—Notice—Postponement.
Failure of p a r t y to appear.
Award—Time for making.
Representation of parties—By attorney.
Witnesses—Subpoena—Fees-—Contempt.
Depositions.
Conservation of property pendente lite.
S u b m i t t i n g law questions to court.
Award—Form.
Confirmation or modification by court on motion.
Vacating by court—Grounds.
Modification by court—Grounds.
Notice of motion—Stay.
Decree of court.
Record to be filed with clerk of c o u r t — E n t r y of j u d g m e n t .
J u d g m e n t — F o r c e and effect.
Appeals.

78-31-1. Written agreement for—Enforceable limited right to revoke.—
Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to arbitration, in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter, any controversy existing
between them at the time of the agreement to submit, or they may agree
to submit to arbitration any controversy which may arise in the future.
Such an agreement shall be valid and enforceable, and no party shall have
the power to revoke the submission without the consent of the other
parties to the submission, except upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the rescission or revocation of any contract.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-1; L. 1977, ch. 142, § 1 .
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-1 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
The 1977 amendment added "or they
may agree to submit to arbitration any
controversy which may arise in the fut u r e " to the first sentence.
Comparable Provisions.
This chapter is based on the 1925 Uniform A r b i t r a t i o n Act which has been
w i t h d r a w n by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
as superseded by the 1956 Uniform Arbitration Act.
Cross-References.
Affirmative
defense, a r b i t r a t i o n
and
a w a r d as, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
8(c).
Board of labor, conciliation and arbitration, Const. A r t . X V I , § 2.
Fees as full compensation for
statutory
boards of a r b i t r a t i o n , Const. Art. X X I , § 2.
F i r e fighters' negotiations, 34-20a-7 to
34-20a-9.
I n d u s t r i a l commission to promote volunt a r y a r b i t r a t i o n of labor disputes, 35-1-16.
P a r t n e r s h i p , single p a r t n e r may not submit to a r b i t r a t i o n , 48-1-6.

Policy t h a t work terms and conditions
should result from v o l u n t a r y agreement,
34-20-1.
Public t r a n s i t district labor disputes,
11-20-32.
W a t e r disputes, informal a r b i t r a t i o n by
s t a t e engineer, 73-2-16.
Future disputes.
An agreement to a r b i t r a t e a future dispute is invalid and unenforceable. Shumaker v. U t e x Exploration Co., 157 F .
Supp. 68.
Provisions of bylaws of corporation for
the appraisement of values of capital stock
of stockholder desiring to sell or t r a n s f e r
it was not an agreement for the arbit r a t i o n of future disputes. Shumaker v.
U t e x Exploration Co., 157 F . Supp. 68.
Whether an agreement is one to arbit r a t e future disputes should depend upon
i t s prospective operation at time of agreement and not upon w h e t h e r in light of
subsequent developments it l a t e r a p p e a r s
of v i t a l import to the p a r t i e s . S h u m a k e r
v. Utex Exploration Co., 157 F . Supp. 68.
This section provides for a r b i t r a t i o n of
disputes existing at the time t h e agreement to a r b i t r a t e is made which shall be
binding on the p a r t i e s ; it does not apply
to agreements to a r b i t r a t e f u t u r e disputes;
such agreements do not oust t h e courts
of jurisdiction. J o h n s o n v. Brinkerhoff,
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Privileged nature of communications
made in course of grievance or arbitration procedure provided for by collective
bargaining agreement, 60 A. L. R. 3d 885.
State court's power to consolidate arbitration proceedings, 64 A. L, R. 3d 528.
Validity and construction of provision
for arbitration of disputes as to alimony
or support payments, or child visitation or
custody matters, 18 A. L. R. 3d 1264.
Validity and effect, and remedy in respect, of contractual stipulation to submit
disputes to arbitration in another jurisdiction, 12 A. L. R. 3d 892.

Validity and enforceability of provision
for binding arbitration, and waiver there*
of, 24 A. L. R. 3d 1325.
Validity of agreements to arbitrate disputes generally as a condition precedent
to the bringing of an action, 26 A, L„ R.
1077,
Validity of agreement to submit all future questions to arbitration, 135 A. L.
R. 79.
Waiver of arbitration provision in contract, 117 A. L. R. 301, 161 A. L. R. 1426.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction.
Submissions to arbitration were to be

liberally construed. Richards v. Smith, 33
U. 8, 91 P. 683, applying R. S. 1898, § 3223.

78-31-2. Contents.—The arbitration agreement must state the question
or questions in controversy with sufficient definiteness to present one or
more issues or questions upon which an award may be based.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-2.
rirfvnr^i^'a -KT/t+Aa

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award<§=>6.
6
C.J,S. Arbitration § 14 et seq.

Compilers Notes.

.

This section is identical to former section 104-36-2 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1931, ch. 58, § 3.

Am

Jur

\ward §s 11

^

^

Arbitr£ion

and

78-31-3. "Court" defined—The term "court" when used in this chapter
means a district court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject
matter.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-3.

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-3 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

78-31-4. Arbitrators—Appointment by court on application.—Upon the
application in writing of any party to the arbitration agreement, and
upon notice to the other parties thereto, the court shall appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators in any of the following cases:
(1) When the arbitration agreement does not prescribe a method for
the appointment of arbitrators, in which case the arbitration shall be
by three arbitrators.
(2) When the arbitration agreement does prescribe a method for the
appointment of arbitrators, and the arbitrators or any of them have not
been appointed and the time within which they should have been appointed
has expired.
(3) When any arbitrator fails or is otherwise unable to act, and his
successor has not been appointed in the manner in which he was appointed.
Arbitrators appointed by the court shall have the same powers as if
their appointment had been made in accordance with the agreement to
arbitrate.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; 0. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-4.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-4 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award@=»26.

6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 60.
5 Am. Jur. 584, Arbitration and Award
Validity and effect of arbitration agreement provision that, upon one party's
failure to appoint arbitrator, controversy
may be determined by arbitrator appointed
by other party, 47 A. L. R. 2d 1346.

78-31-5. Application to be in writing.—Any application made under
authority of this chapter shall be made in writing and heard in a summary
way in the manner and upon the notice provided by law or rules of court
for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly
provided.
History: It. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-5.

Civil Procedure, Rules 6(b),
7(b), 43(e).

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-5 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

CoUateral References.
Arbitration and Award@^26.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 60.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 584, Arbitration
Award § 86.

Cross-Reference.
Motions and orders generally, Rules of

(d),

(e),

and

78-31-6. Hearings — Time — Notice — Postponement. — The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and notify the parties
thereof, and may adjourn the hearing from time to time if necessary, and,
on application of either party and for good cause, may postpone the
hearing to a time not extending beyond the date fixed for making the
award.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-6.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36 6 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Admission of notice.
It is sufficient if parties admit in their
pleadings notice of meeting of board of
arbitrators. CiannopuJos v. Pappas, 80 U.
442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927,
ch. 62.
Right to produce evidence and be heard.
The parties have a right to be heard

on their proofs, and it is the duty of
arbitrators to hear all the evidence material to the matter in controversy. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d
353, applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
CoUateral Ref erences.
Arbitration and AwardO=*31, 32.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 79 et seq.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 604, Arbitration
Award §§ 114-116.

and

Insurance: necessity and sufficiency of
notice of and hearing in proceedings before
appraisers and arbitrators appointed to
determine amount of loss, 25 A. L. R. 3d
680.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Failure to file submission before hearing.
Under R. S. 1898, §3223, the effect of
failure to file submission in court before
hearing was only to permit parties to
revoke submission and prevent court from

acquiring jurisdiction until filed, and did
not affect right of arbitrators to proceed
to hearing. Richards v. Smith, 33 U. 8,
91 P. 683.
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78-31-7. Failure of party to appear.—If any party neglects to appear
before the arbitrators after reasonable notice, the arbitrators may nevertheless proceed to hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence
which is produced before them.
History: I*. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-7.

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award031.

Compiler's Notes.
*
. . . .
This section is identical to former section 104-36-7 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

2 C f S > V bitr S^ io «n § 7 84 "A K-f ••
A
5 Am. Jur0 2d 607, Arbitration and
Award $s 118

78-31-8. Award—Time for making.—If the time within which the
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration agreement, the award
must be made within sixty days from the time of the appointment of the
arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of sixty days shall have
no legal effect, unless the parties extend the time in which said award
may be made, which extension, or any ratification, shall be in writing.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-8.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-8 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
„ « * i » *
Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award@=»50.

6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 97.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 615, Arbitration and
Award § 128.
Construction and effect of contractual
or statutory provisions fixing time within
which arbitration award must be made, 56
A. L. R. 3d 815.

78-31-9. Representation of parties—By attorney.—No one other than
a party to the arbitration, or a person regularly employed by such party
for other purposes, or a practicing attorney at law, shall be permitted by
the arbitrator or arbitrators to represent before him or them any party
to the arbitration.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-9.
nnmvrfwa "K^f-a
Compilers Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-9 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award<3=>31.
6
C.J.S. Arbitration § 84.
^
Arbitration and
5 Am
Jur< 2 d
Award § 113

78-31-10. Witnesses—Subpoena—Pees—Contempt.—The arbitrator or
arbitrators, or a majority of them, may require any person to attend
before him or them as a witness, and to bring with him any book or writing
or other evidence. The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the
fees of witnesses in courts of general jurisdiction. A subpoena shall issue
in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and
shall be signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them,
shall be directed to the person and shall be served in the same manner
as a subpoena to testify before a district court. If any person so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey such subpoena, the court
may, upon petition, compel the attendance of such person before the
arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person for contempt in the same
369
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manner as is provided for the attendance of witnesses or the punishment
for their failure to attend district courts.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; G. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-10.

Subpoenas, Bales of Civil Procedure,
Rule 45.
Witnessed fees, 21-5-4.

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-10 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
e
'
>
>»
Cross-References.
Contempt generally, 78-32-1 et seq.
Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer, 78-32-15.

Collateral References.
. . . . ..
, .
•,>>-*<>« o-i
^ b l t ' a t l . o n K » nd ,. Aw e ar 9 T ^ ' " *
6 c A
. f
V b l t r ^ 1 0 * i 8 7 \ fc.„ ».
A
5 ^m. Jur. 2d 609, Arbitration and
Award §121.
Liability of parties to arbitration for
costs, fees, and expenses, 57 A. L. B. 3d
633.

78-31-11. Depositions.—Depositions may be taken with or without a
commission in the same manner and for the same reasons as provided
by law for the taking of depositions.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-11.
Compiler's Notes.
Except for the deletion of "in actions
pending in the district courts" from the
end, this section is identical to former
section 104-36-11 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Cross-Beference.
Depositions and discovery generally,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26 to 37.

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award<£=>31.
6
C.J.S. Arbitration § 87.
5 Am
- J u r - 2<* 602> Arbitration and
Award § 110.
Diacovery

in

aid

of

arbitration

pro-

ceedings, 98 A. L. B. 2d 1247.

78-31-12. Conservation of property pendente lite.—At any time before
final determination of the arbitration the court may, upon application of
a party to the submission, make such order or decree or take such proceedings as it may deem necessary for the preservation of the property
or for securing satisfaction of the award.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-12.
*vA«i«i w « vi+mm
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-12 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 .

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award®=>31.
6 c J s
- - - Arbitration § 69.
5 Am. J Jur.
2d K l587,
» 7 l Arbitration and
5 Am
pr
9a
Award 8 90
*

78-31-13. Submitting law questions to court.—The arbitrators may on
their own motion, and shall by request of a party to the arbitration:
(1) At any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law
arising in the course of the hearing for the opinion of the court, stating
the facts upon which the question arises, and such opinion when given
shall bind the arbitrators in the making of their award.
(2) State their final award, in the form of findings of fact, for the
opinion of the court on the questions of law arising on the hearing.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-13.

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former set-
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tion 104-36-13 (Code 1943) which was repeated by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award<£»31.
6 G.J.S. Arbitration and Award §§55,
120.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 621, Arbitration and
Award § 140.

78-31-15

Necessity that arbitrators, in making
awards, make specific or detailed findings
of fact or conclusions of law, 82 A« L. B.
2d 969.
Waiver, or estoppel to assert, substantive right or right to arbitrate as question
for court or arbitrator, 26 A. L. R. 3d 604,

78-31-14. Award—Form.—The award of the arbitrators, or of a majority of them, shall be drawn up in writing and signed by the arbitrators,
or a majority of them. The award shall definitely deal with all matters
of difference in the submission requiring settlement, but the arbitrators
may, in their discretion, first make a partial award, which shall be enforceable in the same manner as the final award. Upon the making of an
award the arbitrators shall deliver a true copy thereof to each of the
parties thereto, or their attorneys, without delay.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-14.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-14 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Effect and conclusiveness of award.
The award of arbitrators, acting within
the scope of their authority, determines
the rights of the parties to it as efficiently
as a judgment secured by legal procedure,
and is binding on the parties until set
aside or its validity is questioned in some
proper manner. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80
U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927,
ch. 62.
Partial award.
This section makes provision for a partial award, which shall have the same
effect as a final award, and judgment may
be entered for that part thereof which is
final. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442,
454, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927,
eh. 62.
Where arbitrators find that a certain

sum of money is due, such finding or
award is an indication of a full and complete execution of the submission. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353,
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
Collateral Bef erences.
Arbitration and Award^=>51.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration §95 et seq.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 613, Arbitration
Award § 125.

and

Comment note: determination of validity
of arbitration award under requirement
that arbitrators shall pass on all matters
submitted, 36 A. L. E. 3d 649.
Concurrence of all arbitrators as condition of binding award, 77 A. L. E. 838.
Power of arbitrators to award injunction, 70 A. L. E. 2d 1055.
Quotient arbitration award or appraisal,
20 A. L. E. 2d 958.
Eight of arbitrators to act on their own
knowledge of facts, or factors relevant
to questions submitted to them, in absence
of evidence in that regard, 154 A. L. E.
1210.

78-31-15. Confirmation or modification by court on motion.—At anytime within three months after the award is made, unless the parties
shall extend the time in writing, any party to the arbitration may apply
to the court for an order confirming the award, and the court shall grant
such an order, unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as
provided in the next two succeeding sections [78-31-16, 78-31-17]. Notice
in writing of the motion must be served upon the adverse party, or his
attorney, five days before the hearing thereof.
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-16.

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-15 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
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Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award<£=»72.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 120 et seq.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 626, Arbitration and
Award § 145.

Appealability of judgment confirming or
setting aside arbitration award, 7 A. L. B.
3d 608.
Time for impeaching arbitration award,
85 A. L. R. 2d 779.

78-31-16. Vacating by court—Grounds.—In any of the following cases
the court shall, after notice and hearing, make an order vacating the
award, upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
Whets an award is vacated, and the time within vrhiek the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its
discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-16.

Fraud, bad faith or misconduct.
Fraud, bad faith, and prejudicial imposition will vitiate award, even though
Compiler's Notes.
contract of submission provides that such
This section is identical to former sec- award shall be absolute and conclusive
tion 104-36-16 (Code 1943) which was and without appeal. Bivans v. Utah Lake
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Land, Water & Power Co., 53 U. 601, 174
P. 1126, applying C. L. 1907, §3228.
Admissibility of affidavit or testimony of
If one party to arbitration agreement
arbitrator.
requests one of three arbitrators for furWhile an arbitrator may not by affidavit ther time to present certain testimony,
or testimony impeach his own award or and is assured by arbitrator that he
show fraud or misconduct on the part of
would be given an opportunity before the
the arbitrators or any of them, testimony award was made to present such further
or affidavit of an arbitrator is admissible evidence, which promise the arbitrator
to establish what matters were presented did not keep, and did not even convey
to and considered by the arbitrators, and request to other arbitrators, such misany arbitrator is a competent witness to behavior comes within subd. (3). Gianestablish such facts. Giannopulos v. Pap- Jiopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353,
pas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applving Laws applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
1927, ch. 62.
Before misconduct of arbitrators under
subd. (3) will afford ground for vacating
Disregard of evidence.
Refusal to review material testimony is award, it must appear that "the rights of
any party have been prejudiced." Gianground for setting aside the award. For nopulos v. Papas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353,
example, substantial prejudice may be applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
suffered by one of the parties by the
failure or refusal of arbitrators to con- Motion to vacate.
Material and competent statement of
sider items of expense properly admissible in evidence, or to consider a part- facts contained in motion to vacate, and
nership agreement between the parties, in the supporting affidavits, if not denied,
or to consider a lease. Giannopulos v. must be taken as true. Giannopulos v.
Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353, applying
Laws 1927, ch. 62.
Laws 1927, ch. 62.
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A pleading denominated an answer may,
in legal effect, be regarded as a motion
to vacate the award where it affirmatively
sets out reasons why such should be done,
and prays that the award be vacated and
that plaintiff take nothing. In other words,
the court may look at substance rather
than the form of the document. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353,
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
Statutory grounds as exclusive.
No other grounds for vacating or setting
aside an award than those specified in this
section can be taken advantage of. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d 353,
applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
Vacation of awards in general
Awards will not be disturbed on account
of irregularities or informalities, or because court does not agree with award,
so long as proceeding has been fair and
honest, and substantial rights of parties
have been respected. Bivans v. Utah Lake
Landt Water & Power Co., 53 U. 601, 174
P. 1126, applying C. L. 1907, § 3228.

78-31-17

Ordinarily a court has no authority to
review the action of arbitrators to correct
errors or to substitute its conclusion for
that of the arbitrators acting honestly
and within the scope of their authority«
Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442, 15 P. 2d
353, applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award@=>75-82.
6 C.J.8. Arbitration § 149 et seq.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 643 et seq., Arbitration
and Award § 167 et seq.
Arbitrator's consultation with outsider
or outsiders as misconduct justifying vacation of award, 47 A. L. R. 2d 1362.
Arbitrator's viewing or visiting premises
or property alone as misconduct justifying
vacation of award, 27 A. L. R. 2d 1160.
Improper attempt by influencing or by
attempting to influence decision as ground
for revocation of arbitration, or for avoidance of award thereunder, 8 Ae L. R. 1082.
Setting aside arbitration award on
ground of interest or bias of arbitrators,
56 A. L. R. 3d 697.

78-31-17. Modification by court—Grounds.—In any of the following
cases the court shall, after notice and hearing, make an order modifying
or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration :
(1) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an
evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property,
referred to in the award.
(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted
to them.
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting
the merits of the controversy.
The order must modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent
thereof.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Snpp., 104-31-17.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-17 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Collateral References,
Arbitration and Award<&=>72.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 154-156, 168.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 626, Arbitration and
Award § 145.
Comment note: power of court to resubmit matter to arbitrators for correction

or clarification, because of ambiguity or
error in, or omission from, arbitration
award, 37 A. L. R. 3d 200.
Disqualification of arbitrator by court
or stay of arbitration proceedings prior
to award on ground of interest, bias, prejudice, collusion or fraud of arbitrators, 65
A. L. R. 2d 755.
Power of arbitrator to correct, or power
of court to correct or resubmit, nonlabor
award because of incompleteness or failure
to pass on all matters submitted, 36 A. L.
R. 3d 939.
Quotient arbitration award or appraisal,
20 A. L. R. 2d 958.
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78-31-18. Notice of motion—Stay.—Notice of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award shall be served upon the adverse party or his
attorney, within three months after an award is filed or delivered, as
prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in a civil action. For
the purposes of the motion any judge who might make an order to stay
the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an
order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of
the adverse party to enforce the award.
History: L, 1951, ch. 58, $ 1 ; G. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-18.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former seetion 104-36-18 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

Cross-Reference.
Service of notices, Rules of Civil Procedure
> B u l e 6<d>> <e>'
Collateral References,
Arbitration and Award <S=>77.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 147, 165.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 656, Arbitration and
Award § 185.

78-31-19. Decree of court.—Upon the granting of an order confirming,
modifying, correcting or vacating an award, judgment or decree shall
be entered in conformity therewith.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-19.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-19 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 .

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award^»75-84.
6 CJ.S. Arbitration §§ 129, 145 et seq.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 642, Arbitration and
Award § 166.

78-31-20. Record to be filed with clerk of court—Entry of judgment.—
The party moving for an order confirming, modifying, correcting or
vacating an award shall, at the time such motion is filed with the clerk,
file, unless the same have theretofore been filed, the following papers
with the clerk :
(1) The written contract, or a verified copy thereof, containing the
agreement for the submission, the selection or appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators, and each written extension of the time, if any,
within which to make the award.
(2) The award.
(3) Every notice, affidavit and other paper used upon an application
to confirm, modify, correct or vacate the award, and each order made
upon such application. The judgment or decree shall be entered and
docketed as if it were rendered in a civil action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-20.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-20 (Code 1943) which waa
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 except
that in the former statute the last sentence appeared as a separate paragraph
rather than as part of snbd. (3).

Purpose of section.
This section provides a method by which
an award, made as provided by this chapter, may be given legal sanction and reduced to judgment by summary proceedings in the nature of a motion filed in
court. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 U. 442,
15 P. 2d 353, applying Laws 1927, ch. 62.
Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award^=73.
6 C.J.8. Arbitration § 146.
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78-31-22

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Tiling of award.
Under R.S. 1898, §§3223 and 3227, it
was not duty of arbitrators to file their
award with clerk; parties could, if they

wished award to have force and effect of
judgment, file award with clerk. Richards
v. Smith, 33 U. 8, 91 P. 683,

78-31-21. Judgment—Force and effect.—The judgment or decree so
entered and docketed shall have the same force and effect in all respects
as, and shall be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment
or decree; and it may be enforced as if it had been rendered in the court
in which it is entered.
History: L. 1951, di. 58, § 1 ; 0. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-2L
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-21 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award^=»82.
6 C.J.8. Arbitration §§ 97, 148.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 642, Arbitration
Award § 166.

and

Award or decision by arbitrators as
precluding return of case to or its reconsideration by them, 104 A. L. B. 710.

78-31-22. Appeals.—An appeal may be taken from the final judgment
or decree entered by the court.
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-31-22.
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-36-22 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
Order as appealable.
Order of court in arbitration case, setting aside award and ordering new hearing without order for resubmission but
also affirmatively ordering plaintiffs and
interveners to present their claims for
damages to receiver of defendant corpo-

ration, held final and appealable order
within C.L. 1907, §§ 3230 and 3300. Bivans
v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co.,
53 U. 601, 174 P. 1126.
Collateral References.
Arbitration and Award^=>73.
6 C.J.8. Arbitration § 161 et seq.
5 Am. Jur. 2d 626, Arbitration
Award § 145.

and

Appealability of judgment confirming or
setting aside arbitration award, 7 A. L. B.
3d 608.

C H A P T E R 32
CONTEMPT
Section 78-32-1.
78-32-2.
78-32-3.
78-32-4.

78-32-5.
78-32-6.
78-32-7.
78-32-8.
78-32-9.
78-32-10.
78-32-11.
78-32-12.
78-32-13.
78-32-14.
78-32-15.
78-32-16.

Acts and omissions constituting contempt.
Re-entry after eviction from real property.
In immediate presence of court; summary action—Without immediate
presence; procedure.
Warrant of arrest, commitment or order to show cause may issue.
Bail.
Duty of sheriff.
Bail bond—FormOfficer's return.
Hearing.
Judgment.
Damages to party aggrieved.
Imprisonment to compel performance.
Procedure when party charged fails to appear.
Excuse for nonappearance—Unnecessary restraint forbidden.
Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer.
Procedure.
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CHAPTER 31
ARBITRATION
78-31-1.

Written agreement for, etc.

Constitutionality.
The amendment of this section to permit
valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration of future disputes does not violate
Art. I, § 11, Art. I, § 7, nor Art. VI, § 28 of the
state Constitution. Lindon City v. Engineers
Constr. Co. (1981) 636 P 2d 1070.
Municipal corporations.
Absent a statutory prohibition, a municipal corporation has the power to submit to
arbitration any claim asserted by or against

it; the application of this section to permit
valid and enforceable agreements for future
disputes where one party was a municipal
corporation did not violate Art. VI, §28 of
the state Constitution. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co. (1981) 636 P 2d 1070.
Law Reviews.
Alternatives to the Tort System for the
Nonmedical Professions: Can They Do the
Job?, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 57.

CHAPTER 32
CONTEMPT
78-32-1.

Acts and omissions constituting contempt.

Cross-References.
Defense costs in criminal actions, contempt
based on failure of convicted defendant to
pay, 77-32a-7 to 77-32a-12.
Disobedience of district court order by
city court.
City court judge was not in contempt for
failing to comply with a judgment of the district court where that order was not served
upon him by writ, but was returned to the
city court together with other papers in the
78-32-2.

bindings of fact required.
To justify a finding of contempt and the
imposition of a jail sentence, there must be
ihade written findings of fact and judgment
Supported by clear and convincing proof that
the party knew what was required of him,
^nd having the ability to comply, willfully
^nd knowingly failed and refused to do so.
Thomas v. Thomas (1977) 569 P 2d 1119.

Re-entry after eviction from *eal property.

Separate mortgages foreclosed in single
action.
Where two parcels of realty, subject to separate mortgages executed by the same mortgagor to the same mortgagee, were foreclosed
in the same action with judgment being
awarded for a combined amount, and the evidence established that one of the parcels was
offered and sold separately at the foreclosure
sa)e and that the other parcel remained
unsold, it was error for trial court to apply
the sale price against the combined amount
78-32-9.

file on order of remand. State v. Giles (1978)
576 P 2d 876.

Awarded in the foreclosure judgment and
3 ward a deficiency judgment for the remaining balance; if the sale price was less than
the portion of the foreclosure judgment, plus
costs, secured by the sold parcel, a deficiency
Judgment could have been awarded for such
difference; however, before deficiency judgment could be entered with respect to the
Unsold parcel, such parcel would have to be
Sold and the proceeds applied against the
indebtedness and costs secured thereby.
Sawden & Associates v Smith (1982) 646 P
2d 711.

Hearing.

Rights of one charged with contempt.
In a prosecution for contempt, not committed in the presence of the court, due process

of law requires that the person charged be
advised of the nature of the action against
him, have assistance of counsel, if requested.
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Lien of attorney and discharge thereof.
Where attorney's fee has been allowed
by court in foreclosure suit, and amount
of fee has been adjudicated and made
part of judgment, attorney has interest
in judgment and lien thereon to extent
of amount allowed, and lien cannot be
discharged by payment to anyone except
attorney who, to amount of lien, is deemed
equitable assignee of judgment. Gray v.
Denhalter, 17 U. 312, 53 P. 976, applying
Laws 1894, ch. 29, p. 25.
Necessity that court determine and fix fee.
Under this section it is error for the
court to fix a 10% attorney's fee without
determining whether it is a reasonable
one. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320,
145 P. 1036, applying C. L. 1907, §§ 3504,
3505.
Under this section, the trial court cannot
escape the responsibility of determining
and declaring what amount shall be allowed as an attorney's fee despite any
stipulation of the parties upon that sub]ect
contained in either note or mortgage. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036,
applying C. L. 1907, §§ 3504, 3505.
Purpose.
Statute was enacted to pi event division
of fees provided for in mortgage between
attorney and mortgagee and to allow only
such reasonable attorney's fees to be taxed
against defendant as were actually agreed
to be paid, or were paid, for attorney's
services. McClure v. Little, 15 U. 379, 49

P. 298, 62 Am. St. Rep. 938, construing
Laws 1894, ch. 39, p. 25.
This section was adopted to protect
debtors against being required to pay
excessive attorney's fees in foreclosure
suits. It was not, however, intended that
personal actions upon notes should be
affected. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320,
145 P. 1036, construing C. L. 1907, §§ 3504,
3505.
"Seasonable" fee.
This section contemplates a reasonable
sum as an attorney's fee, independently
of provisions of note or mortgage. By a
"reasonable fee," is meant one which is
reasonable under the facts and circumstances of each case, which must depend
upon the amount in controversy, the labor
and the responsibility imposed upon the
attorney in obtaining judgment. A smaller
fee would be more reasonable in a default
case than in a contested one. Jensen v.
Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036, construing C. L. 1907, §§ 3504, 3505.
Collateral References.
MortgagesO=>581(5).
59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 812.
55 Am. Jur. 2d 590 et seq., Mortgages
§ 625 et seq.
Attorney's compensation in absence of
contract or statute fixing amount, 57 A. L.
R. 3d 475.
Attorney's fees in matters involving real
property mortgages and deeds of trust,
58 A. L. R. 3d 215.

CHAPTER 38
NUISANCE, WASTE, AND OTHER DAMAGE
Section 78-38-1.
78-38-2.
78-38-3.
78-38-4.

"Nuisance" defined—Right of action for—Judgment.
Right of action for waste—Damages.
Right of action for injuries to trees—Damage.
Limited damages in certain cases.

78-38-1. "Nuisance" defined—Right of action for—Judgment.—Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses,
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the
subject of an action. Such action may be brought by any person whose
property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened
by nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or
abated, and damages may also be recovered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-38-1.

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-56-1 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, §3.
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Form and certainty.
A judgment or decree was to be in
plain and intelligible language; the property which was the subiect of judgment
was to be described with sufficient certainty to leave its identity free from
doubt. Smith v. Phillips, 6 U. 376, 23 P.
932; City of Springville v. Holley, 6 U.
378, 23 P. 933.
Where statute did not require judgment to be in any particular form, ordinarily judgment was sufficient if by use
of proper language it was stated what
prevailing party was to receive and what
losing party was required to do, pay, or
discharge. Robinson v. Salt Lake City,
37 U. 520, 109 P 817.
Judgment for "the sum of 242.98" was
sufficients ceitain. Snow v. West, 37 XJ.
528, 110 P. 52.
Fact that judgment read "defendant,"
instead of "defendants," was not fatal,
since such irregularity was not matter of
jurisdiction so as to make judgment void.
Higgs v. Burton, 58 U. 99, 197 P. 728.
No particular form or words was essential to constitute a ludgment, provided
they were such as to indicate with reasonable certainty a final determination of the
rights of theparties and the relief granted
or denied. But in order that the document
be a judgment it had to be sufficiently
definite and certain as to be susceptible
of enforcement; it had to specify the
relief granted or denied; it had to
determine the rights of the parties, and
describe the parties for or against whom
it was rendered. If it did not order, adjudge, or decree anything, it had not even
the first essential requisite of a judgment.
Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 U. 563, 276 P.
159.
Judgment in favor of one not a party.
In the absence of a court order substituting the person in whose favor judgment was finally rendered for the orig-

Rule 54(b)

inal party, judgment would be reversed,
because there was, in effect, no judgment
in the case. Lowell v. Parkinson, 4 U.
64, 6 P. 58, applying Civil Practice Act
of 1870.
Orders distinguished.
Order was decision of a motion, while
judgment was decision of trial. Cox v.
Dixie Power Co., 81 U. 94, 16 P. 2d 916.
Order granting restitution of moneys
collected on execution after motion for
new trial was granted, made without notice or hearing, did not have effect of
binding judgment. Cox v. Dixie Power
Co., 81 U. 94, 16 P. 2d 916.
Validation of invalid judgment by statute.
Legislature could not validate void
judgments but where court had jurisdiction of subject matter of suit and of person of defendant, legislature could validate judgment which was defective for
omission of some essential step which legislature had right to dispense with. In
re Christiensen's Estate, 17 U. 412, 53 P.
1003, 41 L. B. A. 504, 70 Am. St. Rep. 794.
What are "judgments."
An order of a district court, on appeal
from probate court, refusing to confirm
sale of decedent's real estate, was not a
"judgment." In re Estate of Gibbs, 4 U.
97, 6 P. 525.
A verdict could not be regarded as a
judgment. Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 U.
563, 276 P. 159.
A document denominated "Judgment on
Verdict," which had not even the first
essential requisite of a judgment, was not
appealable. Such a document, when filed
in the clerk's office, was no more than an
order for a judgment, or an order directing the clerk to enter and docket a judgment nunc pro tunc. Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 U. 563, 276 P. 159.

(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims And/Or Involving Multiple
Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
ant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and
Compiler's Notes.
Rule 54(b) was amended by the Su- cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and
counterclaim would be subject, on remand,
preme Court effective May 21, 1976. The
amendment inserted references to multiple to revision since all claims presented had
not been adjudicated and since trial court
parties and to adjudication of rights and
liabilities of all the parties; and made made no express determination as required
by this section. M. & S. Constr. & Engiminor changes in phraseology.
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 54(b), neering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 IT.
(2d) 139, 467 P. 2d 410.
except for its substitution of "and/or"
for "or" after "third-party claim," and
its insertion of "by the court" after "ex- Collateral References.
Judgment in favor of less than all
press determination," both in the first
parties to contract as bar to action
sentence.
against other parties, 3 A. L. R. 124.
Gross-Reference.
Operation and effect of Rule 54(b)
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, governing entry of judgment on multiple
claims, 38 A. L. R. 2d 377.
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 62(h).
Right to judgment, levy or lien against
Absence of express determination.
individual in action under statute permitting persons associated in business
In action based on alleged breach of
loan agreement, where trial court improp- under a common name to be sued in that
name, 100 A. L. R. 997.
erly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with prejudice and granted defendDECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Affirmance of joint judgment as to one
party, reversal as to another.
Supreme Court could affirm a joint
judgment as to one appellant and reverse
it as to another unless in doing so injustice resulted to party against whom judgment was affirmed. Sweatman v. Linton,
66 U. 208, 241 P. 309, distinguished in 86
U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, 86 U. 522, 46 P.
2d 672.

Joint obligations.
In suit on joint contract, recovery could
be had against one or the other, or both,
of the defendants. Ruffati v. Societe
Anonyme Des Mines De Lexington, 10 U.
386, 37 P. 591.

(c) Demand for Judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a p a r t y against whom a judgment is
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the p a r t y in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the p a r t y has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the
case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side
as between or among themselves.
(2) J u d g m e n t by Default. A judgment by default shall not be
different in kind from, or exceed in amount, t h a t specifically prayed for
in the demand for judgment.
Compiler's Notes.
quantum meruit or other theory, since a
This Rule is similar in substance to Fed. defendant must be extended every reasonable opportunity to meet an adversary's
Rule 54(e), but differs from it in text.
claim. Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 U.
Application.
(2d) 175, 264 P. 2d 279.
A party must not be prejudiced in any
One cannot recover on an implied contract where he pleads and attempts to way by the introduction of new issues, but
prove an express contract, seeking no where a partnership issue was raised at
amendment of his pleading, demanding no the trial, was not objected to by defendrelief under and urging no claim under a ant, and both sides went into facts of the
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JUDGMENT
(b) Amendment.
Abandonment of motion.
Party must be deemed to have abandoned
its motion to amend a particular finding, when
it permitted trial court to enter a final order
denying its written motion to amend without

Rule 54(d)

securing a ruling on its claimed pending motion
to amend the particular finding. Zions First
Nat. Bank v. C'est Bon Venture (1980) 613 P
2d 515.

RULE 53
MASTERS
(e)

Report.

(2) In Nonjury Actions.
Failure to object.
One who made no objection to master's report as required by this subdivision could not

question the report for the first time on appeal
from district court order adopting the master's
findings. Score v. Wilson (1980) 611 P 2d 367.

PART VII
Judgment
RULE 54
JUDGMENT; COSTS
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims, etc.
dant's motion to dismiss, thus leaving the parDenial of motion to dismiss.
This rule does not necessarily mean there is ties in court, then entered an order that such
a final judgment merely because the court's denial was a final judgment. Little v. Mitchell
order so recites; there was in fact no final (1979) 604 P 2d 918.
judgment where the trial court denied defen(c) Demand for Judgment.
(2) Judgment by Default.
Attorney fees and costs.
District court's award of attorney fees in excess of the fees demanded in the complaint and
of costs where no costs were demanded was
proper where the proof at trial showed the
party entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope
(1978) 589 P 2d 752.

(d) Costs.
Depositions.
Defendant was not entitled to the cost of
taking depositions where the depositions were
not used at trial and there was no evidence
presented that they were necessarily incurred
for the preparation of defendant's case. Nelson
v. Newman (1978) 583 P 2d 601.
Memorandum of costs filed before judgment.
Where memorandum of costs if filed before
judgment, and costs in specific amounts are
awarded in that judgment, then a party may
move to alter or amend the costs in the judgment under Rule 59 and the time limits contained therein, and is not limited to challenge

Nature of relief sought.
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was defective because of the nature of relief sought
even though it did not demand judgment for
personal liability on contract and judgment
was granted for such personal liability, since
this rule provides that a judgment shall grant
the relief to which a party is entitled even
though it is not demanded. Motivated Management International v. Finney (1979) 604 P
2d 467.
ing the costs under the procedure of this rule.
Nelson v. Newman (1978) 583 P 2d 601.
Objection to costs claimed.
Defendant waived any error as to the costs
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited
23 days after filing of cost bill filing any objection. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe (1978) 576 P
2d 847.
Statutory limits.
Award of costs in excess of those expressly
allowed by statute for service of subpoena,
witness fees and preparation of model, photographs and certified copies of documents was
improper even though the costs represented
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American Arbitration Association
For the Submission
of existing disputes:We, the undersigned parties, hereby agree to
submit to arbitration under the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association the following controversy: (cite briefly J. We further agree that the
above controversy be submitted to (one) (three)
Arbitrators) selected from the panels of Arbitrators of the American Arbitration Association. We further agree that we will faithfully
observe this agreement and the Rules and that
we will abide by and perform any award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) and that a judgment
of the Court having jurisdiction may be entered
upon the award.

Arbitration is the voluntary submission of a dispute
to a disinterested person or persons for final determination. And to achieve orderly, economical and
expeditious arbitration, in accordance with federal
and state laws, the American Arbitration Association is available to administer arbitration cases
under various specialized rules.
The American Arbitration Association maintains
throughout the United States a National Panel of
Arbitrators consisting of experts in all trades and
professions. By arranging for arbitration under the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, parties
may obtain the services of arbitrators who are familiar with the construction industry.
The American Arbitration Association shall establish and maintain as members of its National Panel
of Arbitrators individuals competent to hear and
determine disputes administered under the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. The Association shall consider for appointment to the Construction Industry Panel persons recommended by
the National Construction Industry Arbitration
Committee as qualified to serve by virtue of their
experience in the construction field.

Standard Arbitration Clause
Parties may refer to these Rules in their contracts. For this purpose, the following clause
may be used:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof shall
be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrators) may be entered in any Court having
jurisdiction thereof

The Association does not act as arbitrator. Its function is to administer arbitrations in accordance
with the agreement of the parties and to maintain
Panels from which arbitrators may be chosen by
parties. Once designated, the arbitrator decides the
issues and an award isfinaland binding.
When an agreement to arbitrate is written into a
construction contract, it may expedite peaceful
settlement without the necessity of going to arbitration at all. Thus, the arbitration clause is a form
of insurance against loss of good will.
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Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules
1. Agreement of Parties
The parties shall be deemed to have made these
Rules a part of their arbitration agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration under the
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. These
Rules and any amendment thereof shall apply in
the form obtaining at the time the arbitration is initiated.
2. Name of Tribunal
Any Tribunal constituted by the parties for the
settlement of their dispute under these Rules shall
be called the Construction Industry Arbitration
Tribunal, hereinafter called the Tribunal.
3. Administrator
When parties agree to arbitrate under these Rules,
or when they provide for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association, hereinafter called
AAA, and an arbitration is initiated hereunder,
they thereby constitute AAA the administrator of
the arbitration. The authority and duties of the
administrator are prescribed in the agreement of
the parties and in these Rules.
4. Delegation of Duties
The duties of the AAA under these Rules may be
carried out through Tribunal Administrators, or
such other officers or committees as the AAA may
direct.
5. National Panel of Arbitrators
In cooperation with the National Construction
Industry Arbitration Committee, the AAA shall
establish and maintain a National Panel of Construction Arbitrators, hereinafter called the Panel,
and shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators therefrom as hereinafter provided. A neutral arbitrator
selected by mutual choice of both parties or their
appointees, or appointed by the AAA, is herein5

after called the arbitrator, whereas an arbitrator
selected unilaterally by one party is hereinafter
called the party-appointed arbitrator. The term
arbitrator may hereinafter be used to refer to one
arbitrator or to a Tribunal of multiple arbitrators.
6. Office of Tribunal
The general office of a Tribunal is the headquarters
of the AAA, which may, however, assign the administration of an arbitration to any of its Regional Offices.
7. Initiation under an Arbitration Provision in a Contract
Arbitration under an arbitration provision in a contract shall be initiated in the following manner:
The initiating party shall, within the time specified
by the contract, if any, file with the other party a
notice of an intention to arbitrate (Demand), which
notice shall contain a statement setting forth the
nature of the dispute, the amount involved, and
the remedy sought; and shall file three copies of
said notice with any Regional Office of the AAA,
together with three copies of the arbitration provisions of the contract and the appropriate filing
fee as provided in Section 48 hereunder.
The AAA shall give notice of such filing to the
other party. A party upon whom the demand for
arbitration is made may file an answering statement in duplicate with the AAA within seven days
after notice from the AAA, simultaneously sending a copy to the other party. If a monetary claim
is made in the answer the appropriate administrative fee provided in the Fee Schedule shall be forwarded to the AAA with the answer. If no answer
isfiledwithin the stated time, it will be treated as
a denial of the claim. Failure to file an answer shall
not operate to delay the arbitration.

after the arbitrator is appointed no new or different claim or counterclaim may be submitted without the arbitrator's consent.
9. Initiation under a Submission
Parties to any existing dispute may commence an
arbitration under these Rules byfilingat any Regional Office two copies of a written agreement to
arbitrate under these Rules (Submission), signed
by the parties. It shall contain a statement of the
matter in dispute, the amount of money involved,
and the remedy sought, together with the appropriatefilingfee as provided in the Fee Schedule.
10. Pre-Hearing Conference
At the request of the parties or at the discretion of
the AAA a pre-hearing conference with the administrator and the parties or their counsel will be
scheduled in appropriate cases to arrange for an
exchange of information and the stipulation of uncontested facts so as to expedite the arbitration
proceedings.
11. Fixing of Locale
The parties may mutually agree on the locale where
the arbitration is to be held. If any party requests
that the hearing be held in a specific locale and the
other party files no objection thereto within seven
days after notice of the request is mailed to such
party, the locale shall be the one requested. If a
party objects to the locale requested by the other
party, the AAA shall have power to determine the
locale and its decision shall befinaland binding.
12. Qualifications of Arbitrator
Any arbitrator appointed pursuant to Section 13
or Section 15 shall be neutral, subject to disqualification for the reasons specified in Section 19. If
the agreement of the parties names an arbitrator or
specifies any other method of appointing an arbitrator, or if the parties specifically agree in writing,
such arbitrator shall not be subject to disqualification for said reasons.

8. Change of Claim or Counterclaim
After filing of the claim or counterclaim, if either
party desires to make any new or different claim
or counterclaim, same shall be made in writing and
filed with the AAA, and a copy thereof shall be
mailed to the other party who shall have a period
of seven days from the date of such mailing within
which to file an answer with the AAA. However,

13. Appointment from Panel
If the parties have not appointed an arbitrator and
have not provided any other method of appointment, the arbitrator shall be appointed in the following manner: Immediately after thefilingof the
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Demand or Submission, the AAA shall submit simultaneously to each party to the dispute an identical list of names of persons chosen from the Panel.
Each party to the dispute shall have seven days
from the mailing date in which to cross off any
names to which it objects, number the remaining
names to indicate the order of preference, and return the list to the AAA. If a party does not return
the list within the time specified, all persons named
therein shall be deemed acceptable. From among
the persons who have been approved on both lists,
and in accordance with the designated order of
mutual preference, the AAA shall invite the acceptance of an arbitrator to serve. If the parties fail to
agree upon any of the persons named, or if acceptable arbitrators are unable to act, or if for any
other reason the appointment cannot be made
from the submitted lists, the AAA shall have the
power to make the appointment from other members of the Panel without the submission of any
additional lists.
14. Direct Appointment by Parties
If the agreement of the parties names an arbitrator
or specifies a method of appointing an arbitrator,
that designation or method shall be followed. The
notice of appointment, with name and address of
such arbitrator, shall befiledwith the AAA by the
appointing party. Upon the request of any such
appointing party, the AAA shall submit a list of
members of the Panel from which the party may
make the appointment.
If the agreement specifies a period of time within
which an arbitrator shall be appointed, and any
party fails to make such appointment within that
period, the AAA shall make the appointment.
If no period of time is specified in the agreement,
the AAA shall notify the parties to make the appointment, and if within seven days after mailing
of such notice such arbitrator has not been so appointed, the AAA shall make the appointment.
15. Appointment of Arbitrator by PartyAppointed Arbitrators
If the parties have appointed their party-appointed
arbitrators or if either or both of them have been
appointed as provided in Section 14, and have au8

thorized such arbitrator to appoint an arbitrator
within a specified time and no appointment is made
within such time or any agreed extension thereof,
the AAA shall appoint an arbitrator who shall act
as Chairperson.
If no period of time is specified for appointment
of the third arbitrator and the party-appointed arbitrators do not make the appointment within seven
days from the date of the appointment of the last
party-appointed arbitrator, the AAA shall appoint
the arbitrator who shall act as Chairperson.
If the parties have agreed that their party-appointed
arbitrators shall appoint the arbitrator from the
Panel, the AAA shall furnish to the party-appointed
arbitrators, in the manner prescribed in Section 13,
a list selected from the Panel, and the appointment
of the arbitrator shall be made as prescribed in
such Section.
16. Nationality of Arbitrator in International Arbitration
If one of the parties is a national or resident of a
country other than the United States, the arbitrator shall, upon the request of either party, be appointed from among the nationals of a country
other than that of any of the parties.
17. Number of Arbitrators
If the arbitration agreement does not specify the
number of arbitrators, the dispute shall be heard
and determined by one arbitrator, unless the AAA,
in its discretion, directs that a greater number of
arbitrators be appointed.
18. Notice to Arbitrator of Appointment
Notice of the appointment of the arbitrator, whether mutually appointed by the parties or appointed
by the AAA, shall be mailed to the arbitrator by
the AAA, together with a copy of these Rules, and
the signed acceptance of the arbitrator shall be filed
prior to the opening of the first hearing.
19. Disclosure and Challenge Procedure
A person appointed as neutral arbitrator shall disclose to the AAA any circumstances likely to affect his or her impartiality, including any bias or
anyfinancialor personal interest in the result of
9

the arbitration or any past or present relationship
with the parties or their counsel. Upon receipt of
such information from such arbitrator or other
source, the AAA shall communicate such information to the parties and, if it deems it appropriate
to do so, to the arbitrator and others. Thereafter,
the AAA shall determine whether the arbitrator
should be disqualified and shall inform the parties
of its decision, which shall be conclusive.
20. Vacancies
If any arbitrator should resign, die, withdraw, refuse, be disqualified or be unable to perform the
duties of office, the AAA shall, on proof satisfactory to it, declare the office vacant. Vacancies shall
be filled in accordance with the appUcable provision
of these Rules. In the event of a vacancy in a panel
of neutral arbitrators, the remaining arbitrator or
arbitrators may continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy, unless the parties
agree otherwise.
21. Time and Place
The arbitrator shall fix the time and place for each
hearing. The AAA shall mail to each party notice
thereof at least five days in advance, unless the parties by mutual agreement waive such notice or modify the terms thereof.
22. Representation by Counsel
Any party may be represented by counsel. A party
intending to be so represented shall notify the
other party and the AAA of the name and address
of counsel at least three days prior to the date set
for the hearing at which counsel is first to appear.
When an arbitration is initiated by counsel, or
where an attorney replies for the other party, such
notice is deemed to have been given.
23. Stenographic Record
The AAA shall make the necessary arrangements
for the taking of a stenographic record whenever
such record is requested by a party. The requesting
party or parties shall pay the cost of such record as
provided in Section 50.

of one or both parties, who shall assume the cost
of such services.
2 5 . Attendance at Hearings
Persons having a direct interest in the arbitration
are entitled to attend hearings. The arbitrator shall
otherwise have the power to require the retirement
of any witness or witnesses during the testimony
of other witnesses. It shall be discretionary with
the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the
attendance of any other persons.
26. Adjournments
The arbitrator may adjourn the hearing, and must
take such adjournment when all of the parties agree
thereto.
27. Oaths
Before proceeding with the first hearing or with
the examination of the file, each arbitrator may
take an oath of office, and if required by law, shall
do so. The arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath administered by any duly qualified
person or, if required by law or demanded by either party, shall do so.
28. Majority Decision
Whenever there is more than one arbitrator, all decisions of the arbitrators must be by at least a majority. The award must also be made by at least a
majority unless the concurrence of all is expressly
required by the arbitration agreement or by law.
29. Order of Proceedings
A hearing shall be opened by the filing of the oath
of the arbitrator, where required, and by the recording of the place, time, and date of the hearing, the
presence of the arbitrator and parties, and counsel,
if any, and by the receipt by the arbitrator of the
statement of the claim and answer, if any.
The arbitrator may, at the beginning of the hearing,
ask for statements clarifying the issues involved.

24. Interpreter
The AAA shall make the necessary arrangements
for the services of an interpreter upon the request

The complaining party shall then present its claims,
proofs and witnesses, who shall submit to questions
or other examination. The defending party shall
then present its defenses, proofs and witnesses, who
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shall submit to questions or other examination.
The arbitrator may vary this procedure but shall
afford full and equal opportunity to the parties for
the presentation of any material or relevant proofs.
Exhibits, when offered by either party, may be
received in evidence by the arbitrator.
The names and addresses of all witnesses and exhibits in order received shall be made a party of
the record.
30. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party
Unless the law provides to the contrary, the arbitration may proceed in the absence of any party, who,
after due notice, fails to be present or fails to obtain an adjournment. An award shall not be made
solely on the default of a party. The arbitrator shall
require the party who is present to submit such
evidence as deemed necessary for the making of an
award.
31. Evidence
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire
and shall produce such additional evidence as the
arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. An arbitrator authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon the request of any party,
or independently. The arbitator shall be the judge
of the admissibility of the evidence offered and
conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be
necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence
of all of the arbitrators and all of the parties, except
where any of the parties is absent in default or has
waived his or her right to be present.
32. Evidence by Affidavit and Filing of
Documents
The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit, giving it such
weight as seems appropriate after consideration of
any objections made to its admission.

33. Inspection or Investigation
An arbitrator finding it necessary to make an inspection or investigation in connection with the
arbitration shall direct the AAA to so advise the
parties. The arbitrator shall set the time and the
AAA shall notify the parties thereof. Any party
who so desires may be present at such inspection
or investigation. In the event that one or both parties are not present at the inspection or investigation, the arbitrator shall make a verbal or written
report to the parties and afford them an opportunity to comment.
34. Conservation of Property
The arbitrator may issue such orders as may be
deemed necessary to safeguard the property which
is the subject matter of the arbitration without
prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final
determination of the dispute.
35. Closing of Hearings
The arbitrator shall specifically inquire of the parties whether they have any further proofs to offer
or witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative
replies, the arbitrator shall declare the hearings
closed and a minute thereof shall be recorded. If
briefs are to be filed, the hearings shall be declared
closed as of the final date set by the arbitrator for
the receipt of briefs. If documents are to befiledas
provided for in Section 32 and the date set for their
receipt is later than that set for the receipt of briefs,
the later date shall be the date of closing the hearing. The time limit within which the arbitrator is
required to make an award shall commence to run,
in the absence of other agreements by the parties,
upon the closing of the hearings.

All documents not filed with the arbitrator at the
hearing, but arranged for at the hearing or subsequently by agreement of the parties, shall be filed
with the AAA for transmission to the arbitrator.
All parties shall be afforded opportunity to examine such documents.

36. Reopening of Hearings
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at
will, or upon application of a party at any time before the award is made. If the reopening of the hearing would prevent the making of the award within
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the
contract out of which the controversy has arisen,
the matter may not be reopened, unless the parties
agree upon the extension of such time limit. When
no specific date isfixedin the contract, the arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the arbitrator
shall have thirty days from the closing of the reopened hearings within which to make an award.
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37. Waiver of Oral Hearings
The parties may provide, by written agreement, for
the waiver of oral hearings. If the parties are unable to agree as to the procedure, the AAA shall
specify a fair and equitable procedure.
38. Waiver of Rules
Any party who proceeds with the arbitration after
knowledge that any provision or requirement of
these Rules has not been complied with and who
fails to state an objection thereto in writing, shall
be deemed to have waived the right to object.
39. Extensions of Time
The parties may modify any period of time by
mutual agreement. The AAA for good cause may
extend any period of time established by these
Rules, except the time for making the award. The
AAA shall notify the parties of any such extension
of time and its reason therefor.
40. Communication with Arbitrator and
Serving of Notices
There shall be no communication between the parties and an arbitrator other than at oral hearings.
Any other oral or written communications from
the parties to the arbitrator shall be directed to the
AAA for transmittal to the arbitrator.
Each party to an agreement which provides for arbitration under these Rules shall be deemed to have
consented that any papers, notices or process necessary or proper for the initiation or continuation
of an arbitration under these Rules and for any
court action in connection therewith or for the
entry of judgment on any award made thereunder
maybe served upon such party by mail addressed to
such party or its attorney at the last known address or by personal service, within or without the
state wherein the arbitration is to be held (whether
such party be within or without the United States
of America), provided that reasonable opportunity
to be heard with regard thereto has been granted
such party.

toi and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or
specified by law, not later than thirty days from
the date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings
have been waived, from the date of transmitting
the final statements and proofs to the arbitrator.
42. Form of Award
The award shall be in writing and shall be signed
either by the sole arbitrator or by at least a majority if there be more than one. It shall be executed
in the manner required by law.
43. Scope of Award
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
which is just and equitable and within the terms of
the agreement of the parties. The arbitrator, in the
award, shall assess arbitration fees and expenses as
provided in Sections 48 and 50 equally or in favor
of any party and, in the event any administrative
fees or expenses are due the AAA, in favor of the
AAA.
44. Award upon Settlement
If the parties settle their dispute during the course
of the arbitration, the arbitrator, upon their request, may set forth the terms of the agreed settlement in an award.
45. Delivery of Award to Parties
Parties shall accept as legal delivery of the award
the placing of the award or a true copy thereof in
the mail by the AAA, addressed to such party at
its last known address or to its attorney, or personal service of the award, or the filing of the award
in any manner which may be prescribed by law.
46. Release of Documents for Judicial Proceedings
The AAA shall, upon the written request of a party furnish to such party, at its expense, certified
facsimiles of any papers in the AAA's possession
that may be required in judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration.

41. Time of Award
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitra-

47. Applications to Court
No judicial proceedings by a party relating to the
subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a
waiver of the party's right to arbitrate.
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The AAA is not a necessary party in judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration.
Parties to these Rules shall be deemed to have consented that judgment upon the award rendered by
the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Federal or
State Court having jurisdiction thereof.
48. Administrative Fees
As a not-for-profit organization, the AAA shall
prescribe an administrative fee schedule and a
refund schedule to compensate it for the cost of
providing administrative services. The schedule in
effect at the time of filing or the time of refund
shall be applicable.
The administrative fees shall be advanced by the
initiating party or parties in accordance with the
administrative fee schedule, subject to final apportionment by the arbitrator in the award.
When a matter is withdrawn or settled, the refund
shall be made in accordance with the refund schedule.
The AAA, in the event of extreme hardship on the
part of any party, may defer or reduce the administrative fee.
49. Fee when Oral Hearings are Waived
Where all oral hearings are waived under Section
37 the Administrative Fee Schedule shall apply.
50. Expenses
The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be
paid by the party producing such witnesses.
The cost of the stenographic record, if any is made,
and all transcripts thereof, shall be prorated equally between the parties ordering copies, unless they
shall otherwise agree, and shall be paid for by the
responsible parties directly to the reporting agency.
All other expenses of the arbitration, including required traveling and other expenses of the arbitrator and of AAA representatives, and the expenses
of any witness or the cost of any proofs produced
at the direct request of the arbitrator, shall be
borne equally by the parties, unless they agree
16

otherwise, or unless the arbitrator in the award assesses such expenses or any part thereof against
any specified party or parties.
51. Arbitrator's Fee
Unless the parties agree to terms of compensation,
members of the National Panel of Construction
Arbitrators will serve without compensation for
the first two days of service.
Thereafter, compensation shall be based upon the
amount of service involved and the number of hearings. An appropriate daily rate and other arrangements will be discussed by the administrator with
the parties and the arbitrator(s). If the parties fail
to agree to the terms of compensation, an appropriate rate shall be established by the AAA, and
communicated in writing to the parties.
Any arrangement for the compensation of an arbitrator shall be made through the AAA and not directly by the arbitrator with the parties. The terms
of compensation of neutral arbitrators on a Tribunal shall be identical.
52. Deposits
The AAA may require the parties to deposit in advance such sums of money as it deems necessary to
defray the expense of the arbitration, including
the arbitrator's fee if any, and shall render an accounting to the parties and return any unexpended
balance.
53. Interpretation and Application of
Rules
The arbitrator shall interpret and apply these Rules
insofar as they relate to the arbitrator's powers
and duties. When there is more than one arbitrator
and a difference arises among them concerning the
meaning or application of any such Rules, it shall
be decided by a majority vote. If that is unobtainable, either an arbitrator or a party may refer the
question to the AAA for final decision. All other
Rules shall be interpreted and applied by the AAA.
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ADMINISTRATIVE F E E SCHEDULE
A filing fee of $200 will be paid at the time the
case is initiated.
The balance of the administrative fee of the AAA
is based upon the amount of each claim and counterclaim as disclosed when the claim and counterclaim are filed, and is due and payable prior to the
notice of appointment of the neutral arbitrator.
In those claims and counterclaims which are not
for a monetary amount, an appropriate administrative fee will be determined by the AAA, payable prior to such notice of appointment.
Fee for Claim
or Counterclaim

Amount of Claim
or Counterclaim

3% (minimum $200)
$ 600, plus 2% of excess
over $20,000
$40,000 to $80,000
$1,000, plus 1% of excess
over $40,000
$80,000 to 160,000
$1,400, plus Vi% of excess
over $80,000
$160,000 to $5,000,000
$ 1,800, plus lA% of excess
over $160,000
Where the claim or counterclaim exceeds $5 million,
an appropriate fee will be determined by the AAA.
If there are more than two parties represented in
the arbitration, an additional 10% of the administrative fee will be due for each additional represented party.
$1 to $20,000
$20,000 to $40,000

OTHER SERVICE CHARGES
$50 payable by a party causing an adjournment of
any scheduled hearing;
$100 payable by a party causing a second or additional adjournment of any scheduled hearing;
$50 payable by each party for each second and
subsequent hearing which is either clerked by the
AAA or held in a hearing room provided by the
AAA.

REFUND SCHEDULE
If the AAA is notified that a case has been settled
or withdrawn before it mails a notice of appointment of a neutral arbitrator, all of the fee in excess
of $200 will be refunded.
If the AAA is notified that a case is settled or withdrawn thereafter but at least 48 hours before the
date and time set for the first hearing, one-third of
the fee in excess of $200 will be refunded.

When no amount can be stated at the time of filing,
the administrative fee is $500, subject to adjustment in accordance with the schedule as soon as
an amount can be disclosed.
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